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documentation and  information In  addition  to  the  official  acts published  in  the Official 
Gazette  of  the  European  Communities,  the  activities  of 
the European Communities  are reported on  in publications 
appearing  at regular  intervals. 
Thus, the Commission of the European Communities publ-
ishes a  Monthly Bulletin on  the activities of the Communi-
ties  while  the  European  Parliament  issues  a  periodical 
Information Bulletin on its own activities. 
The Council of Ministers issues a  press release after all 
its sessions. Its activities are also reported on  in  a  spe-
cial section  of the Bulletin of the European Communities. 
The Survey of European Documentation is intended to serve 
as a  supplement to  the  above publications.  It deals with 
salient  features  of  the  process  of  European  integration 
taking place outside Community bodies. I. 
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9/A P a r  t 
DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN  INTEGHATIO~ 
at the National Level 
I.  GOVERNMENTS AND  PARLIAMENTS 
Austria 
Realism about integration policv in Austri:m Go,·ernment circles 
Official circles in Vienna began to adopt a new line after the summer 
recess with regard to relations with the European Economic Communit,·.  This 
is bound up with a more realistic appraisal of the chances for an  arrangr~ment 
with the Community.  Mr.  Otto Mitterer.  Minister of Trade since the beginning 
of the year.  came back to this point on 1 November  196~.  sa~·ing that Austrian 
foreign policy was not geared to illusions but to reality.  This realil\· included 
the fact that Vienna's efforts to conclude an agreement \dth the E EC  had run up 
against obstacles. 
This comment referred mainly to those obstacles that had accumu-
lated because of the precarious internal situation of the European Ecor.omic 
Community as a result of French opposition to every move to enlarge the Com-
munity.  The Italian veto on any link between Brussels and Vienna was also one 
of the obstacles; the hope did,  however.  seem to be thatfurtherprogress oyer 
the South Tyrol issue might perhaps soon remove this difficulty. 
What was not mentioned but lay behind the new Austrian line on 
European policy appeared to be  a different assessment of Austria's room to 
manoevre on foreign policy.  which appears to have been brought about by the 
events in Czechoslovakia.  These events appear to have changed the ideas cur-
rent in Vienna about the possible willingness of the Soviet Union to interpret 
the Central European status quo in a flexible manner.  The crisis in the  Euro-
pean Community, however,  excuses all concerned from discussing the thorny 
issue of Soviet attitudes to an Austrian arrangement with Brussels. It is under-
stood that the question has not recently been tackled by Moscow either. 
- 1 -The customs discrimination against Austrian exports to the EEC has 
in the meantime become too pronouced to be disputed.  The Austrian Govern-
ment appears to want to  pursue a 'small steps' policy more vigorously,  so as 
to secure easier terms for some Austrian exports to the EEC whose position is 
particularly threatened.  The recent visit to Brussels of Mr.  Schleinzer, Min-
ister for Agriculture, comes under this heading. 
Further steps are in preparation.  The Federal Government has 
asked the diplomatic representatives of the Six to sound out the views of the 
Governments concerned about such a policy. It is hoped in this way to prepare 
the basis for a series of requests concerning which it can be assumed with 
some certainty that the six Governments and the Community authorities in Brus-
sels would be prepared to talk. The results would then be discussed at a con-
ference of ambassadors in Vienna.  Some encouragement appears to have been 
drawn from signs that are taken to indicate a certain willingness on the part of 
the French Government to consider Austria's wishes.  These are understood to 
have originated from a discussion between Mr.  Waldheim,  Austrian Foreign 
Minister,  and his colleague Mr.  Debr~ at the United Nations in New York. 
It is stressed in responsible circles that the policy of 'small steps' 
does not mean that Austria wishes to abandon the idea of a comprehensive ar-
rangment with the European Community.  This remains the main, the ultimate 
objective.  This would continue to determine Vienna's attitude on all issues af-
fecting the European Free Trade Area. 
Austria wishes to take part in any moves to promote trade within 
EFTA but will oppose any EFTA proposals or decisions that might restrict it 
in pursuing its policy on the  EEC.  The door to the EEC should be kept open 
and nothing done that might suggest that EFTA was in any way anti-EEC and 
worsen Austria's position vis-a-vis the Six. 
Dr.  Waldheim,  the Foreign Minister,  and Mr.  Mitterer, Minister 
for Trade,  saw new hopes that Austria will  still be able to come to some form 
of economic arrangement with the EEC in the latest proposals put forward by 
Mr.  Debr~. French Foreign Minister,  on customspolicyandtrade agreements 
between EEC States and countries outside the Community. Austria's Foreign 
Ministry would carefully consider what new scope for talks this could open up 
and what improvements might result. 
On 15  November 1968 Dr.  Waldheim warned Austrian industrialists 
against entertaining too high hopes. 'Although a silvery streak is appearing on 
the horizon of European economic integration,  I would caution you against over-
confidence.  It does seem to me significant, however, that the question of trade 
policy arrangements is again being broached in Brussels, because any easing 
- 2-of the hitherto so rigid positions is bound to be iri our interests.' Dr. Waldheim 
added that, both within and outside the EEC, differences of view as to the suit-
ability of trade policy arrangements still existed,  so that the consultations 
agreed on would certainly not prove easy.  Although it was  still not possible to 
determine the full range of the advantages that would follow from the latest 
French proposals, Austria would spare no effort to translate these into reali-
ties as soon as possible. 
Quite apart from the question of accession to the EEC and of co-
operation in politics and other fields,  Austria considered that economic co-
operation in Europe had to be pushed ahead. The nine-point French proposal, 
the plans put forward by Mr.  Brandt, German Foreign Minister,  and the Bene-
lux Memorandum submitted by Mr.  Harmel, Belgian Foreign Minister,  were 
signs of a new development in the EEC; these had led,  the previous week, to a 
meeting in Vienna of the Austrian ambassadors to the EEC capitals at which, 
after searching discussions, it was concluded that if the trade policy arrange-
ment now to be discussed were finalized,  it would be suitable for relievingthe 
burden on Austrian exports. 
The question of European economic integration was also on the 
agenda of the Joint Franco-Austrian Committee's second meeting in Vienna. As 
Mr. Mittererhadtold the Finance and Budget Committee of the Parliament,the 
integration issue called neither for optimism nor for pessimism but for realism. 
Austria would not allow itself to be driven into an 'aU-or-nothing' situation. 
Economic officials in Eastern Germany had warned Austria against 
expanding its trade with the EEC.  They had also called for the strengthening of 
the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON).  As the East Berlin 
journal 'Sozialistische Aussenwirtschaft' reported on 3 November, the 'German 
Democratic Republic' would regard close economic links between Austria and 
the Common Market as a violation of its neutrality under Article 4 of the State 
Treaty. 
On the other hand,  it considered close ties between Austria and the 
Socialist countries as 'necessary'; it was in its essential interest to reduce 
the E EC' s share of foreign trade, both in relative and in absolute terms, with 
countries outside the  EEC. The journal argued that an association with Brussels 
could bring serious upheavals to Austrian industry and agriculture. It was true 
that the Common Market was not a specifically military bloc. It was, however, 
'exclusively composed of NATO  countries and forms the economic basis ofthis 
aggressive bloc.' 
The main argument to support the alleged violiation of Austrianneu-
trality was the fact that the Federal Republic of Germany was the EEC' s most 
- 3  -powerful member. This contravened the ban on political and economic links to 
which Austria committed itself in 1955. 
'Association would in practice amount to linking up with the Bonn 
State', the journal went on to say.  The difference in Austria's approach to the 
Federal Republic and to East Germany was sufficient evidence of this. 
(Neue Zurcher Zeitung,  2 November 1968; 
Die Welt,  6 November 1968; 
Industriekurier,  16  November 1968) 
- 4-Belgium 
1.  Statement by Mr.  Pierre Harmel on the question of reinforcing and 
enlarging the European Community 
On 3 October 1968,  Mr.  Pierre Harmel,  Belgian Minister for For-
eign Affairs,  addressed the organization of European journalists at Val Duchesse 
(Brussels).  Mr.  Harmel made a number of practical proposals calculated to go 
beyond the stage of mere declarations of intent regarding the reinforcement 
and enlargement of the European Economic Community : 'There is.  as :\Ir. 
Brandt pointed out,  an obvious connexion between the problem of enlarging the 
Communities and that of their development.  It must be accepted that the idea 
of the internal development of the Cpmmunities.  which we  all want.  should not 
serve as an alibi or as a substitute for a common political Yision of Europe's 
future,  as expressed within the Communities or elsewhere. E\·en if Europe had 
to be opened through another channel than the Communities.  ,,.e  are condiYed 
that,  at the end of the road,  the Communities would find again their natural 
place in the centre of Europe of tomorrow. 
What other avenues are there  ? 
In the first place.  there is the problem of political co-operation and. 
in particular.  that of co-ordinating the  foreign policies  of the countries  of 
Europe.  The course to follow is clearly indicated in Article 8 of the Brussels 
Treaty; it appears to be partic~larly advisable.  under present circumstances 
in Europe.  and in accordance with the wishes of public opinion in our coun':ries. 
In agreement with our Benelux par';ners.  we definitely intend to discuss this 
problem at the next session of WEU Council and to make proposals to that ef-
fect. 
We want to go  beyond the stage of occasional consultation in order to 
reach at least that of compulsory consultation on matters jointly agreed and to 
progress towards the harmonization of our external policies. These proposals 
take into account the efforts made in the past and.  in particular.  the need to 
base government work on some form of institutional structure if it is to be 
successful. At the same time. we  must raise the question of defence. This falls 
within the natural competence of WEU and it is a  matter of special importance 
since France decided to stand aloof from the Atlantic military organization in 
peace time.  Systematic discussions on  defence problems  could lead  to  C(l· 
ordinated defence action on the part of the States of Europe and make it possi-
ble to create, within NATO,  what could become  the European  pillar  of the 
Alliance. 
We believe that  no-one who wishes  to see a  strong Europe  could 
object to closer military co-operation between the States of Europe and to more 
- 5  -balanced relations within the Alliance. In this context, and as a minimum aim. 
we hope to achieve European co-ordination on arms manufactures and purchases. 
We  also want to achieve something positive,  as soon as possible, in 
the field of technology  ;in this connexion, I  should like to draw your attention to 
the remarkable report put forward a couple of days ago at the E LDO conference 
in Paris by my colleague, Mr. Th~o  Lef~vre. By way of conclusion to an inves-
tigation carried out under a good oaices mission.  he described as follows the 
conditions that should be met by European technological co-operation if this is 
to be effective : 
1.  It must embrace all the main fields of advanced technology; specialized 
bodies.  divided into sectors, would be inadequate; 
2.  Solidarity should go beyond the stage of research and include production 
and marketing. which presupposes the setting ~.<p of industrial groupings. 
including concerns of several countries; 
3.  Solidarity must also be practised in terms of time in order to give each 
country. in a number of programmes.  a fair proportion of jobs as well 
as a fair amount of business connected with the new techniques:this 
could not be done on a  single programme without affecting its efficiency. 
Those are the views of the Belgian Government.  Next we have  to 
tackle the problem of our currencies.  where Europe's division is particular!~· 
nefarious.  The solidarity of our currencies is a state of fact. Jointly. our coun-
tries are in  a position to play a decisive part in the world's monetary polic~·. 
What is lacking is an institution that would make it possible to organize this 
solidarity on equitable bases and enable us fully to exercise our responsibilities 
and po\\'ers on a world plane. 
Politics,  defence.  technology.  currencies, these are four avenues of 
European co-operation which we want to explore in the coming months. The first 
two are definitely outside the scope of the Communities, whereas technology 
and monetary questions touch on them in certain respects. Without raising legal 
problems and with the sole aim  of achieving a greater measure of efficienc~·. 
it is essential to organize with the Communities the particular forms of co-
operation required for these sectors.  In doing so, we remain strictly within 
the terms of Article 8 of the Treaty referred to earlier on. 
These new ideas we wish to explore as seven partners with all the 
Western European States that wish to unite and are pledged to do  so.  The ob-
jective is to advance as seven partners towards new prospects.  Even if.  after 
- 6 -having attempted this,  it should become impossible to achieve a positi\·e result 
as seven partners, there would be no  reason for "giving up the job".  I men-
tioned earlier on the fact that the Common Market project.  originally started 
by seven partners,endedupwith six partners in an open Treaty.  Non-member 
countries of Western European Union could also be interested in such  ;.~rojects. 
There may be a number of reasons,  all perfectly valid. for a country. 
at a given moment,  not to be prepared to embark on a particular course \\'hen 
others are ready to do  so.  This should not act as a permanent disqualification 
as otherwise we would have to give up,  once and for all, the idea of achieving 
European integration.  No  train would ever run if it had to wait for all the pas-
sengers to be quite ready.  The golden rule to follow is to ensure that there is 
no defection but,  at the same time, not to be discouraged if an enterprise has 
to be started with less partners than one would have hoped to have. 
I believe that these views are shared by many European political 
figures.  I also feel that we have reached the point where a choice must be made. 
Either we create now the bodies and methods required for an effective operation 
or,  in view of present difficulties,  we fall back on national programmes  and 
policies.' 
Various conflicting views were expressed in the press in connexion 
with the Harmel plan. 
a.  Mr.  Spaak in favour of strenthening  and enlarging Europe 
The Fourteenth Congress of the Atlantic Treaty Association was held 
in Lisbon from 14  to 18 October 1968.  Mr.  Spaak came out strongly against the 
'historical error' made by General de Gaulle in regarding Yalta as the  source 
of the events in Czechoslovakia. After having recalled personal memories of the 
San Francisco meeting. Mr.  Spaak said,  'It is not Yalta,  it is not the blocs 
that have brought about the Prague tragedy.  Yalta did not divide the world into 
two blocs.  The blocs \Vere  made necessary by Russia's policy.' He reminded 
the audience that,  as early as 1958,  General de Gaulle himself had suggested 
to the Americans and the British the creation of a three-power directorate to 
settle on behalf of all westerners the problems of the world.' 
The former Belgian Prime Minister was surprised at the more or 
less general acceptance of Communism after fifty years.  Everything  that had 
happened over the past half-century derives,  according to him, from Commu-
nism,  both as a doctrine of Soviet imperialism and as a foreign policy \\·eapon. 
- 7 -What must be done then ? Must we  revert to cold war? In substance 
l\Ir. Spaak' s answer was No. But we must view peaceful co-existence with open eyes. 
Since the idea of peaceful co-existence had been accepted, we have had Budapest 
and Prague.  These are, to some extent, the results of peaceful co-existence. 
For the Belgian statesman,  the danger does not lie in our relations 
with Communism but  in the  internal relations  within our own Alliance.  This 
raises a crucial question :Will America's nuclear arsenal be placed  at our 
disposal in case of danger  ?  Mr.  Spaak regretted that a clear answer couldnot 
be given to that question. 
In conclusion, Mr. Spaak felt that there was only one valid answer -a 
united Europe. 'If we combine all our political. economic and military forces.  we 
shall be able to talk with Americans on an equal footing.'  In this  connexion 
l\1r. Spaak vigourously denounced the attitude ot the French Government which' is 
systematically blockinf:. and without any valid reason, any progress that may be 
made towards Europe. '  1\ddressing the French delegation,  Mr.  Spaak frankly 
stated: 'You must understand our anger at this arbitrary and authoritarian 
policy ...  We must. if  n·~cessary  continue on the road toward European unity with-
out France. even though this maybe against all our wishes ... Something new must 
be done with those who wish to follow us. It is stupi.d to reject Britain's offer.' 
Concluding his address, he urged the other countries of Europe -
inc htding Britain - to work together in fut"J.re  in the military,  economic and 
technological fields. 
b.  Mr.  Tindemans' views on the Harmel plan 
Addressing on 7 October the Antwerp Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry,  Mr.  Tindemans,  Belgian Minister forCommunity Relations. empha-
sized the importance of Mr.  Harmel's proposal for a transformation of NATO 
and reviving the idea of European integration within the framework of  WEU. 
:\Ir.  Tindemans stated that if Mr.  Harmel's proposal did not meet with a 
favourable response,  then the Benelux countries would have to direct their ef-
forts towards special agreements with Britain.  In doing so.  the three smaller 
member countries of the Community would demonstrate that their insistence 
on requesting that negotiations should be started with London.  could not be re-
garded as mere verbiage. 
(Press Department of the Luxembourg Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Exter-
nal Trade; R~publicain Lorrain,  17 October 1968: Luxemburger Wort.  ~G Oc-
tober 1968; De Standaard,  8 October 1968) 
- 8-~- Statement bv Mr.  Lefe\Te on European Science Polic\· problems 
a.  European co-operation on space research 
At the close of the European Space Conference held in Bad Godesberg. 
Mr.  Lefevre.  Minister forPlanningandScientificResearch.madethe following 
statement to a Belgian newspaper on  14  November : 'At the E LDO  :\1 inisterial 
Conference.  the European launcher programme was saved thanks to an  agree-
ment to appropriate Bfrs.  31 ,300m to the "Europa II" rocket project. An agree-
ment was reached with the United Kingdom on the conditions under which Blue 
Streak would be made available and an agreement was also achieved on the 
compensation to be granted to Italy. 
The Spaey Committee was asked to draw up future launcher pro-
grammes in agreement with the ELOO Council. 
The European Space Conference,  which now comprises a larg·er 
number of countries,  reached a major compromise between the countries \\'hich 
intend to go on with the development of European launchers.  i.e.  F ranee.  the 
Federal Republic of Germany,  Italy.  the Netherlands.  Belgium and Australia. 
and the other countries (the United Kingdom,  Switzerland.  Sweden.  Denmark. 
Spain. etc.) which take a different view. 
This compromise was worked out by the Spaey Committee but \\'US 
not negotiated until 11 November. 
It comprised an agreement on the cost and number of European 
launchers to be used in the general programme and a further agreement on the 
long-term aims of the basic programme for a single space organization. 
The United Kingdom entered an important reserYation on the finan-
cing plan.  Sweden and Denmark abstained. 
The conference reached an  agreement on the financial coverage for 
ESRO for the period 1969-1971.  It will meet again in March and April 1969 to 
see if it is possible to begin the first stage of the application satellite progl·am-
me (Eurovision satellite). 
A new agreement and a new European space programme \vill be con-
sidered in 1969 by an  ruiJlQc  committee of senior officials.' 
- 9-b.  A five-year plan for nuclear technology 
On 22 November 1968,  Mr.  Th~o Lef~vre informed the press ofthe 
decision of the Ministerial Committee on Science Policy approving a Belgian 
five-year plan covering the years 1968-1972 for the development of nuclear 
technology : 
'The development of nuclear energy opens up new prospects for 
industry and this will be an important factor for economic expansion calling 
for highly advanced techniques which may themselves have an interesting ef-
fect on technological development in other sectors. 
Developing nuclear technology.  however.  calls for considerable re-
search and development work which,  in view of the costs involved, presupposes 
the intervention of public authorities within an overall programme in which 
definite aims are established,  including the division of work between industrial 
enterprises and nuclear research centres.  such as the Nuclear Energy Centre 
at l\Iol. 
For these reasons.  I submitted a fi\'e-year plan to the Ministerial 
Committee on Science Policy; this covers all national research and develop-
ment \rork on nuclear technology. 
This plan,  which comes as the result of co-operation between public 
and private sectors, will be a great asset for the future of our nuclear industr  >'. 
It provides that the State will.  between 1968 and 1972. contribute nearly 
Bfr.  4. OOOm;  similarly.  industry will share the cost of the programme under 
the legislation on economic expansion. 
The plan's aim is to concentrate the national effort on a limited 
number of projects with a view to obtaining maximum technical and economic 
effectiveness by merging the industries concerned so as to achieve close co-
operation.  particularly with the Nuclear Energy Research Centre. 
The programme is geared to improving and developing reactor 
strings,  in particular fast reactors which are unanimously regarded as the 
most promising for the future. 
The development of this string has involved close co-opPration be-
tween the Benelux countries and the Federal Republic of Germany under an 
- 10-inter-governmental agreement.  The plan also takes into account some of the 
essential work in public service and support. ' 
c.  The future of Euratom 
After the meeting of the Euratom Council of Ministers on 29 Novem-
ber 1968,  Mr.  Lef~vre commented as follows  : 'The discussions on the Coun-
cil were rather pointless and specious ..... when they started quibbling about 
full stops and commas I left .....  There is no American challenge.  There is 
simply a gulf between them and us.  Until we work together we  shall at best 
achieve no more than a compromise between national ambitions. ' 
The Belgian Minister told his colleagues that Belgium did not ''"ant to 
see the existing centres disappear. It trusted that a budget would be adopted. 
possibly on a month-by-month basis. pending the introduction of a large-scale 
programme by 1 June 1969. 
The Minister thought that in future it  would be better to exclude work 
which could be done on a national basis from the joint research programme and only 
include in it projects which necessitated large sums of money and which could 
be part of an industrial expansion endeavour.  The faulty link between research 
and its industrial application was,  moreover,  one of the things that the Com-
mission deplored in its summary of ten years of Euratom acti\·ities. 
Mr.  Lef~vre also came out in favour of the principle of a gradual 
and partial redevelopment of the Joint Research Centre to include technological 
activities outside the nuclear context.  Euratom would thus become a large-
scale European technological association where progress could be made on 
data-processing,  aeronautical engineering and space research. 
(Le Soii:·,  15  and 22  November,  1 and 2 December 1968) 
3.  Parliament discusses European problems 
a.  Agricultural policy 
The General Report on income and expenditure for 1969 included a 
noteworthy chapter on the common agricultural policy. 
-11-It begins by discussing its prospects : 
'The unification of agricultural prices and the introduction of ma-
chinery to secure the balance of the markets are now established facts. so. the 
months al1ead will have to be devoted toestablishingtheclearestpossibleguide-
lines  for the common agricultural policy  - which includes both prices polic.\'. 
\\'ith all the measures which may affect the various production.  and structure 
polic.L  Special attention should be paid to social policy in the agricultural 
sector. 
It is worth noting· here the definite \\·ish of some member States to 
em·isagc social measures on behalf of farms on the borderlines of profitability: 
the.'· fm·our a bolder economic policy for agriculture on a  more general agri-
cultural front. 
The unification of prices in the Community was the result of a par-
ticularly keen political arbitration but this thankless task should not be reg·arded 
as the culmination of but as the prerequisite to.  a real agricultural policy.  It 
is clear that a permanent impro\·ement in the conditions of production must be 
cuupled with a  special effort in marketing products. 
It is to be expected that the finalization of this policy. which will be 
of benefit principally to those member States which have a large territory. 
\\'ill be relatively difficult and will need time. 
Few countries have so far found entirely satisfactory solutions to the 
problem of structure. 
This is no doubt due to an ever-increasing mechanizationoffarming. 
to the very swift growth of production costs,  to the continuing exodus from the 
land to other branches of the economy and lastly to the cli\·ersity of regional 
production conditions. 
The Community has assumed responsibility for the structure policy 
only to a  limited extent,  but it is to be expected that this will.  in time,  become 
nearly as important as market policy. ' 
Following this, the financial implications of this policy are revie\\·ed: 
'This, however,  should be effected with proper discrimination because 
an undue increase  in the quantities produced should be avoided.  even though 
production conditions can be vastly improved in farms which could  be brought 
- 12  -into line with today' s  requirements.  For this purpose.  public finance should be 
extended selectively.  We  should not forget that the situation on se\·eral leading 
agricultural markets in the Community is still difficult (wheat.  butter.  milk 
powder.  etc.).  The self-sufficiency rate in foodstuffs is alread~· near to  !HI per 
cent. It would also appear essential to reserve a certain margin for imports  · 
from third countries.  so as to avoid completely depressing possible Commu-
nity exports and in order to be able to draw in income from import levies. 
It goes without saying that the re,·iew of financial problems. espe-
cially the cost of the common agricultural policy.  is being carefull~· studied by 
experts.  Despite the fact that it will not be possible to ,,·ork out comprehensi\·e 
accounts for this policy until the end of the 1968-1969 farming year.  the finan-
cial estimates already established are giving great concern to the responsible 
authorities of all the member States. 
The policy as regards the organization of agricultural markets.  as 
de,·ised in 1961,  involved introducing financial compensation arrangements as 
bet\\"een those member States importing agricultural products.  and \\·hich there-
fore earned substantial levies.  and the exporting member States \\·hich  had to 
bear heavy expenditure in marketing their surpluses. 
This compensation found expression in the financial solidarit\ ol the 
member States and took a practical form in the various Council regulations on 
financing the general agriculturall)olicy.' 
The General Report reviews the repercussions on the national budget 
of the financial provisions of the common policy : 
'As was pointed out in the general review of the 1968 budg·et.  this 
accounting technique is a complex one and,  as a result, has invoh·ed serious 
delays in the Commission departments.  These delays are being made go:)d:the 
effect will be an additional budgetary charge in 1969 for those member States 
whose share of the total expenditure under the Guarantee Section exceeds the 
amount of national expenditure eligible for assistance from the Fund over the 
given period. 
This is the case for Belgium. 
The following table shows the Guarantee Section of the EAGGF ac-
counts for the first five periods and indications of the budgetary charge (in 
million francs) : 
- 13  -Belgium's 
Belgian  Net  Budgetary 
Periods  expenditure  charge  in  share 
eligible 
contribution 
Belgium 
1964-1965  690  98  592  60  '0  in 1967 
40  r,;  in 1969 
1965-1966  934  528  426  75 
r;  in 1968  1( 
25 
p 
'r  in 1969 
'  1966-1967  1,472  888  584  73  ~;  in 1969 
?- ("/ 
~u  r  in 1970  : 
Measures are being taken to accelerate the clearance of accounts in 
the Guarantee Section for current periods; these are going hand in hand with 
the efforts to make good the delays in clearing previous periods. The firsthalf 
of  1967-1968  had already been  partly cleared  (to the extent of  73  per cent 
through payments on accounts) as on31 July 1968.Thesecondhalfof this same 
period will be cleared in the same way on 13  December 1968. which means that 
the member States having a  debit account will have to pay their debit balances 
before 15  January 1969.  The final liquidation of this period will be effected be-
fore 31 October 1969.  the relevant payments being made before 30 November 
1969. 
As a result of rather extraordinary  circumstances. the first half-year 
balanceduefortheperiod1967-1968.effected as on 31 July 1968,wasfavourable 
for Belgium  because it received a credit balance of around Bfrs.  lOOm.  The 
balance of the second half-year balance due for this period, \\'hich will be drawn 
up on 15  December 1968.  will be a  substantial debit. 
Consequently,  the 1969 budget will have to bear the full financial 
impact for the 1967-1968 period if all the time limits are adhered to.  This 
charge is estimated at Bfrs.  1, 374m .. or the difference between the Belgian 
share in the total expenses of the EAGGF (Guarantee Section). which is assessed 
at Bfrs.  6, 319m.  for  ~his period,  and the Belgian  expenditure eligible  for 
assistance from the Fund.  Bfrs.  4. 945m. 
The Government felt,  however.  that the time-limit of 30 October 
1969 for clearing the final balance due for the period 1967-1968 will not be 
adhered to because of the many regulations that have to be issued before this 
clearance can take place. It has therefore limited the credits to be written d0\\11 for 
1969to those which will. in fact. be cleared during the budgetary period. 
- 14  -In addition, the 1969 budgetary period will also have to bear the first 
settlement of payments on account of 75  per cent for the period 1968-1969. 
To sum up,  the financial burden charged to the 1969 budget under 
the heading of the financial obligations contracted under the Guarantee Section 
of the EAGGF is out of proportion because it is partly the result of the inclu-
sion of back-payments for previous periods and partly of the acceleration in 
clearing accounts for current periods. 
If all the charges under the Guidance Section are added together  .the 
resulting amount is Bfrs.  2, 156m  .  which should be reduced to Bfrs. 1. 406m 
in order to take into account the change in the closure date of 31 October 1969. 
The present commitments of the Community under the Guidance 
Section will mean budgetary charges of the order of Bfrs.  860m  for Belg-ium: 
this \Vill be spread over several budgetary years.  For 1969.  the GoYernment 
has written down a credit of 425  million francs so that it may.  in 1%9.  be able 
to meet its financial obligations under the Guidance Section.' 
During the dif:cussion held by the Budget Committee of the Chamber. 
a question was asked about Belgium's contribution to the EAGGF  : 'A member 
of the Commission pointed out that the increase in expenditure cannot be re-
garded as straightforward assistance for Belgian agriculture.  It ma~·be recog-
nized that Belgian agriculture only gets the benefit of  approximate!~· one third 
of the Belgian contributions to the EAGG F. 
The apportionment key for Belgium's contribution amounted to  ~. 1 
per cent of the total contributions between 1 July 1967  and  1 Jamtar~· l~J/(1.  al-
though Belgium only accounts for 4. 8 per cent of European agriculture.  This 
unduly high apportionment key was one of the requirements that had to be met 
in the interests of the free movement of goods. 
Similarly.  Antwerp plays a part in the increase in expenditure in its 
capacity as a transit port for agricultural products.' 
Lastly.  the chapter on agricultural policy discusses the subsidy to 
the Belgian Agricultural Fund and the relations between this Fund and the 
EAGG F  : 'The purpose of this subsidy is to balance the Agricultural Fund 
budget in 1969: its expenditure will exceed its income by Bfrs.  3. G93m  The 
income of the Agricultural Fund is estimated at Bfrs.  4. 112m  and is com-
prized almost entirely from its share in the slaughterhouse tax and the agri-
cultural leYies.  The expenditure is estimated at Bfrs.  7. R05m  .  97  per cent 
- 15  -of which concerns expenditure under the common agricultural policy,  which is 
thus eligible for EAGGF (Guarantee Section) assistance. 
When the final half-yearly accounts are cleared for the current 
period, this expenditure will be subtracted from our net share in the total  ex-
penditure under the Guarantee Section.  Since 1 July 1967,  there has been a 
close correlation between the budgetary credits relating to subsidies for the 
Agricultural Fund and the financial contribution that Belgium will have to pay 
the following year under the Guarantee Section. If the first are substantial 
during any given year. the second will be proportionately less the following 
year. 
In the report on expenditure under the Guarantee Section. it is pointed 
out that in the period 1967-1968.  Belgian expenditure eligible for EAGGF 
(Guarantee Section) assistance is estimated at Bfr.  4, 945m. 
For the budgetary year 1969.  this expenditure is estimated at 
Bfr.  i. SO:l m  and mainly concerns the three principal sectors : cereals, dairy 
produce and sugar. ' 
During the session  of 27 November in the Chamber of Representatives. 
:\Ir.  Dequae (Christian Democrat) discussed the credits for agriculture under 
the \\·ays  and means  budget.  He felt that the contribution to the EAGGF could 
not be used as an argument for any cuts in the budget for agriculture proper. 
lie said : 'It \\·oulcl be wrong to argue as if this.expenditure were incurred for 
the benefit of our agriculture.  It would.  above all.  be wrong to make compen-
sations as if it was a question of support for the farmer himself.  A Minister 
has e\·en sought to make a per capita calculation for the agricultural sector. 
You will understand at once that it is not only nonsensical but also 
quite wrong to present the facts in this way.  This contribution to the EAGGF 
ine lucles the transfer of 90 per ·cent of the levies,  which are also included in 
receipts.  although this is not stated directly. 
Similarly.  we  note that we import 11 per cent of the agricultural 
products that come from third countries  ;this is mainly due to Antwerp because. 
in fact.  Belgium only accounts for 5 per cent of the agriculture in the EEC. 
This simply means that the greater part of these amounts should not 
be attributed.  nor allocated.  to agriculture and to the farmers: it is the result 
of the position which the port of Antwerp enjoys in the European complex and 
it is one which we should all find gratifying. 
- 16  -Through its direct contributions to the EAGG F.  I3elg·ium  accepted a 
share of 8 to 9 per cent.  which is the result of a general settlement at  this 
time; its purpose is to enable industry to integrate and this "·as made dependent 
on the agricultural issue being settled.  This contribution is thus not  in propor-
tion to the part played by Belgian agriculture in the Common :\Iarket.  It is not 
agriculture  which is responsible for this because it was an agreement designed 
to open up the Community as a whole  and to break a deadlock at the negotiations. 
especially at the  level of industry and the Community.' 
b.  Monetary policy 
On 19 November in the debate on the ways and means budget. 
Mr.  Eyskens, Prime Minister,  told the Chamber of Representath·es :'It is 
quite certain that we cannot avoid international contingencies.  If there "·ere a 
serious crisis, we should inevitably suffer the consequences. 
Having said which,  the balance of payments of the United States has 
improved so that the fears in this context have been allayed. 
In Europe,  Belgium. the Netherlands and Germany are in a particu-
lar privileged position in view of their monetary and financial situation.  It is 
true that there has been rampant inflation for a number of years no,,·  and that 
the purchasing power of money is falling.  Since 1963. the fall has been of around 
_33  per cent.  If we compare the position with that of other countries.  ,,.e  find 
that Belgium is in the group in question.  Of course. the fall  in the purl'hasing 
power raises a social problem affecting savings.  especially small saYings.  but 
this rampant inflation is common to the whole of the western ,,·oriel. 
Even if we wished to make use of all the possible monetary tools. \\·e 
could not eliminate this inflation completely because it is to some extent impor-
ted. 
This is why I say that we must. work out international monetary agree-
ments in order to strengthen discipline,  which is the only way in which we  can 
deal with rampant inflation. 
This will not raise any monetary problem as long as inflation in one 
country is not greater than in others and this is not the case in Belgium. Sim-
ilarly.  it is true that our economic position is strong.  Our exports have in-
creased by 15  per cent. despite the devaluation of the pound sterling.  We  are 
entering a recovery phase which will,  I am sure,  lead to a boom. 
- 17  -Consequently,  I should like to state quite categorically that,  in view 
of the general situation in Belgium and its financial position,  the Belgian franc 
is a  strong currency.  At the same time,  there is no monetary problem under 
the present circumstances.' 
Mr.  Snoy et d'Oppuers,  Minister for Finance,  made a  statement on 
26 November,  concerning the conference of the Ten which was held the previ-
ous week in Bonn.  He outlined the agreement reached and emphasized: 'Since 
the Bretton Woods conference and the creation of the International Monetary 
Fund.  periods of currency convertibility and stability of exchange rates have 
allowed for an unprecedented expansion of world trade.  From the point ofview 
of the European Economic Community,  in which the Belgian economy is devel-
oping its full potential,  it was also necessary to avoid a  disorganized situation. 
The measures taken in the short term were twofold: on the one hand.  our  ex-
ports to Germany,  which averaged 6, 819 million per month for the first nine 
months of this year,  will receive a  stimulus from the fiscal reduction of -l:  per 
cent ad valorem when imported into Germany.  I am convinced that these mea-
sures will bring a  considerable expansion.  Similarly,  the measures taken in 
France ought normally to lead to a  fall in consumption and consequently  a 
slo\Ying down of France's imports: during the first nine months of 1968, we sold 
an average of Bfr.  5, 827m  per month to France. 
I am personally convinced that these measures,  taken together by 
our main partners in the Common Market,  will not be prejudicial to our exports. 
As to the exchange control and export subsidy provisions announced 
b~· the French Government,  these will have important implications calling for 
concerted action within the institutions of the European Economic Community. 
The Government is convinced that this will be most constructive, in compliance 
\\·ith the provisions of the Treaty of Home.  I should,  moreover,  like to  point 
out that the Treaty of Rome procedure was adhered to particularly closely at 
the Bonn conference.  during which three meetings of the Six were held  in the 
presence of representatives of the Commission. 
The Bonn conference once again showed how interdependent the in-
terests of all countries are in international monetary matters. It also dem-
onstrated once again just how far the achievements of the Common Market are 
contingent on a concerted,  Community,  monetary policy.  It shm,·ed the urgent 
need to progress in integrating Europe and enlarging the Common Market.' 
- 18  -During the same debate,  Mr.  Persoons (Christian Democrat)  re-
ferred to the international monetary crisis: 'Another threat is that of a wide-
spread deflation.  How can we avoid a rise in interest rates at a time when coun-
tries are fighting to maintain their economies? What measures will Belgium 
take? Can European integration hold its own in the event of "'idespread specu-
lation? 
The recent political crises have brought home to us how urgent it is 
to take political integration measures in Europe.  The United States is on  the 
eve of changing its President and,  it is to be hoped,  of settling the situation in 
Vietnam,  The time seems to be right for monetary integration,  especially af-
ter the Bonn negotiations,  which showed how vain the nationalist argument is. 
The creation of a  single European currency would not,  in my opinion, 
raise insurmountable difficulties. 
If we  have not got the strength of mind to contend \Yith  speculation. 
some kind of monetary tool,  shared by the Six or the Seven,  im·ol ving dra  \\·ing 
rights,  would be a valid defence against speculators. 
A gold and currency reserve fund could give support to its action in 
the six countries.  The governing body of a European institution of this t~·pe 
would be the best agency for helping the European Community to apply its di-
rectives.  The common institution would be in a  good position to engage in  this 
dialogue with the dollar area towards which we are inevitably mo\·ing so as to 
change the international monetary system.  Belgium is in a good position  to 
bring these States and individuals closer together. 
Speaking for the Socialist Group,  Mr.  Larock approved the statement 
on monetary problems by the Finance Minister: 'There are three reasons  for 
approving this statement and these should be made clear and,  to some extent, 
conditional.  The first is that maintaining an international monetary order is 
essential to our economic expansion,  provided it is properly co-ordinated.  It 
is in France that the crisis broke out.  But its consequences are liable to  be 
felt in the finance and trade of countries associated with France in a commu-
nity of interests,  both as regards trade and the stability of currencies. 
At a  time when this is under trial,  it is our duty,  and it is in  our 
interest,  to help restore a  minimum of monetary order. Our participation in 
this joint assistance goes to a  great,  friendly country,  setting aside any eval-
uation of the policy or the governmental methods which are practised there.' 
- 19-The second reason: the Minister mentioned one of the main causes 
for the crisis: speculation. 
'It is not for us to judge what has happened in France. We  should 
note,  however,  that yesterday the French Prime Minister inveighed against 
the shameless action of speculators - a form of national defeatism which the 
desire for profit did not justify. 
But the ills were not the monopoly of any single country.  Inflation 
could become rampant anywhere.  Hence any national measure designed to con-
tain it should have our agreement.  Failing this we  shall,  sooner or later, bear 
the responsibility of being its victims. 
Where do these thousands of millions which flow from one country 
to another while remaining in the same hands, come from: to a large extent 
from the work of men workers,  staff,  management and technicians.' 
The third reason: the future of the European Community and its very 
existence make it imperative.  The Minister of Finance added that a collective 
expansion called for the integration and enlargement of Europe. 
'This is so obvious that there is no need to stress our very real hope 
that this manifest monetary solidarity help make each of the six countries more 
aware of what unites it to the others and of all that is out of date and fraught 
with risks in economic nationalism and in all that stands in the way of achieving 
~ greater Europe. 
We trust that the Government will have an eye to the real effects of 
collective assistance and keep Parliament regularly and accurately informed. 
We  also hope that the export drawbacks granted by the French Government will 
be the subject of an agreement under the Treaty of Rome and that the tempo-
rary exemptions may be contained within limits that make them consistent 
with the rules of the Treaty.' 
(Chamber of Representatives: Doc.  No.  4 and 4-I,  1968-1969; 
Summary record of the sessions of 19-26 and 17 November 1968) 
- 20-c.  Recognition at the European level of the Belgian title of engi-
neering technician 
On 19  November the Senate heard a parliamentary question by 
Mr.  Hougardy (Liberal),  addressed to the Minister for National Education on 
the arrangements to be made for engineering technicians. 
Mr.  Hougardy stated: 'Our engineering technicians would,  nmY  that 
some of the arrangements under the Treaty of Rome are coming into applica-
tion,  like to be able to go on pursuing their occupation,  both in Belgium  and 
abroad.  For this purpose,  their studies must assume a new shape: the diploma 
which gives eligibility for higher education must be required for admission. 
The courses must then be increased to a standard length of four years.  This 
measure ought to make it possible (i)  to work out a training programme  in 
which teaching is coupled with prolonged contacts with industrial activities: 
(ii) to give a  margin whereby the general emphasis and level of studies could 
be adjusted to the growing requirements of an ever-changing world:  (iii) to 
place all establishments on a strictly equal footing and to classify our engi-
neering technicians with those of their foreign colleagues who have received 
similar training and on whose behalf their Governments have taken timely and 
suitable protection measures. 
The situation in a good many schools also needs to be changed in 
law.  At present,  our engineering technicians do  not measure up to the condi-
tions laid down by the European Communities and by such bodies as U~ESCO 
and the OECD to be classified in the profession.  The transitional measures 
will run out in 1969 because in 1970 directives will be issued establishing the 
equivalence of diplomas.  I would stress the urgency of this matter.' 
The Liberal Senator added: 'It is also in my capacity as rapporteur 
to the European Parliament on the subject of the equivalence of diplomas that 
I have become aware of the importance of this issue.  Our European partners 
have not failed to take the measures they thought necessary for the protection 
of their nationals,  whereas our own engineering technicians are handicapped 
at the international level.  Perhaps it is indiscreet of me to tell you of my ex-
perience as the European Parliament rapporteur on this draft but I do so be-
cause I am aware of the danger run by our own engineering technicians.' 
Stressing this point,  Mr. Hougardy said: 'The Government should end 
the proliferation of engineering schools,  the number of which appears anom-
alous,  and should introduce a new qualification better suited to the level and 
emphasis of studies and should enact an interim provision to ensure respect 
for acquired rights.' 
- 21-In reply to this parliamentary question, Mr. Dubois, Minister  for 
National Education,  stated: 'Originally the diplomas for engineers and engi-
neering graduates were granted after three years of study,  some categories 
of engineers receiving four years training.  The efforts of those promotingnon-
university teaching succeeded,  in 1933,  in creating the qualification of engi-
neering technician awarded after three years of studies; but this standardiza-
tion did not meet with the approval of all concerned. 
Since the last war,  the particularly rapid industrial change has 
prompted the directors of several schools to review their programme  and 
lengthen the courses of study.  In 1959,  the schools agreement sought to secure 
a free choice for fathers and sometimes pushed into the backgroundsucheco-
nomic and social requirements as were linked with the operation of the various 
branches of industry.  An additional difficulty arose after the signature of  the 
Treaty of Rome which,  in Article 57,  lays down provisions relating to the 
right of establishment and the equivalence of diplomas for engineering techni-
cians. 
The time-limit laid down  in the Treaty of Rome for introducing the 
free movement of individuals and their establishment in EEC countries obliges 
us to take the necessary legal provisions to enable Belgian engineering techni-
cians to occupy their rightful place in the Europe of the Six. 
After years of study,  our predecessors have not been able to find an 
acceptable solution. 
In November 1965,  Mr.  Dehousse suggested that a committee should 
be set up to look into the structural changes needed.  This committee was set 
up by Mr.  Toussaint and Mr.  Grootjans in July 1966; it comprised industrial-
ists,  professional associations,  the trade unions and the civil service. It was 
asked to report on three points: (i)  the qualitative and quantitative needs for 
engineering technicians in industry; (ii)  the ranking of the engineering techni-
cian in the Common Market: (iii) the conditions under which these engineering 
technicians could go to university and,  particularly,  to faculties of applied 
sciences. A wide-ranging agreement was reached on the conclusions drawn up 
by this committee. 
A bill should therefore be passed to stop the proliferation of these 
schools; but it should not be limited to this if it is to be more than a palliative. 
Indeed,  there are at present more than sixty establishments which award di-
plomas for engineering technicians. 
- 22 -According to information from EEC departments,  the time-limit in 
the Community will probably not be before September 1970. 
We can,  however,  already define the general emphasis of the op-
tions open to us.  Rather than closing schools which,  in practice,  would  be 
impossible,  Mr.  Vermeylen,  Minister for National Education,  and myself 
prefer to create a third degree of education,  which will issue diplomas to in-
dustrial or agricultural engineers after four years.  The bill will specify  the 
number of sections in these schools. 
Our solution may resolve this problem at the European level,  al-
though it will not automatically mean that current diplomas will have the same 
value.  As regards students who are still studying,  interim arrangements are 
planned to allow adjustment to the new conditions.  As regards first-year stu-
dents,  the current year will be valid under both systems. 
We are also concerned with the harmonization of higher education, 
both university and other.  Flexible arrangements to allow a transition from 
one system to the other are planned.  Lastly,  a new supplementary study sys-
tem will be organized and the new dispensation will come into practice in easy 
stages.' 
(Senate,  Summary Record,  Session of 19 November 1968) 
d.  The added value tax 
On 15  November the Government submitted to the Chamber of Rep-
resentatives a bill introducing the added value tax code,  The Opinion of  the 
Council of State which was given on 11 April 1968 is appended to the bill. 
With reference to the division of authority,  the Council of State 
writes: 'In the matter which will be replaced by this ·draft code,  that of taxes 
in the same  category as the stamp.  ~el'8)are numerous empowerments,  some 
of which might seem to give the Sovereign special powers with regard to  es-
sential matters belonging to the fiscal field. ' 
The Council of State quotes several examples and adds: 'Although 
the explanatory statement expresses no  view  on this point,  numerous 
- 23-empowerments in the draft added value tax code reflect the idea that the Ex-
ecutive must,  on the one hand,  be able to act rapidly and,  on the other,  inter-
vene at frequent intervals in view of the changes in structure and organization 
which take place in industrial,  commercial and agricultural enterprises. 
Similarly,  where the articulation of precise regulations would have 
called for a  more thorough analysis or lengthy discussion of detail,  the Gov-
ernment felt it expedient to ask the legislator for the necessary power to deal 
with these matters. 
The empowerments planned in the bill are so numerous that  some 
chapters could be part of an "outline law".  None of these powers is coupled 
with any obligation for the Council of Ministers to deliberate on an order.' 
Having submitted all the empowerment provisions to a comprehen-
sive analysis,  the Council draws the following conclusions: 'According  to 
Article 25,  paragraph 2 of the Constitution,  powers must be exercised in the 
way laid down in the Constitution.  They are,  in theory,  inalienable and may 
not be transferred.  The empowerments extended to the Sovereign can only 
cover matters which are not within the purview of the legislator and,  in the 
case of the latter,  measures on points of detail or straightforward imple-
mentation. 
Taxes may only be introduced in Belgium in the manner laid down in 
Articles 110 and 112 of the Constitution.  These provisions constitute a guar-
antee for all citizens.  They have not,  so far,  been regarded as an obstacle to 
the sound exercise of powers.  They have not yet been subject to revision and 
are not included in the Statement of Revision of which the Chambers now stand 
apprised. 
It is for the legislator to decide,  while respecting the Constitution, 
what shall be the scope of his purview in regard to dues and taxes; in the set-
tlement of these points,  the legislator may not refer to the Sovereign.  This 
area must,  however,  include everything affecting the whole range of taxes,  the 
rates of taxes and exemptions from taxes. 
The bill is also intended to establish a permanent code. It cannot 
be compared to an act conferring special powers on the Executive for a limit-
ed period. 
- 24-These requirements to respect the relevant areas of responsibility 
and  power  could prompt the  objection that  overriding and  urgent  reasons 
sometimes demand immediate changes in the taxation system and that only the 
Executive can intervene with the necessary speed. 
The urgency factor which must govern some changes in rates  is, 
however,  less significant in regard to taxes than it is in regard to customs and 
excise duties,  where available foreign products may be imported en masse 
before an increase in duty,  or cleared of customs when they are already in 
bond. 
To  deal  with this contingency,  provision might be made for an em-
powerment to the Sovereign which would authorize interim measures under a 
reasoned,  deliberated order from the Council of Ministers.  The bill which 
finally implements these measures should be submitted at once and be retro-
active in effect,  so as to cover the execution of provisional measures.  To give 
a full guarantee that the system is constitutional and operational,  provision 
should be made for the royal order to be quashed,  that is to say that it would 
"ex tunc" be to no effect if the bill were not submitted within a specifiedperiod 
(one,  two or three months,  for example). 
By contrast,  the intention seems to have been to avoid over-bur-
dening the legal texts with definitions or lists of products,  leaving it to  the 
Executive to establish these. 
These definitions and nomenclatures,  however,  are closely bound 
up with establishing the range of taxes.  They determine its scope and  its 
limits.  They should be the business of the legislator. 
While it might be impractical to include these definitions and  no-
menclatures in the code itself,  they should be appended to the bill and thus 
voted on by the parliament.  This was the method followed for the import duty 
tariff.' 
(Chamber of Representatives,  Doc.  No.  88  (S.E.  196"8)- 1) 
- 25-e.  The World Sugar Agreement 
In an oral question to the Minister of Agriculture,  Mr.  Radoux, 
Socialist member of the Chamber of Representatives,  asked why the European 
Economic Community had not subscribed to this Agreement,  which was  so 
important for the producing countries.  He  wanted to know if the EEC's policy 
on sugar export quotas was consistent with its policy with regard to aid to the 
developing countries. 
Mr.  Heger,  Minister for Agriculture,  replied as follows:  'The Eu-
ropean Economic Community did,  in fact,  take part in the negotiations on the 
International Sugar Agreement. It ran into procedural difficulties in obtaining 
recognition as a  Community.  The EEC has a common policy for sugar, sothat 
the six member States were negotiating as an entity,  the Commission repre-
sentative being its spokesman.  This was challenged from the legal point  of 
view by some of the participating States. ' 
The bases for a possible new agreement had been the subject  of 
debates on the International Sugar Council for several years; any agreement 
had to take into account the deterioration in world prices,  the political diffi-
culties between Cuba and the USA  and the structure of the world sugar mar-
ket,  which is divided into preferential areas,  on the one hand,  and a free mar-
ket,  on the other. 
During the pre-negotiation phase between May and July last year,  it 
emerged that most of the producing countries regarded quantity as the only 
reasonable basis for an agreement.  The EEC did not,  for this would have in-
volved calling into question certain articles in a  regulation which was already 
the result of a compromise between the Six. 
The reasons why the Community did not participate were: (i)  a re-
duction in export opportunities; (ii) failure of importers to give any undertaking; 
(iii) uncertainty regarding the re-exports of the Communist countries; (iv)  the 
difficulties of readjusting Community legislation.  Belgium was,  however, 
ready to try to bring about a reconciliation between the Six,  in so far as its 
essential interests could be taken into consideration. 
As to the consistency of this attitude with the policy for helping the 
developing countries,  the problems had to be seen in their context.  The policy 
for helping these countries was still a  matter for the individual States of the 
Community.  · 
- 26  -Except as regards cereals,  on the one hand (following the Kennedy 
Round),  and the Association Agreement on the other,  the Community had not 
yet got a common policy for helping the developing countries. 
(Chamber of Representatives,  Summary Record,  19 December 1968) 
f.  The implementation of the treaties and international acts con-
cerning transport by road,  rail or navigable waterways 
On 16 October 1968,  the Government submitted a bill to the Chamber 
of Representatives,  authorizing the Sovereign to take any measure needed to 
give effect to obligations under international treaties and international  acts 
pursuant thereto through the medium of a reasoned order taken by the Council of 
Ministers concerning transport by road, rail or  navigable waterways; these mea-
sures might include the abrogation or modification of legal provisions.  The 
measures thus taken by the Executive would be coupled with penalties, without 
prejudice to any compensation for damages. 
In view of Belgium's obligation to meet the commitments under 
treaties or acts pursuant thereto,  the Government asked how decisions taken 
at the international or Community level,  calling for intervention of the national 
authority,  could be applied in the national context. 
The following is an extract from the Explanatory Statement: 'Is it 
necessary to have recourse to the legislator every time that the nature  of 
measures to be taken brings them within the purview of the legislative author-
ity,  pursuant to our Constitution and the state of our laws? 
Or should it be left to the Executive to make obligatory in Belgium 
decisions taken pursuant to international treaties which have been approved by 
the legislator? 
This bill proposes that the second alternative be aclopted for the fol-
lowing reasons: 
(a)  International treaties concerning transport may be classified as outline 
laws.  Like them,  they lay down principles and indicate a policy whose 
implementation is a matter for the Executive. 
- 27-(b)  The competence of the State is often bound by decisions emanatingfrom 
supranational authorities.  This "executory" function is rather one for 
the Executive than the legislative,  from whom it would be difficult to 
request a straightforward ratification of decisions which come outside 
the scope of the legislative by virtue of its own will. 
Even the Benelux Treaty,  which provides for no authority higher than 
the national one,  is hard to have enacted by the legislator, bearing in 
mind the unanimity of the member States which this execution neces-
sitates. 
(c)  Lastly,  the time interval required for a law is hardly compatible with 
that available to implement decisions taken internationally,  which are 
having to be implemented with increasing promptness.' 
The Council of State returned an Opinion on the bill on 28  July 1967. 
It considered that although the constitution did not prevent special powers being 
entrusted to the Sovereign to enable him to take the necessary measures  to 
execute obligations under treaties or acts pursuant thereto and although  an 
effort to standardize in this context was indicated,  the laws governing such 
delegations of power had to be drafted with precision,  especially when as was 
the case here,  the measures taken by the Sovereign were coupled with penal 
sanctions.  This precision could be achieved by a limitative articulation of the 
treaties,  within which the delegation might take effect. It  could also  be achieved 
by limiting the extent of the delegation of powers to the self-executing rules 
contained in the treaties and acts pursuant thereto,  in so far as the execution 
of these rules had not been exclusively entrusted to any supranational body. 
Bearing in mind the requirements of legal co-ordination,  it had to 
be pointed out that the Sovereign already held some of the powers that the bill 
proposed to entrust him with.  To avoid disputes,  which might arise from the 
executory orders with respect to their legal basis,  it would be preferable ei-
ther to exclude from the scope of the bill those delegations of power which 
followed from earlier laws or explicitly to abrogate them. 
The Chamber of Representatives passed the bill without a  debate on 
18  December 1968. 
(Chamber of Representatives,  Doc.  No.  89 (S. E.  1968)  - 1) 
- 28-1.  Mr.  Boulin discusses French agricultural policy and Europe 
Mr.  Boulin,  French Minister of Agriculture,  spoke in Ami  ens on 
7 October to the farming leaders of the Picardy region: 'France only accepted 
the customs dismantlement in the industrial sector to the extent that its agri-
culture attracted compensations.  Although our country covers half the total 
agricultural area in the Community,  the present surpluses are being produced 
by our partners who have gone in for productions for which they had no voca-
tion.  They will,  therefore,  have to help finance marketing these surpluses.' 
Addressing in Libourne (Gironde) the 'Young Chamber of Commere;e' 
on 13  October,  Mr.  Robert Boulin explained his views more precisely: 'We 
will wait for the proposals of Mr.  Mansholt and our partners and then,  I think, 
France will, like the other countries, have to express its views on this matter by 
recalling certain elementary rules. 
What is essential for Europe is Community preference.  We  have 
created the industrial Europe and we accepted the customs dismantlement only 
because we were given an assurance that our country will have a counterpart 
in agriculture,  for 50 per cent of the cultivated land in the EEC is in France. 
It is in a position,  therefore,  to supply the Community.' 
Speaking on  14 October,  the President of the Movement for  Safe-
guarding Family Farms came  back to the ideas expressed by the Minister of 
Agriculture when he discussed the common agricultural market: 'Our partners 
in the Common Market refuse to finance the liquidation of our surpluses or to 
bear the cost of disastrous withdrawals.  At one fell swoop the Common Market 
is seen in broad daylight for the bluff that it is. ' 
(Le Monde,  8 and 15  October 1968) 
2.  General de Gaulle's visit to Turkey 
General de Gaulle,  President of the French Republic,  was the offi-
cial guest of Turkey from 27 to 31  October 1968.  From the long joint commu-
nique issued at the end of this official visit it is to be noted that: 'Both parties 
- 29-expressed their satisfaction at the positive development of the "association" 
between Turkey and the European Economic Community and confirmed the 
need to make an effort to strengthen these association links.' 
(Le Monde,  27,  28,  29  and 31  October 1968) 
3.  Mr.  Michel Debre outlines the reasons and substance of France's 
proposals to its Common Market partners 
At the close of the meeting of the Council of Ministers on 6 Novem-
ber 1968,  Mr.  Joel Le Theule, Secretary of State for Information,  read the 
following communique: 
'The Minister for Foreign Affairs gave a report on the international 
situation.  He  gave an account of the meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Com-
mon Market which was recently held in Brussels . 
The major part of Mr.  Debre's oral report was in connexion with 
the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the EEC in Brussels.  The French 
Foreign Minister explained the reasons for the French initiative.  He  hoped 
that the Community would overcome the present crisis,  as France wishes t.) 
demonstrate that it is possible to continue the common policy,  even without 
enlarging the Community. 
In fact,  Mr.  Debre presented two memoranda -one concerning the 
Community's external relations and the other the resumption of the common 
policy.  In the first memorandum,  the French Foreign Minister mainly sug-
gested that commercial arrangements be entered into with European States, 
whether or not these are candidates for accession to the Common Market,  as, 
for example,  Austria or Switzerland.  These trade arrangements could be con-
cluded independently from the accession procedure. 
The proposal was not a new one,  Mr.  Le Theule pointed out. It was 
in accordance with the suggestion made by General de Gaulle in 1967 in a press 
conference. 
Mr.  Debre also suggested that technological co-operation be devel-
oped,  as well as agreements on patents.  These should,  however,  be subject to 
- 30-two conditions: (a) that there should be agreement among the Six,  and (b)  that 
the Six adopt a  common position in any external negotiations. 
These proposals will now be looked into by the Commission. 
In the second memorandum,  the Minister for Foreign Affairs made 
a clear reference to the resumption of the common policy,  which could be 
pursued independently from s.ny enlargement of the Community as a number of 
problems had not yet been settled.  These applied,  in particular,  to the fiscal 
obstacle.  A number of regulations had to be harmonized. As for the transport 
problem,  this had hardly been touched upon. 
It was absolutely necessary to clear all these difficulties,  as other-
wise the customs union would automatically have to be reconsidered. 
These two French proposals are not a step towards the enlargement 
of the Community but show that France's attitude is far from being negative, 
since it suggests both external negotiations and the development of the comm.}n 
policy.  There was a  lengthy discussion on these two memoranda,  and their 
approval by all the Six was facilitated by the very "co-operative" attitude of 
the German Foreign Minister. ' 
(Le Monde,  7 November 1968) 
4.  French National Assembly: Mr.  Debre on Europe 
'Do you think that at long last 1969 will be the great year for Europe 
or are we to fear that this will be the year of a great Europea:1 setback?' This 
was the question which Mr.  Arthur Conte (Gaullist) put to the French Govern-
ment during the debate held on  7 November on the budget for the Foreign Mi-
nistry. 
Mr.  Raymond Bousquet (Gaullist), delegate to the European Parlia-
ment,  spoke of the enlarger11ent of the Common Market and of the risks that 
the very structure and aims of the Community would change if the EE C were 
to expand to comprise twelve to fifteen member States.  He  said:  '\Ve are, 
however,  ready to deal with tht:lse difficulties: on two conditions.  The first is 
that the specific problems of the applicant States - currency,  agricultural, 
- 31-structural, economic, etc.  - should be resolved under conditions which do not 
threaten what the Six of us have built with so much effort.  The second is that 
the applicant States put to good advantage the time we are going to take to con-
solidate our Community,  to adjust to the situation that will result from their 
membership.  Mr.  Bernard Destremeau (Independent Republican) trusted that 
there would be periodic consultations between the six Foreign Ministers as 
envisaged in May 1967 when the heads of State met in conference in Rome.  He 
added that the policy of detente was the expression of Western Europe ..... 
including the UK.  He said that the touchstone of the British Government's 
European co-operation spirit lay in accepting its responsibility concerning the 
security of Europe and setting up a federal body. 
Speaking in the afternoon session,  Mr.  Andre Chandernagor (Fede-
ration of the Democratic and Socialist Left) stated that there were two new 
factors concerning Europe: the fact that the three British political parties had 
joined the Action Committee for the United States of Europe and the nine-point 
revival plan to which Mr.  Debre had given his assent.  He  added:  'If,  failing 
any immediate agreement on the major issues,  empirical arrangements make 
progress possible,  then we shall not oppose them.  Quite the contrary.' 
Mr.  Michel Debre,  Foreign Minister,  gave details about the foreign 
affairs budget and then dealt particularly with France's main concern: balance 
and the union of Europe.  He  stressed the importance for Europe of Franco-
German relations and outlined France's attitude to the Common Market since 
1958:  'Everything in Europe depends on Franco-German relations.  The Soviet 
intervention in Czechoslovakia once again highlights the serious problems of 
Germany's status ( .....  ).  We  have been  constantly concerned to co-operate 
with that country.  We  have had great faith in the judgment of our partners.  We 
think that they are guided by the same spirit and will continue to be so. 
It would be inconsistent with the facts and really unfair not to pay 
tribute to the German leaders' desire for peace,  for renewal and for a sincere 
European understanding. 
Time may only bring further changes, that is the pursuit of Germany's 
peaceful development and the gradual awareness of the European peoples,  both 
in the East and West,  of their solidarity.  France will make every effort to 
promote this peaceful development,  to encourage this mutual understanding 
and to blot out memories which are almost ineradicable. 
The Common Market has been and in some ways still is a great 
adventure for France.  We have fulfilled two conditions and this has enabled 
us to succeed: the common external tariff and the agreement on common 
- 32-policies, particularly for agriculture.  Customs duties were gradually reduced 
and then abolished on 1 July,  and this was in spite of the events of last May. 
With reference to the common external tariff,  furthermore,  we agreed at the 
Kennedy Round to an appreciable reduction which was not originally planned. 
On certain points of our agricultural policy we have made concessions to our 
partners which clash with the Community preference and these have somewhat 
disturbed our own producers and our taxpayers even more. 
We have thus fulfilled our contract as regards the Common Market 
and we have indeed done more.  We have been the prime movers of political 
co-operation between the Six and this could have produced good results if our 
lead had been followed. 
What is the origin of the present difficulties? Ill will on our part? 
Not at all. It is true that we have been taking issue with the supranational ide-
ology since 1958.  To criticize us for this is to adopt a polimical stance,  not 
one of good faith.  No nation of whatever size will agree to be bound by others 
with respect to its fundamental interests. 
The criticism levelled at us is quite clear and has been repeated in 
every wave of anti-French propaganda.  We  are opposed to enlarging the Com-
munity and in doing so we are said to be holding up the progress of Europe. 
This calls for some comment. 
A new factor arose a few years ago: the request for membership 
submitted by the United Kingdom.  But in fact the problem is that of enlarging 
the Community - described as being that of the Six  - into a  Community which 
would quickly become one of twelve and perhaps more.  Would this be a good 
thing or not? This is an open question.  One point,  however,  is beyond doubt 
and that is the. change in everything. 
Political co-operation as we want it would become much more dif-
ficult.  Is it possible to envisage common thought and action,  internally as well 
as externally,  between men and women in the countries surrounding the Baltic 
and those in the countries surrounding the Mediterranean or the Adriatic? It 
w~uld no longer be a  Community but a small league of nations on the European 
scale. 
From the economic point of view,  the change is also considerable. 
It is hard to argue that with ten,  twelve or fourteen countries,  there would he 
the same free exchange or the same hopes for a  common economic policy as 
between six. It would be equally difficult to establish identical customs tarriffs 
-33-vis-a-vis the outside world and,  again,  equally difficult,  not to say impossible, 
to establish trade policies drawn up together either within this vast area or 
vis-a-vis third countries. 
The problem of what is known as the British accession issue is one 
of a profound change.  We  can envisage this.  We  shall not keep the Common 
Market going on our own if  nobody wants it any more.  But let us dare to say 
this,  for before going on from one adventure to another,  we  have the right to 
require that the business should be honestly and fully investigated by the Six 
and that they should unanimously lay down the clear policies and take the 
definite decisions which must be envisaged in view of such a complete and 
profound change which would be so pregnant with consequences and that each 
one clearly assume his responsibilities. 
It is true that the European Commission has submitted a report, 
parts of which are excellent.  But the heart of the matter,  as I just described 
it,  has been side-stepped.  The report does no more than say that the develop-
ments would depend on the negotiations themselves.  This is indeed what we 
do not want.  It is not a question of starting from scratch again.  Nor is it a 
question of starting from a formal statement: the Treaty of Rome,  the whole 
Treaty and nothing but the Treaty.  Such a statement would conceal too many 
divergent interpretations for the Treaty is only a framework containing some 
out-of-date articles and articles which have been applied in a different way 
from that originally planned. 
Further justification for our attitude is to be found in the great dif-
ferences in the way the British and continental economies are developing(  ..... ). 
We  have also to think of ourselves and particularly of the great 
recovery drive which the events of last May and the social discussions which 
followed it impose upon us.  The competitiveness of our economy was impaired 
and if we were able boldly to adhere to the time-limit of 1 July,  it is now our 
duty to greet any new overtures with justifiable caution. 
At the same time what we propose is less a recovery plan than the 
application of decisions already taken jointly.  It is not enough,  to guarantee 
the vitality of this vast market,  to remove customs duties nor indeed to lay 
down the principles governing certain common policies.  Customs and fiscal 
harmonization measures must be taken,  failing which,  one way or the other 
customs duties will reappear and more quickly than one might imagine to cor-
rect the anomalies.  A European effort must be made to encourage enterprises 
to come up to the level of world competition,  provided of course that they are 
European enterprises and not legal fac;ades hiding decision-taking centres 
outside Europe. 
- 34-Why do we hesitate to take such measures? For the same reason 
that causes us to pause before entering into commercial arrangements.  It will 
not be acknowledged that there is a reasonable alternative to the blind mutation 
of the Community.  We did not agree to enter into the difficult adventure of the 
Common Market to go,  with our eyes closed,  along any path not carefully ex-
plored in advance or where we have no assurance about the intentions of those 
who travel with us. 
Despite its diversity,  Europe is a whole. It is not possible to be 
happy,  prosperous,  and carefree in one part of Europe if the bridges to the 
other side,  connecting us with the East European countries,  including the main 
State which is Russia,  are to remain permanently broken.  To accept this 
division is to give up building a  Europe at peace. It also means giving up the 
European idea itself in so far as the resulting insecurity would for a  long time 
deprive the nations of Europe of the chance of pursuing their own policy. If  we 
fail gradually to bridge the gap we are bound to accept that Europe will be at 
the mercy of the power blocs.  This leads us to the major problem of detente 
which is the key to the future. ' 
Speaking after the Foreign Minister,  Mr.  Abe lin, Secretary-General 
of the 'Progress and Modern Democracy' Party,  said that by rejecting any 
supranational arrangements,  France had helped to break up all the machinery 
which could have given Europe real size and :real common policies: 'Our argu-
ment is that France has deprived itself of most of its means of action.  By 
leaving NATO,  whose shortcomings we did not under-estimate,  we have lost 
any power of control or initiative in the allied defences and we have made 
Europe more dependent on the United States.  By rejecting any form of supra-
nationality and by opposing British accession to the Common Market as a 
matter of principle,  you really have helped to bring to a halt all the machinery 
which could have led to a common European policy. 
France wishes to strengthen the Community without enlarging it but 
the majority of its partners want to strengthen it by enlarging it: it is possible 
to go on for a  long time like this.  Uniting Europe obviously calls for serious 
study but results will not be obtained unless there are a minimum of ultimate 
political objectives; you on the other hand challenge them in the name of your 
principles.  You reject what you refer to as the "political ideology ofthe Treaty 
of Rome".  What has happened to your great ambitions in Latin America? And 
what became of your drive against the supremacy of  the dollar? And the Franco-
German Treaty?' Mr.  Abelin concluded: 'It is true that there could be no 
Europe without France but today our partners have the right to ask: is it really 
possible to build Europe with France.' 
(Le Monde,  8,  9 November 1968; 
French National Assembly) 
- 35 -5.  Mr.  Bettencourt: the Six are not all going in the same direction 
When he took the chair on  Saturday at the annual general meeting of 
the Chamber of Commerce and Industry at Fe  camp Mr.  Andre Bettencourt, 
Minister for Industry,  discussed the problems of the Common Market,  parti-
cularly those of agriculture. 
He took issue with the attitude 'of our partners who consider that 
our agriculture produces too much'.  He added:  'I am prepared to believe in 
the Common Market and in a strong Europe but it must be recognized that we 
are not at this moment in time all going in the same direction.  We  cannot 
allow ourselves to be made bankrupt.  France cannot,  on its own,  carry the 
burden of helping the developing countries with those products in which it has 
a surplus.  The whole of Europe must lend a hand.' 
He  concluded by calling on industrialists in difficulty to amalgamate: 
1 Even when they are on a large scale,  family concerns can no longer remain 
so today.  This means they needs must conclude agreements.' 
(Le Monde,  12 November 1968) 
6.  Europe discussed as the National Assembly debates agriculture 
When the National Assembly discussed the budget for agriculture, 
some speakers laid special stress on the European implications of French 
agricultural policy. 
Mr.  Roland Boscary-Monsservin,  a member of the European Par-
liament,  wanted to set the  debate in its 'right context': the European context. 
After quoting the figures given by the European Commission concerning agri-
cultural production in the member States,  he said: 'If I allow myself to start 
by quoting the figures,  it is because I feel it is absolutely essential to begin 
this debate by dispelling the current misunderstandings about surpluses,  to 
"break up" this atmosphere of defeatism, one might almost say of panic or at 
any rate of Malthusianism in which some people have for some time now been 
trying to cast over our agriculture. 
- 36-It is said that industry should expand more rapidly.  But industry,  or 
large sections of it,  has felt that to do this,  the expansion of the agricultural 
sector had to be curtailed. 
Arguments of the following variety have recently been appearing in 
the newspapers,  both the financial and economic ones: "The agricultural price 
is too high",  "The agricultural price means a large wage bill",  "Agricultural 
taxation is heavy",  "Agricultural taxation prevents us from making industrial 
investments".  Or even: "Agriculture wishes to close its doors on  the outside 
world".  "The practical result is that the outside world does not wish to pur-
chase our industrial goods. If  you do not reverse the position,  you will prevent 
us from achieving any expansion in our external trade." 
It goes without saying that some of our partners,  who have never 
accepted the idea of preferences ... have been delighted at the opportunity to 
echo this kind of view.  But let us,  just the same,  not forget that there is a 
Hamburg and there is a Rotterdam in Europe! 
If  we add - why not say this openly? - the political factor: we  do not 
want the United Kingdom in the Common Market.  Let me make it quite clear, 
Sir,  that I am not opposed to your position.  But when we take an uncompro-
mising attitude which is,  because of the Treaty provisions,  based on  the law, 
we are confronted with uncompromising attitudes which have no foundation in 
law. 
Major efforts are being concentrated on slowing down expansion in 
our agricultural sector because this is one of the sectors to which we are the 
most attached and all of this is taking place in the atmosphere to which I have 
just referred. 
The real question arising today -over and above your budget and 
over and above what is written and what is said - is in fact whether the agri-
cultural potential is to give way to the industrial potential. 
Similarly,  are we going to think again about all our ideas on prefer-
ences,  are we going to open the door to some kind of free trade dispensation? 
Be under no delusion,  ladies and gentlemen,  this is the real point 
at issue. ' 
- 37  -Turning to the Minister,  Mr.  Boscary-Monsservin added:  'Someone, 
whose words carry much greater weight than mine must ensure that there is 
no  question of revising the common agricultural policy, as so far implemented, 
especially as regards the market organizations and the defence of the price 
principle. 
And again,  Sir,  perhaps you should outline what the common policy 
should look like. ' 
Mr.  Boscary-Monsservin concluded his speech by referring to the 
problem of Britain's accession to the Communities: 'We cannot oppose both the 
enlargement of the Community and its consolidation,  bearing in mind the ulti-
mate political objectives it implies.  I agree with you in not wanting any en-
largement of Europe because I am convinced that if  we admit Britain - as 
Mr.  Debre so aptly expressed it - we shall be obliged to admit Austria and 
Denmark.  Then the substratum,  all this carefully harmonized market to which 
we are very attached,  will become diluted and we shall end up with the kind of 
arrangements that obtain in a free trade area. ' 
Mr.  Louis Briot,  also a Gaullist member of the European Parliament, 
began by congratulating Mr. Boulin for having acted in concert  with Mr. Mansholt 
in presenting a  'viewpoint in some respects analogous'.  But in his speech 
Mr.  Briot showed that in spite of everything 'there is no symbiosis,  no rela-
tionship between the Community budget and that of the Minister'.  He conceded 
that there was indeed a  Community preference but there was also an Article II 
in the Treaty of Rome which provided for maintaining external trade links. 
'Our European colleagues',  he said,  'attach much greater importance to ex-
ternal trade than to Community preference.' 
Mr.  Andre Rossi,  a Christi2n Democrat member of the European 
Parliament,  then took the floor:  'It is not necessary to repeat that this budget 
is a transitional one,  pending the finalization by the EEC of measur.es that have 
not yet been worked out in full. '  He  answered the speakers who had stressed 
Community preference by saying: 'They should not forget that the Common 
Market already absorbs more than half our exports.' 
Mr.  Boulin stated in reply to the various speakers and in particular 
to Mr.  Boscary-Monsservin: 'The range of measures I have described could 
not be devised for a purely national situation.  As you know,  the European 
Commission has drawn up a working document which is designed to adjust the 
common agricultural policy to the present situation. 
- 38-This document is now being discussed within the Commission in 
Brussels and it seems that these are difficult discussions. It will not be until 
December that the Governments of the member States will learn of the con-
clusions they reach. It will probably take well into 1969 for the Council of 
Ministers of the Six to take the overall decisions,  which in the short term 
justifies the measures I have proposed to you. 
France awaits this document with interest. 
The national measures which it  proposes reflect its desire to organize 
itself; and this could serve as an example.  But of course it is ready to take 
into consideration any reasonable and effective proposals which the Commis-
sion or our partners may make - some of which may be modelled on our own 
measures -and,  of course,  they could be harmonized at the European level. 
I should however like,  while observing the discretion that is neces-
sary on the eve of international negotiations,  to recall the principles on which 
the French Government will not compromise. 
The first principle is Community preference.  Not only must this be 
maintained but the figures I quoted a few moments ago oblige us to improve 
it.  This is one of the essential principles which the French Government will 
not fail to recall at the negotiations. 
It is indeed for our partners - as it is for us - to look first for sup-
plies within the European Economic Community,  which is the best demonstra-
tion of a truly European outlook but also it is the most obvious way of reducing 
the expenditure incurred by the common agricultural policy. 
It must also be remembered that France - and this is the second 
principle underlying its action - considers it essential fully to maintain finan-
cial solidarity between the member States; this is the most practical proof of 
the European solidarity envisioned in the financial settlement of 1962.  1 
(Debates,  National Assembly,  15 November 1968) 
- 39-7.  Europe and French nuclear policy 
In connexion with the debate on the budget of the French Scientific 
Research Ministry,  Mr.  Ren~ Pleven (Democrat Centre) referred to the prob-
lems of Euratom's future and the attitude of the French Government to that 
organization. 
Mr.  Pleven wondered whether French efforts and those made by 
France's partners were effective enough.  Nuclear power stations in the six 
countries only produced 2 per cent of electric energy,  as against 15 per cent 
in Britain. If  the Six fail to indroduce a European policy,  Europe will be domi-
nated by the United States and incapable of providing its industries with the 
energy sources they will require by 1980. 
Mr.  Pleven was surprised at the type of reactors selected  by France 
and felt that it was mainly because of unproven reactors and booster genera-
tors that the scattering of efforts was so great.  He  believed that the nuclear 
power station market should be a  single market for the Europe of the Six. 
With regard to the project of building a Community isotope separation 
plant,  Mr.  Pleven hoped that France would be the first to give a positive reply 
to the proposal made by the Commission of the Communities for European 
co-operation in the field of nuclear energy for civilian purposes. 
Replying to the speaker,  Mr.  Galley stated in particular: 'We are 
evidently in a situation,  as pointed out by you,  Mr.  Pleven,  where everyone 
is trying to answer to the difficulties through national programmes. ' 
Mr.  Galley went on to say: 'What would be the advantage of our 
working together? This could be quite considerable but,  as is the case for 
marriage, there must be two partners.  Our country'sindustryhasendeavoured 
to establish contacts with German,  Italian or  Dutch firms and has often found 
that its partners are not as particular as we are about American licences and 
not as concerned as we are about independence.  My predecessor,  Mr.  Maurice 
Schumann,  had suggested tothe Council of Ministers of Euratom that research 
work on booster generators should be co-ordinated in order to design with 
German industry a large power-station of 1, 000 megawatts which could sup-
plement the Phenix reactor which has currently a priority place in the French 
programme.  The Germans,  in order to protect the position of their industry in 
that sector,  have not accepted our suggestion and have felt it advisable to join 
a  Belgian and Dutch industrial grouping. 
-40-Well,  Mr.  President,  in this very special field,  we  had made a 
definite offer but this was turned down. 
Pursuing our efforts in the same direction,  we have recently made 
contact with Italian industry.  Our talks with the Italians were very useful and 
even constructive.  I hope to be in a position to announce in 1969 a programme 
of co-ordination of our efforts with those of the Italian industry.  The Italians 
are currently carrying out the PE C experiment,  which is very similar to our 
own Rapsodie project,  and I think they are prepared to participate in our 
Phenix project.  You see,  Mr.  President,  I am doing exactly what you would 
wish me to do. 
As long as we experience financial difficulties in order to ensure 
the normal progress of research work in our country - difficulties which are 
clearly reflected in our austerity budget - we  shall be unable to agree to Eura-
tom spending large amounts on items which,  in the opinion of our partners 
themselves,  are only of very limited interest,  not to say of any interest at all, 
in the nuclear industry context. 
When I find that Euratom is prepared to subsidize activities that 
are likely to further American industrial penetration in our country,  I cannot 
but deplore this action.  American commercial dynamism surely does not 
require such additional help. 
Quite frankly,  France is today quite determined to assign to Eura-
tom a number of tasks that would be additional to the national programmes. 
As you will observe, it is not my intention to pronounce a wholesale 
condemnation of everything that has been done by Euratom,  but with regard 
to the forthcoming negotiations,  we  should like Euratom to concentrate mainly 
on programmes of common interest,  as we would not wish any of our countries 
to participate in work of a limited interest for the Community. ' 
(Le Monde,  20  November 1968; 
Official Gazette,  French National Assembly,  19 November 1968) 
-41-8.  Europe discussed in National Assembly and Senate debates on the 
defence and foreign policy budgets 
1.  Defence budget (National Assembly) 
Mr.  Messmer,  Minister for the Armed Forces,  began the debate 
by saying: 'French defence policy is not one of isolation': 'We are', he went on, 
'in the Atlantic Alliance and we are staying there'.  Commenting on French 
policy in the context of recent events in Czechoslvakia,  Mr.  Messmer said: 
'The French Government naturally condemns the invasion of Czechoslovakia 
by foreign troops and we are,  of course,  interested to know the real reasons 
for the increase in Soviet naval power in the Mediterranean,  but I do not see 
how any defence policy different from ours would remedy this situation.  Has 
NATO,  which some would like us to join again,  given our alliance the means 
to respond more effectively than we did in the Czechoslovakian crisis and can 
it stand up against the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean when the 
high seas are open to all those who wish to sail there provided they commit no 
act of hostility? ' 
This statement did not satisfy all the members of the Assembly and 
a number of speakers,  inducting some from the majority,  expressed doubts 
and concern. 
Mr.  Montalat (SFIO Federation) thought that France was wrong to 
withdraw from NATO,  given the present international situation. 
Mr.  Cazenave (PDM)  and Mr.  Leo Hamon (UDR)  thought that mili-
tary co-operation should be initiated within the Europe of the Six:  'We are 
induced carefully to consider the possibilities for European military co-opera-
tion,' said Mr.  Hamon ..... 'Could we not,  in so far as this be possible,  bring 
the Western European nuclear force and the British force closer together to 
constitute the nucleus of a flexible form of co-operation which would respect 
the identity of the different national forces? Could not forces of conventionally-
armed countries be joined to them as a necessary complement that would ensure 
balance in a changing world?' This point about European co-operation was 
taken up by many speakers from the Modern Democrats Group. 
In reply at the end of the debate,  the Minister stated: 'With regard 
to Europe,  what we desire is its construction and I would remind Mr.  Stehlin 
that it was we who,  in the Fouchet plan,  made precise proposals for building 
the political Europe; it is not our fault if our partners did not accept them.  But 
Europe will not and cannot be a way of saving on defence budgets because,  in 
-42-the last analysis,  the strength of an alliance is the sum of the resources that 
are pooled. If  I may take a leaf from Mr.  Sanguinetti's book,  I would say that 
some countries should not use Europe as an excuse for failing to act. ' 
2.  Foreign Affairs debate (Senate) 
When the foreign affairs budget was discussed in the Senate,  a basic 
disagreement quickly emerged between the views of the Government and those 
of the Opposition,  put forward in particular by Mr.  Lecanuet,  President of the 
Democratic Party of the Centre. 
Mr.  de Lipkowski,  Secretary of State,  opened the debate by saying 
that France was determined to accelerate the uniting of Europe: 'We have to 
go forward and it is for this reason that a  French revival plan  was proposed on 
29 October. It is not enough to abolish customs duties or lay down a  common 
policy.  We have to eleminate the technical obstacles to trade: taxation,  trans-
port,  energy.  We  are at a turning point in the application of the Treaty.  The 
time has come to bridge the gaps left by the Treaty such as policies for indus-
try and science.  We  wish to create a  European patent to encourage the consti-
tution of European commercial enterprises and we will work together to bridge 
the technological gap between Europe and the USA  which has got worse since 
the time when Mr.  Marjolin denounced it in 1964. 
( .....  ) 
If,  after careful study,  the Europe of the Six decides with the full 
knowledge of the facts to enlarge the Community,  France will not be able on 
its own to maintain the present system through thick and thin. Thus there is no 
veto on our part but the requi"rement that the United Kingdom should adjust 
while still outside the Community and not within it. ' 
Mr.  Lecanuet,  speaking after the Secretary of State,  raised the 
debate to a discussion of principles and was strongly critical of the 'Europe 
of the nation States' theory; in reality this was nothing more than a  Europe of 
States and the antithesis of the Europe of peoples. 
'The lesson to be learned from these events is clear: either you will 
take a great step forward in the Common Market or else it will fall to pieces. 
Your proposals of 4 and 5 November are encouraging.  We  ask you togofurther 
to find a compromise by means of the mutual concessions that circumstances 
call for because France's recovery,  which is necessary for Europe,  will not 
otherwise be successful.  Economic integration is not enough to trigger off 
political integration but political integration is essential to economic integra-
tion. 
-43-Be realistic.  Europe needs France.  Our partners are aware of this 
but more than ever before,  France needs Europe.  These plain truths point 
the way to reason and to recovery. It is this course that we ask you to pursue.' 
In reply to Mr.  Lecanuet,  Mr.  Debre,  the Minister,  dealt with the 
British accessi.on problem only in relation to common European defence policy: 
'Without the common external tariff,  the French economy would not have been 
able to withstand the shock and will not be able to do so for a long time to 
come ( .....  ).  At the free trade conference,  the United Kingdom was in a rela-
tively isolated position. It is those who argue on an "aU-or-nothing" basis who 
should be asked to show some readiness to compromise. 
I should like everyone to be aware of the importance of the develop-
ment of Europe's economy and of the place occupied by the French economy 
jn it.  We  do not have the right to place our economy in a less favourable situa-
tion in the name of this or that ideology. ' 
'We are asked',  he said,  'to build a  European defence.  Does this 
mean nuclear arms and a  European nuclear force? If  not,  there is no defence. 
If so,  this implies the option for Germany to possess nuclear arms and this 
is something that France does not want. If  Germany were to be a nuclear power 
there would no longer be any question of detente and something else would 
emerge in the background of the cold war.  The problem as you can see is both 
politically and m!)rally serious.  We  think of the detente in a different way from 
our American friends and our .Soviet partners. 
Our idea of detente is to call the nations of the West to a discussion 
with the Soviets and to state that all European nations have the right to free 
self  -determination. 
Apart from very wide differences of view,  there will be a forward 
movement the moment there is a resolve to put the cold war on one side and it 
·will find expression in the development of economic activities and in an aware-
ness of sharing a  common future. 
It is this policy we intend to pursue in affirming that the detente 
must lead to freedom for all. ' 
(Le Monde,  6-7 December 1968) 
-44-Germany 
1.  Statement on European policy by the German Government 
On  -t  October 1968, Dr. Jttrgen Ruhfus, Spokesman for the Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs,  stated,  with reference to the speech made on 3 October 
by Mr.  Harmel,  Belgian Foreign Minister,  that the German proposals for en-
larging and developing the Communities had been explained in detail on 27  Sep-
tember by Mr.  Brandt,  Minister of Foreign Affairs. If any of the other part-
ners made new proposals,  these would naturally be studied with the greatest 
attention by the German Government.  The German proposals were not directed 
against anyone and the Federal Government did not wish to see any kind of 
group form within the Communities. 
The Federal Government had stated its funuamental willing11ess to 
co-operate with the United Kingdom and the other applicant States in every 
sphere that was not covered by the Treaties of Rome,  even if France did not 
wish to join in.  The Government would,  however,  not take this beyond a point 
which might give rise to French oposition. It still rejected the attempt of the 
'extremists' in the European Communities to force Britain's entry by making· 
the internal development of the Community dependent on its enlargment. 
Speaking to the press in Bonn on 21  October,  l\lr.  GUnter Diehl. 
Secretary of State and Spokesman for the Government,  explained this ne,,· 
shift in emphasis in European policy.  In reply to the question as to where the 
Government stood with regard to the idea of increased co-operation \\ith the 
United Kingdom in areas not covered by the Treaties,  Mr.  Diehl referred to 
a sentence in the Government statement made by Chancellor Kiesing-er on 
16 October.  In this,  the Chancellor had ascribed the stag11ation in Europe to 
the fact that the ,Community had taken on too much at once and was attempting 
to reconcile very different attitudes.  He  said that no-one was  completely right 
and no-one completely wrong on European policy.  The fact that the  Communit~· 
could not be enlarged did not mean that there could be no discussion of pos-
sible co-operation with the applicant States. 
The accession issue was no longer of the greatest relevance for the 
United Kingdom; what mattered was practical co-operation.  This could be 
achieved with regard to defence within NATO or through technological deve  1-
opment.  In seeking co-operation with the United Kingdom and the other appli-
cant States,  the door had to be left open for France and care taken that France 
was not left out.  The question was how far was it possible to go without reach-
ing a  'critical phase' in European policy,  which would bring with it new prob-
lems. 
(VWD-Europa,  4 and 21  October 1968) 
-45-2.  Bonn and Latin American trade problems -Mr.  Brandt,  Foreign 
Minister, warns  the EEC against the widening trade gap with 
Latin America 
Speaking on  6 October 1968 - prior to Mr.  Brandt's departure to 
take part in the Conference of German Ambassadors in the Latin American 
States -Mr. Ruhfus,  spokesman for the Foreign Office,  stated that the 
Federal Government was endeavouring to give greater meaning and depth to its 
dialogue with the leading Latin American politicians.  On the main issues of 
international policy,  Latin Ameria and Germany had a great many views and 
points in common.  These included the problem of disarmament,  armaments 
control,  the security of the non -nuclear States and the unhindered peaceful utili-
zation of nuclear energy.  There was a wide measure of agreement in the as-
sessment of East/West relations too. 
Economic relations would play a special part in the discussions held 
during this visit.  Maintaining and stepping up trade with Latin America was 
important to Germany.  In recent years trade had not expanded so favourably 
and this had also affected German trade within the EEC.  The oft-expressed 
concern of Latin America that imports into the Community would encounter 
difficulties because of the external tariffs and levies was,  however,  not in-
cluded in this generalization,  said the German spokesman. Communityimports 
from Latin America rose from $  1,650m in 1958 to $  2, 740m in 1967 or 65 
per cent as compared with the increase in German exports of around $  450m 
from $1,600m to $2,050m or 28 per cent. 
The speaker recalled that the German Government had spoken up for 
the legitimate interests of the Latin American countries within the EEC and 
would also endeavour in the near future to find a satisfactory solution for both 
sides. 
On 25  October,  Mr.  Willy Brandt,  the Foreign Minister,  warned that 
the common agricultural policy could hamper the development of the Latin 
American States and hence have adverse political implications.  Before the 
end of his visit to Chile,  Argentina,  Uruguay and Brazil,  he said that the prob-
lem of the common agricultural policy was discussed in his talks with all four 
States - sometimes in very strong terms. 
These countries were much more diverse politically,  economically 
and socially than was often imagined in Europe.  He  said: 'We found reliable 
friends in all four States who wanted us to take a greater interest in them. 
This is not necessarily a matter of money.  Above all they want to share our 
economic and technological experience. ' 
-46-Mr.  Brandt's visit to Brazil proceeded in a very friendly atmos-
phere.  When he stayed in Rio de Janeiro,  he was received by President Arturo 
da Costa e  Silva and by Mr.  Jose Magalhaes Pinto,  Foreign Minister. 
The main topics in Both discussions were East-West relations,  the 
'all-German' policy,  the reservations of both Governments about the nuclear 
non-proliferation treaty and the possibilities of co-operation between Brazil 
and Germany in the peaceful use of nuclear energy,  the disparity between in-
dustrialized and developing countries and between Western Europe and Latin 
America. 
In Brazil there was great interest in the ide~ of an economic agree-
ment,  a point which had already been discussed between Argentina and Germany. 
The Government representative in Rio took issue with the preferences given 
to the coffee-producing states in Africa and the all-round hardening of the com-
mon agricultural policy.  Mr.  Brandt promised to work for an 'open policy' 
with respect to the wishes of third countries. 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  7 October 1968; 
Die Welt,  26 October 1968) 
3.  Mr.  strauss,  Federal Finance Minister,  and Mr.  Schroeder,  Fed-
eral Minister for Defence,  discuss European policy 
Addressing his party's regional executive on 7 October 1968, 
Mr.  Strauss,  CDU  Chairman and Finance Minister,  said that Europe could 
not be achieved by frivolous discussions but only by a process of welding to-
gether all the component countries.  Germany,  moreover,  needed 'reconso-
lidated' connexions.  He was strongly opposed to the constant discussion of a 
revaluation of the German Mark and said that this had to be struck from the 
agenda. 
Speaking in Frankfurt on 8 October 1968,  Dr.  Schroeder,  Federal 
Minister for Defence,  called for a bolder European policy on the part of the 
German Government for Britain's admission to the European Economic Com-
munity. 
Speaking in the Economic Forum of Hesse, healsocalledforan 'over-
haul' of Germany's approach to East Europe and emphasized the willingness 
-47-of the German Government to increase defence expenditure in view of the 
Soviet invasion of Czechoslvakia.  With reference to defence policy,  he said 
that there had,  so far,  been no cause to abandon NATO's 'flexible response' 
doctrine as formulated in May 1967; on the other hand,  it had to  be ascertained, 
within the Alliance,  that sufficient resources and armaments would be made 
available in the right place and at the right time in order to apply this strategy 
with success. 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  9 October 1968) 
4.  -Bundestag debate on Europe 
On  16 October Chancellor Kiesinger told the Bundestag  that increased 
co-operation between the European members of NATO 'Yas of decisive impor-
tance for the future of the Alliance.  He  welcomed the statements of the Ame-
rican President to fulfil its Alliance obligations but pointed out with some 
emphasis that President Johnson regarded it as necessary for the European 
partners to make a greater effort.  Chancellor Kiesinger said that the Govern-
ment intended to carry on with its peace policy in spite of all the disappoint-
ments flowing from the Soviet policy.  He  stressed that France agreed with 
the German proposals for furthering the internal development of the EEC. 
This issue had not to be made contingent on an enlargement of the Community 
otherwise the result would be a standstill.  He  said that France should not be 
excluded from European planning. If France left an empty seat in the EEC this 
could not be filled by the United Kingdom. 
Chancellor Kiesinger stressed that the latest signs from Moscow 
made it seem questionable whether the Soviet Union still approved of co-opera-
tion between socialist and non-socialist States which it had welcomed in the 
Karlsbad agreement. 
In actual fact it was the Soviet Union which intended to change the 
status quo because its new policy embodied the desire to make the current 
division of Germany into something permanent.  The Soviet Union well knew 
that the overwhelming majority of peoples did not share the Russian view.  It 
had always to be remembered that Germany had so far the moral and political 
support of most countries in the world for its peaceful national approach to 
reunification. 
-48-Chancellor Kiesinger repeated that the German Government had,  in 
its endeavours to reunify Germany,  to seek understanding and co-operation 
with all those concerned,  including the Soviet Union.  He  said that he was curi-
ous to know whether the new Moscow Policy would take this offer of understand-
ing as another example of hostile aggression. 
The German Government had always stressed that in solving the 
difficult problems of reunification the interests of all concerned,  including 
Russia,  had to be fairly dealt with.  It had similarly frequently repeated that 
this could only be achieved by slowly overcoming the existing tension.  'This 
is a perfectly open political programme and we are ready to discuss with the 
Soviet Union and with all those concerned how it could be effected. ' 
The Chancellor further emphasized that the Soviet intervention in 
Czechoslovakia had strengthened the Western plans to consolidate the Alliance. 
The German Government was ready to examine the American proposals for 
greater participation by the European countries in the Atlantic Alliance and to 
take part in the relevant consultations. 
He  referred to the statement by Presid-ent Johnson's Defence Minis-
ter,  Mr.  Clifford,  which stressed that an operative Alliance was needed to 
avoid a world catastrophy.  The Chancellor,  still referring to the talks with 
Mr.  Clifford,  added that as regards the balance of payments with the USA  it 
was essential to work out a  'long-term solution acceptable to both countries.' 
With reference to his talks with General de Gaulle in Bonn,  the Chancel-
lor said that they discussed furthering the policy of peace which alone could bring a 
divided Germany together. He repeated General de Gaulle's statement  that France 
would stand  by the NATO countries in the serious event of a catastrophe. France 
had not in any way encouraged Germany to leave NATO.  President  de Gaulle had 
indicated that France had the second greatest  contingent of troops in Germany and 
had not asked for any currency equalization  payments in exchange. 
It was noted with satisfaction in the talks that France too was theo-
retically in favour of enlarging the Community. The Chancellor said that France 
had affirmed its support for all the Bonn proposals for overcoming  the regret-
table stagnation in Europe that affected the internal growth of the Community. 
The stagnation, which was an unfortunate feature of European  policy, 
had its origin, he felt,  in the fact that too much had been attempted at once and in 
continuing endeavours to bring all the different points together in a single package. 
As a result  no progress was being made.  The only approach was a pragmatic one. 
-49-Chancellor Kiesinger again stressed that he had never said that 
Bonn did not wish to take any step in Europe without France: 'That is ridicu-
lous!'  He  had only pointed out that France could not be excluded in the drive 
to unity in Europe,  and in this he was in agreement with the leading statesmen 
of Europe.  'Only with France and Germany and not against or without either 
of the two can Europe be built.' He warned against coupling the internal growth 
of the EEC with the accession issue. It was a question of doing what was pos-
sible.  One could go to the Wailing Wall but no progress would be made by 
complaining. If Germany and France were to be permanently estranged this 
would be a catastrophe.  'I therefore advise whoever is only too ready to be 
critical to look into his heart and ask what he himself would really be able to 
do;  politics is the art of the possible. ' 
In reply to the question - 'And England?' - the Chancellor went on: 
'And England? -You know perfectly well that this Government shares the 
conviction of the Bundestag majority,  that England should and must be part of 
the Community and share in building the Europe of the future.  But you know 
equally well that we cannot achieve this end by causing France to vacate its 
chair in order to sit Britain in its place.  The United Kingdom itself woul.1 not 
wish this.' 
The question - 'And England?' - should not be addressed to him 
but to those who opposed British  entry because of their own interests.  In 
reply to sceptical comments from the opposition rows on German influence on 
France on this matter Dr.  Kiesinger replied: 'Has it been your experience to 
achieve success in convincing everyone to whom you speak of your view?' In 
reply to further comments he said: 'Let us then leave history to decide.' 
'The "preferential" co-operation between Bonn and Paris',  he said, 
'should in no eventuality become a field for prior consultation vis-a-vis the 
other European countries and thereby impede the development of the Commu-
nity'. It should not weaken the European institutions but had on the contrary 
to be directed at strengthening them.  Complaints alone would be purposeless. 
Dr.  Kiesinger said that further efforts would have to be made.  An 
attempt would be made,  be announced,  when Mr.  Harold Wilson,  British 
Prime Minister,  visited Bonn early in the new year to make worthwhile pro-
gress, both as regards Anglo-German relations and co-operation between 
England and the Community. 
In a recent diplomatic message,  Mr. Wilson had repeated with great 
emphasis Britain's wish to become a member of the European Communities. 
A reply would be sent within the next few days. 
-50-During the debate in the Bundestag,  the Opposition was critical of 
the Government statement made by the Chancellor; it had not made clear how 
it intended to carry its foreign and European policies into effect. 
Mr.  Mischnick,  Chairman of the FDP Party,  said that the state-
ments of Mr.  Gromyko,  Soviet Foreign Minister,  should not be described as 
a policy and thus be classed as immutable.  He expressed doubts as to whether 
the consensus of opinions of all parties concerned on some of the foreign policy 
issues arising following the events in Prague was still valid.  With reference to 
the Chancellor's statement that the East European policy would be overhauled, 
Mr.  Mischnick asked whether this meant ignoring the experience so far gained 
together.  The Opposition wished to be kept informed on this subject.  The term 
'overhaul' raised doubts as to whether the outcome of the review might be a 
reversal of the position adopted jointly.  The leader of the Opposition drew 
attention to the lack of any clear statement about France; no policy line had 
emerged; it was not clear whether the Federal Republic was ready to take its 
own line on European policy if de Gaulle were not in agreement.  The Federal 
Government should make it clear to de Gaulle that he could not always advo-
cate a  more pronounced  European importance  and  yet prevent closer co-
operation between the Western States of Europe.  He could also not be opposed 
to America's having the leading rMe in the West and at the same time be op-
posed to a co-ordinated foreign policy on the part of the western nations,  in-
cluding those of EFTA and the EEC. 
With reference to European defence,  he said that the Government 
should pursue its endeavours to achieve a European defence system with greater 
resolution.  Bonn had,  through diplomatic channels,  to find out what the views 
of Moscow were on the Bucharest decisions taken in Warsaw in July 1966; 
these mooted the convening of a  European conference to discuss European 
security issues and a  European declaration of co-operation.  The Government 
should now ask Moscow that was the position with regard to these decisions 
following the events in Prague. 
Mr.  Schmidt,  the SPD Chairman,  said,  with reference to German 
defence,  that one did not feel reassured that everything was in order and that 
the partners in the Alliance or,  indeed,  Germany itself could be relied on.  He 
interpreted Chancellor Kiesinger's reservations on ~his point in his Govern-
ment statement as meaning that these were problems that should not neces-
sarily be dealt with in public.  Consequently the relevant bodies,  such as the 
Foreign Affairs Committee,  had to be informed.  He  thought that there should 
be much more information about the defence endeavours. 
Mr.  Barzel,  Chairman of the CDU/CSU party,  the next spokesman 
on German policy,  said that there were a series of questions which had to be 
-51-discussed not only in the Bundestag but also in NATO.  Prior to the defence 
policy debate that had been announced,  discussions should take place on the 
appropriate measures to be taken. 
The debate ended with a discussion about European policy and Mr. 
Apel,  SPD member,  had some comments about the relevant passages in the 
Government statement.  The Chancellor had clearly said that Franco-German 
co-operation had not got to lead to a  situation prejudicial to any West European 
State.  He  had also said that this co-operation had not to pose a threat to the 
existing European institutions.  The SPD opinion,  however,  was that Franco-
German co-operation should not give the impression that Germany's European 
policy could thereby be influenced and guided.  It was a fact that the EEC had 
become such a valuable instrument in the growth of the economy that the 
Community was not there as a forum for discussions.  Mr.  A  pel saw the lack 
of progress on foreign and defence policies as being one of the main reasons 
for the difficulties facing European integration. 
He described as far from clear some of the Chancellor's comments 
on the merger and on the internal consolidation of the Community.  He said that 
any rapprochement to suit French interests would be inacceptable. The internal 
consolidation of the Community must be pursued jointly with new memberships. 
As regards relations with the United Kingdom,  he said that the Chancellor had 
made no practieal statement about the future.  The announcement of  the meeting 
with Mr.  Wilson was not enough.  Similarly,  with regard to British accession, 
the Community was not bound by institutional regulations,  as laid down in the 
Treaties.  There was an urgent need for definite cohesion in Europe. The ques-
tion had to be asked whether there was any desire to set up a technological 
community and also to tackle the monetary or development policies side-by-
side with the EEC.  It had to be carefully examined whether the Harmel plan 
was acceptable.  It was wrong,  said Mr.  Apel,  to conclude that Gaullism was 
alone responsible for the present difficulties.  The purpose of Gaullist Euro-
pean policy,  to enable Europe to speak with a single voice to the giants of 
East and West,  was to be welcomed,  although it was not certain that French 
policy would achieve this goal. 
Mr.  Sta:ratzke,  the FPD member, wondered whether the Government 
had really helped to further European integration in its own province or whet-
her it was not just sitting in a glass house.  Prior to this,  Mr.  Althammer, 
CDU member,  had advocated co-operation in the armaments business with 
Germany's partners,  particularly France; this would involve taking into ac-
count Germany's own industry,  particularly that of aeronautical engineering. 
(Frankfurther Allgemeine Zeitung,  16,  17,  18 and 19 October  19~8; 
Die Welt,  17 and 18 October 1968; 
Neue ZUrcher Zeitung,  18 October 1968; 
Deutscher Bundestag,  188th Session of 16 October 1968 and 
189th Session of 17 October 1968) 
-52-5.  Bonn's views on agricultural policy 
Interviewed on the radio on 20  October 1968,  Mr.  Hocherl,  Federal 
Mini.ster for Food,  warned German farmers against overproducing at a time 
when meat prices were rising; he said that the stabilization of prices for beef, 
veal and pig meat ought not to lead to a  situation where production again ex-
ceeded demand. 
He was also anxious about the milk surplus in the EE C.  This was 
even more difficult to dispose of than the butter and cereal surpluses.  The 
payment of bonuses for the slaughter of cows would call for very large sums 
of money which the State could not provide on its own.  In order not to break 
up the EEC agricultural policy over the milk issue,  he said he had begun bilat-
eral talks. 
Difficult discussions,  perhaps the most difficult which the EEC had 
had in recent times,  would have to be patiently endured over the agricultural 
programme submitted to the Council of Ministers by the European Commission. 
Mr.  Schmidt (Gellersen),  the SPD agricultural expert,  said he was 
very concerned about the development of the EAGG F which could wreck the 
whole agricultural programme. It would be necessary to take a strong line in 
Brussels about a new way of financing agriculture in the EEC; it would not be 
enough to change the apportionment key. 
The Free Democrats critized the structure programme of Mr. 
Schiller,  Federal Minister for Economic Affairs.  Mr.  Ertl,  Deputy Chairman 
of the FDP,  argued that the structure policy did not warrant priority over a 
dynamic policy for product prices.  The FDP was not opposed to structural 
changes if as a result,  the costs of agricultural enterprises were reduced. 
Mr.  Ertl doubted whether enough employment opportunities could be created 
for around a milli.on farmers who,  in his view,  would have to leave the land. 
The natural process of change that had been going on since 1950 should not be 
pursued in a  socially unacceptable way by recourse to economic policy pres-
sure.  There was a suspicion that the agricultural policy of the coalition was 
directed towards liquidating German agriculture in favour of the EEC. 
He said that if  the farmers in the EEC were to obtain sufficiently 
high prices then supply had to be tighter,  i.e. the area under cultivation and 
the number of farms had to be reduced.  This was the conclusion drawn by 
Dr.  Gollnick (Hamburg) when he spoke at the ninth annual general meeting of 
the Society for Economic and Social Science in Agriculture; the meeting was 
held in Giessen from 7 to 9 October. 
-53-The land left fallow could be turned into parks or forests he said. 
Dr.  Gollnick,  who was standing in as expert adviser for Mr.  Mansholt,  Vice-
President of the European Commission,  added with respect to agricultural 
product supplies that he favoured creating 'a structural import  need' ofootween 
10 and 15 per cent.  He also came out,  inter alia,  in support of free price 
competition in EEC agriculture; but he was,  at the same time,  opposed to any 
cut in farm prices; the proposed 15 to 25 per cent reductions were socially 
unacceptable. 
In reply to the question as to what structural objective the EEC 
should have for its agriculture,  Dr.  Helmut Schmidt of the IFO Institute for 
Economic Planning,  said that there were two competing aims: 
1.  to concentrate land and livestock in large enterprises; 
2.  to work towards a mixed structure comprising related farming 
enterprises: the directly productive,  the supplier firms and the 
service industries. 
Dr.  Schmidt did not however advocate either of these as the 'absolute 
answer'.  He  was particularly in favour of concentration.  Professor Plate 
(Hohenheim) called for an early review of the policy for milk,  wheat and sugar. 
Public money was wasted here.  He rejected any quota system for production. 
This was not at all a  suitable tool for the farm incomes policy. 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  8,  10 and 21  October 1968). 
6.  European policy was the focal point of discussions when Mr.  Borten, 
Norwegian Prime Minister,  visited Bonn 
On  21  October 1968 Mr.  Per Borten,  Norwegian Prime Minister, 
went to the Federal capital for political discussions. 
In a short address of welcome at the airport,  Chancellor Kiesinger 
expressed the hope that Norway would soon be united with the European Com-
munities.  'The age we live in calls for all Europeans to join forces' he said. 
Mr.  Borten emphasized the significance of the contacts between the 
Norwegian and German Governments and indicated that there were no major 
bilateral problems between the two countries; relations between them were 
-54-good and friendly.  He  was convinced that the talks in Bonn would consolidate 
the relations between the two countries. 
Prior to his departure,  Mr.  Borten received German correspondents 
in Oslo and stated his views on European integration problems.  With reference 
to the difficulties confronting the Norwegian Government because of the exter-
nal trade effects of EEC regulations,  he explained the Norwegian standpoint as 
follows: 
'Now that the customs duties of the EEC countries have been approxi-
mated through the introduction of the common external tariff,  the special 
Norwegian exports are facing increasing difficulties in the form of a higher 
customs charge.  This is particularly true of relations with the Federal Repub-
lic which formerly levied a relatively low duty on some of the most important 
Norwegian exports.  On the whole,  these duties will be increased as the ap-
proximation to the common external tariff takes effect. 
The difficulties are to some extent offset by the duty-free or reduced 
duty quotas on  such products as aluminium, magnesium, ferro-alloys, newsprint 
and certain fishery products. 
These quotas are very important in Norway's trade with the Federal 
Republic.  The exports of goods,  for which there are customs quotas,  repre-
sent approximately 45 per cent of Norway's exports to Germany.' 
From the Norwegian standpoint,  the EEC's policy on quotas,  which 
in some cases involves introducing duties on goods which formerly came under 
duty-free quotas,  is viewed with some concern. 
'No account seems to have been taken of the increase in consumption 
and this could act as a brake on the normal expansion of trade. ' 
The question of the accession of Norway and other Nordic States to 
the EEC had been under view by the Government and business circles for a 
long time.  Mr.  Borten stated his view as follows: 
'A  year ago of course Norway asked for negotiations on  links with the 
EEC. Such negotiations have however not taken place. Norway thus continues to 
be very interested in wider co-operation between the EEC and the EFTA States 
and will ::::u.pport every effort in this direction. 
-55 -Interim solutions which could help to offset the adverse effects of 
the present market division would be examined from this standpoint.  Norway 
acknowledged its interest in proposals for such a solution,  which the six EEC 
States agree with. 
The Norwegian bid for association with the EEC is however dependent 
on the United Kingdom's being included in an enlarged EEC.  Great importance 
was attached by Norway to unanimaty being reached by the Nordic States on 
giving effect to their special trade policy objectives.  There was no question 
of any Nordic States joining the EEC on their own. 
In Bonn,  Mr.  Borten expressed Norway's concern at the continuing 
division between the EEC and EFTA and expressed the hope that 'the economic 
problems of Europe will be solved in terms of European co-operation. ' 
In a discussion between Mr.  Borten and Chancellor Kiesinger,  it 
was noted that coupling the question of accession with the internal consolidation 
of the Community and similar issues was not desirable. It was clear that the 
Norwegian Government had a certain interest in coming to some trade policy 
arrangement with the Community which could be finalized in the near future. 
Political observers did not however think that this meant Norway wished to 
abandon the idea of joining the EE C. 
Speaking in Bonn on  21  October,  Chancellor Kiesinger spoke in 
favour of overcoming the trade policy division between EFTA and the EEC 
by means of pragmatic interim arrangements.  Until the accession question 
was solved this course for co-operation should be pursued. 
He  gave an assurance that the German Government would support 
Norway's application to join the Common Market.  In an attempt to find ways 
of bridging the economic policy gap between the applicant States and the EEC 
one way out could be a trade policy arrangement modelled on the Franco-
German agreements of February of this year. 
Mr.  Borten and Chancellor Kiesinger agreed that Europe's stagna-
tion should now be overcome by a  'small steps' policy.  Bilateral consultations 
had to be stepped up between the EFTA and EEC Governments with a view to 
harmonizing their foreign policies. 
At the close of the two days of talks with Chancellor Kiesinger,  Mr. 
Borten told the press in Bonn on  21  October that the two Governments were 
-56-agreed that the attempt to bridge the gap in Europe had to be made through a 
policy of 'small steps' for as long as the major objectives of European policy 
could not be achieved. 
In his talks with the Chancellor,  Mr.  Borten expressed his interest 
in the German proposals to pave the way for the accession of the United King-
dom and the Scandinavian countries to the EEC by reducing trade restrictions. 
Chancellor Kiesinger gave an assurance that he would endeavour to 
promote such an arrangement and he was determined to give due attention to 
the interests of the Community and of the applicant States. Speaking to the press, 
Mr. Borten said that the United Kingdom had so far shown very little interest 
in trade policy arrangements.  He was,  however,  convinced that the British 
attitude 'would soften' if proposals for such an arrangement could assume a -
practical form. 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  22  October 1968; 
Die Welt,  22 October 1968) 
7.  A European Defence Authority? A proposal by Mr.  Blumenfeld,  a 
CDU member of the Bundestag 
In a report submitted for the Political Committee of the NATO 
Assembly,  Mr.  ErikBlumenfield advocatedthe creation of a 'European autho-
rity for common defence matters'; this was put forward at the NATO minis-
terial conference in Brussels in November. 
The decision to set up this authority should be taken by a conference 
of the heads of state of the five main EEC countries, the United Kingdom, 
Norway and Denmark.  It should be left to the discretion of the French Govern-
ment whether or not to participate in such a meeting and in the attendant en-
deavours.  Its scope should include a common armaments budget,  armaments 
co-operation,  the development of European weaponry and technology.  The 
report also dealt in detail with the new situation in Eastern Europe and in the 
Mediterranean and called for a progressive construction of a European confe-
deration.  Europe had to be able to answer the questions of the American Pre-
sident with a single voice. 
(Fran"durter Allgemeine Zeitung,  26 October 1968) 
- 57  -8.  Mr.  Brandt,  German Foreign Minister,  stands firm by the goal of  a 
united Europe 
Speaking on Hesse Radio on 8 December,  Mr.  Brandt,  German 
Foreign Minister,  said that he did not believe that the Western States would 
isolate the Federal Republic.  As long as they stood firm by the objectives of a 
united Europe and of peace in Europe,  there would be no such threat to 
Germany. 
He  was here referring to fears that there would be a change in re-
lationships between the Western States; fundamentally such talk was an after-
effect of the monetary crisis. It was foolish and dangerous to talk of a recon-
stitution of the alliances of the second world war.  The groupings that had 
emerged in the monetary crisis resulted,  he said,  from the affirmation of 
interests in what was certainly an important field; but they were definitely not 
the result of political differences. 
He  recalled that shortly before the Bonn meeting of the Group of 
Ten,  the NATO conference in Brussels had,  in mid-November,  found 'jojnt' 
answers to the political questions.  This cohesion was much more pronounced 
than it had been before the Czechoslovak crisis.  'We are thus not faced with a 
change in Western policy but with a monetary policy calamity and every part-
ner must want to resolve it quickly. '  The fact that different views had been 
expressed on that occasion was,  he thought,  not surprising.  They should, 
however,  not be over-dramatized. 
He took the view that there was a wide community of convictions and 
interests on the fundamental issues.  This cohesion was hardly affected at all 
by day-to-day fluctuations.  This applied equally to defence and to European 
co-operation,  even though there was still controversy about form.  'It is in 
Germany's vital interests not only to hold on to this joint platform but to en-
large it.' 
If  there were signs of improved relations between the United States 
and France and between the United Kingdom and France,  Bonn should not react 
jealously. It need have no fear if others came to a better understanding of 
each other.  This would not affect Germany.  'We shall know how to look after 
our own interests and our partners will understand this. ' 
He further expressed his convi.ction that the stage of a united Europe 
would not come any closer if one were to return to the idea of changing groupings 
-58-and alliances.  In Europe,  everybody needed everybody.  'In Europe,  one should 
not talk of who can isolate whom. ' 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  9 December 1968) 
9.  Mr.  Stoltenberg,  Federal Minister for Research,  pledges his full 
support for Euratom 
Speaking to the press in Bonn on 10 December 1968 Mr.  Stoltenberg, 
Federal Minister for Research,  gave an assurance that the Federal Govern-
ment would make every effort to secure a balanced, forward-looking programme 
for the future activities of the European Atomic Energy Community. 
The future of Euratom had been seriously threatened when the EEC 
Council again failed,  when it met in Brussels on 20-21 December,  to get the 
preparatory work on a comprehensive European policy for science and research 
going again; this was because of discussions  on  British accession to the EEC 
and on international monetary questions.  This development was,  however, 
liable to have a paralyzing effect on the EEC. 
Mr.  Stoltenberg announced that in view of the significance of the 
impending EEC Council meeting he would personally explain the attitude of the 
Federal Government to its French partners.  The future Euratom programme 
had not only to create the necessary conditions for the future work at the joint 
research centres in Italy,  the Netherlands,  Belgium and Germany; it was also 
the prerequisite for concluding agreements on important new research and 
development work.  He  stressed that without such a programme, progress 
towards a competitive nuclear industry in Europe would be threatened and the 
urgently necessary co-operation in other fields of research and technology 
would be severely handicapped. 
Mr.  Stoltenberg said that the Federal Government regarded the 
following as the most necessary tasks for the Euratom research centres: 
a)  in the nuclear field,  industrial research and development work 
on heavy-water reactors,  questions of reactor safety,  direct 
conversion,  nuclear measurement and transuranium; 
b)  the peripheral areas of nuclear and general research particularly 
in solid state physics and materials research; 
-59-c)  additional work in the sphere of general economic co-operation, 
particularly data processing. 
For this purpose Euratom should step up co-operation between the 
member states through associations.  This particularly applies to the basic 
programme for fast-breeder and high temperature reactors, researchfacilities 
in biology and plasma physics and health protection. 
On the same day in Bonn the European Union of Germany described 
European research and technology as the order of the day.  It was necessary 
to adjust the work of Euratom in reactor techniques to meet requirements. 
The Federal Government should therefore try,  at the forthcoming EE C Council 
meeting,  to get appropriate decisions taken on the future work of Euratom so 
as to include nuclear fusion,  transuranium research and nuclear fuels.  Faced 
with the apparent disintegration of Euratom,  the European Governments had 
to decide between an effective European Atomic Energy Community and a 
relapse into an out-of-date petty s$ate dispensation. 
(VWD-Europa,  11  December 1968) 
10.  The Bundestag passes a resolution concerning the Euratom crisis 
On 11  December 1968,  the Bundestag unanimously adopted a reso-
lution calling on the Federal Government to insist,  at the discussions in 
Brussels, that the existing staff levels in Euratom's Joint Research Centres 
be maintained. 
The Bundestag viewed with concern the failure of the Council of 
Ministers to agree on Euratom's working programme as this would very soon 
halve the technical staff engaged in European nuclear research.  The threat of 
this loss in terms of intelli.gence and experience,  for which the six member 
states had paid out so much money,  was 'unacceptable'. 
(Die Welt,  12 December 1968) 
- 60-Great-Britain 
Britain is determined to join the Common Market,  Wilson says 
Speaking at the Lord Mayor's banquet in Londen on  11  November, 
Prime Minister Harold Wilson reaffirmed Britain's determination to join the 
Common Market and called France's persistent veto of British membership 
'tragic for ·Europe'. 
Mr.  Wilson said: 'Our purpose is clear,  known and respected  ..... 
What is tragic for Europe is the blind refusal to face facts.  A refusal nonethe-
le!;'S  obdurate,  even if day by day the explanation .for that refusal takes on new 
anq ever bewildering changes of form.  . . . . .  What is tragic for Europe is not 
a tendency to fight the last war - for Europe has learned her lesson -it is 
that progress in Europe is now held up by those who insist on harbouring the 
resentments of the last war. . . . .  Britain was determined to be neither dis- · 
heartened by plausible soi-disant alternatives,  or attractive and tempting 
blind alleys. ' 
(The Times,  12 November 1968; 
Herald Tribune,  13  November 1968; 
Le Monde,  13  November 1968)" 
- 61-1.  From a speech by Mr.  George Colley T. D. ,  Minister for Industry 
and Commerce of Ireland 
On 1 Octobf:r,  Mr.  George Colley T. D., Minister for Industry and 
Commerce, was speaking before delegates of the EFTA pharmaceutical indus-
tries association. He said:'. . . . .  For many centuries our contacts with the 
Continent were not as frequent as we would have wished but for some years 
now we have been steadily restoring the links which our geography, our heritage 
and our inclinations make so natural for us.  We  are already members of a 
number of European organizations,  political,  economic and cultural.  We ear-
nestly desire still closer co-operation with other European nations and the 
further strengthening of the links that bind us.  We  have entered into a Free 
Trade Area Agreement with our close neighbour Britain,  and our aim is,  with 
Britain,  Denmark and Norway,  to enter the European Economic Community 
so that we  can play our part in the development of a fully united Europe. As you 
know there are difficulties in our path but our aim to enter Europe remains 
unaltered and we are continuing to work towards this goal.  Our immediate 
task is one of preparation so that when the time comes we will have a note-
worthy contribution to make .....  ' 
(By courtesy of the Mission of Ireland to the European Communities) 
2.  Talks with Mr.  John Lynch,  the Irish Prime Minister 
Mr.  John Lynch,  the Irish Prime Minister,  gave a special interview 
to a correspondent from 'Weltwoche',  in which he discussed national and inter-
national politics.  With reference to European questions,  the conve·rsation went 
as follows: 
Question:  What prejudices did Ireland have about joining the Common Market 
and what were its chances at the moment? 
Answer:  'Ireland belongs to Europe because of its many historical ties and 
joining the European Community would make it easier for us to contribute to 
the political and economic unification of Europe.  This would simply be the 
logical continuation of our loyal co-operation in such European organizations 
as the old OECD and the Council of Europe,  of which Ireland was,  of course, 
- 62-a founder member.  Joining the European Community would give us free access 
to a very much larger market and this would be beneficial to our whole economy. 
Above all,  Ireland would obtain much more favourable prices for its agricul-
tural products than it does at present.  Even if the Six continue tD discuss the 
enlargement problem,  I can see no solution as long as there is no change in the 
French attitude to British membership.  I am none the less convinced that the 
Common Market must one day lead to European unity,  for the accession of 
new members cannot,  in the long run,  be prevented and this is true of our 
country.  In 1967 I visited the capitals of the Common Market countries, in-
cluding Bonn.  All the Governments assured me that Ireland's accession would 
be welcomed.' 
Question:  Consideration was,  from time to time,  given to the plan for another 
common market without France but including the United Kingdom. 
Answer:  'We have always believed that European unity should mean a coming-
together of all like-minded countries and that our membership is as essential 
as that of the United Kingdom and the Scandinavian countries.  Although Euro-
pean unity does not mean much without the United Kingdom,  it would mean 
equally little without France.  As I have said,  however,  I am sure that the 
Common Market will eventually be enlarged. ' 
(Die Weltwoche,  6 December 1968) 
- 63-1.  A motion tabled by Christian-democratic MP's concerning elections 
to the European Parliament 
Sixty-nine Christian-democratic members tabled a motion in the 
Chamber of Deputies calling on the Italian Government to propose to the other 
Governments of the Community that they should approve a bill for the election 
o_f  Members of the European Parliament by di"l:'ect universal suffrage. 
The motion read as follows: 
'The Chamber,  aware of the obstacles standing in the way of a poli-
tically united Europe; considering that achieving this aim would become easier 
through the direct election by universal suffrage of European parliamentarians; 
considering the need,  in the event of the rejection by one or more Governments 
of the Community of direct elections by universal suffrage of its own represen-
tatives,  for Italy unilaterally to effect the election of its own delegates by 
direct universal suffrage pursuant to article 21  (amended) of the Treaty of 
Paris (ECSC)  and articles 138  (EEC) and 108 (Euratom) of the Treaties of 
Rome; urges the Italian Government to propose to the other Community Govern-
ments the approval of a plan for the direct election by universal suffrage of 
Members of the European Parliament according to a procedure that would be 
the same in all member States.' 
(Chamber of Deputies,  report of October 7,  1968) 
2.  Anglo-Italian talks in Rome  .. 
On  11  and 12 November 1968,  Mr.  Roy Jenkins, the British Chancel-
lor of the Exchequer,  met in Rome Mr.  Colombo,  the Italian Minister of 
Finance and interim Secretary for the Budget and Economic Plan. 
In the course of their talks the two Ministers looked into possibili-
ties of developing monetary co-operation,  improving trade relations between 
Britain and Italy and other possibilities of co-operation between London· and 
the  Community countries.  Following a  discussion  on  the  economic  and 
cyclical policies  of the  two  countries,  the  Chancellor  of the  Exchequer 
stressed the efforts made by the British Government to restore the balance-
- 64-of-payments position.  Mr.  Colombo,  in turn,  outlined the current situation 
and short-term prospects of the Italian economy.  He  also mentioned the 
measures taken by the Italian Government to remedy the slowing-down in the 
country's development during the first half of 1967.  These measures appeared 
to yield satisfactory results.  Mr.  Colombo also referred to the balance-of-
payments position in his country.  This showed a slow but steady decrease in 
capital movements and the Government felt it necessary to take measures to 
curb the flow of Italian capital abroad. 
The visit of the British Chancellor of the Exchequer brought into 
relief. the existence of close relations of friendship and co-operation between 
Italy and Britain.  The Italian Government had,  in fact,  been extremely active 
on the international scene in ensuring that full support was accorded to the 
pound.  It had contributed in no small measure to the negotiations that led,  on 
the part of the International Monetary Fund,  to the granting of a stand-by 
credit of $  1,400m.  In addition,  the Bank of Italy,  together with other Central 
Banks,  had contributed to the loan of a  $1,500m credit to the United Kingdom. 
In 1968,  again with the active participation of Italy,  a medium-term support 
agreement was signed in favour of the Bank of England. 
In taking part in these agreements,  the Italian Government was not 
only prompted by the friendly relations that existed between the two countries 
but also by the fact that it was convinced that Europe must strengthen its 
economic and political links with Britain. 
(Il Popolo,  12 November 1968) 
3.  Statement by .Mr.  Colombo,  Minister for the Treasury,  on monetary 
problems 
Addressing the Senate Committee for the Treasury and Finance, 
Mr.  Colombo,  Minister for the Treasury,  stated that the exceptionally high 
level of currency transfers to Germany in anticipation of a revaluation of the 
Deutsch:e Mark,  had raised serious problems for France and the United 
Kingdom.  The reserves of these two countries had been subject to a pressure 
which would have been unbearable if appropriate measures had not been taken. 
Mr.  Colombo then recalled that following the May events in France 
there had been wage increases which had led to increases in production costs 
without there being any corresponding increase in prices.  The resulting si-
tuation was difficult for enterprises.  ' 
- 65-The Minister also referred to the slow process of adjustment in the 
British balance-of-payments position which could not but suffer serious pre-
judice from speculative capital movements. 
In this context,  Italy had also called for the meeting in Bonn,  so as 
to preclude any purely national decisions on problems arising in any individual 
economy.  It was preferable to have international co-operation within the Group 
of Ten rather than in the Community because the issues at stake involved both 
the United Kingdom and the United States. 
Mr.  Colombo recalled that Germany enjoyed an economic situation 
characterized by vigorous expansion,  a full employment of its labour force and 
remarkable price stability.  He  said that Germany preferred to make adjust-
ments in its balance of payments without making any changes in the previous 
order based on fixed rates of exchange.  Some countries doubted whether the 
measures announced by Germany would prove effective and they had not con-
cealed their preference for measures of a different kind.  During the debate, 
reference was also made to the possibility of a revaluation of the Italian Lira. 
Italy had taken a decisive stand in defence of the present system of 
freeing world trade,  based on fixed rates of exchange.  This system called for 
greater co-ordination of economic and monetary policies than obtained at 
present,  but the problems of today would not be overcome by introducing changes 
in rates of exchange every time there were balance-of-payments difficulties. 
Otherwise,  there wouH be the uncertainty that was typical of the system of 
fluctuating exchange rates.  Italy was therefore in favour of solving economic 
problems which were due to balance-of-payments difficulties.  This would 
involve pooling part of the reserves of the Western nations to support coun-
tries in difficulties; under this system the central banks which received funds 
would restore them to those suffering losses.  This solution had been parti-
cularly welcomed by all delegates.  As a result of this general commitment, 
which differed from the system of changes in exchange rates, Italyhadexcluded 
any possibility of a revaluation of the Lira.  Indeed,  the situation in Italy did 
not call for such measures because Italy was pursuing a policy of expansion in 
internal demand.  An  appreciable part of the Italian balance-of-payments sur-
plus,  however,  was intended to be used for extending the internal market both 
in capital and consumer goods. 
(Senate of the Republic,  Meeting of the Committees,  27  November 1968) 
- 66-4.  Mr.  Pedini discusses technological co-operation 
Addressing the Institute for International Political studies in Milan, 
Mr.  Pedini,  Under-Secretary for Research advocated setting up a  European 
Technological Community.  He  said that Italy needed a definite policy  for science 
and technology and referred to the difficulties inherent in launching a policy 
for investment in reasearch.  He  said that there were two arguments in favour 
of international co-operation in this field:  (1)  the acknowledged leeway of the 
European countries,  (2)  reviving European unification through recognition of 
the need for closer contacts in science and technology. 
Mr.  Pedini then described the four main areas in which technological 
co-operation in Europe and the West was possible: pure research,  space, 
electronics and nuclear energy. 
In pure research,  European scientists had always been very dynamic 
but a gap had arisen because of the brain drain.  In technology,  the balance of 
payments position was extremely unfavourable (exchanges of patents,  models, 
productive inventions).  In 1963 the USA  had a credit balance of $514m in con-
trast to the EEC's adverse balance of $292m; Italy's deficit was $107m.  To 
put a halt to the emigration of scientists,  recourse could be had to university 
reform,  research contracts and scientific agreements involving an exchange 
of information.  In space,  all sectors of research and advanced technology 
merged together.  The EEC's interest in space research focused on the pos-
sibilities of postal communications by rocket,  on telecommunication satellites, 
weather forecasting and air traffic control.  Italy needed to be politically pre-
sent in this sector.  With Professor Broglio's st.  Mark programme,  Italy was 
co-operating with the USA.  With regard to the EEC,  it was in Italy's interest 
to participate in projects to make them more homogeneous.  In the field of 
electronics,  Italy was today achieving an independence and originality that 
were promising.  International co-operation would be possible mainly between 
industries and should be carried through by reference to organic planning.  The 
work of the Marechal Committee on data processing and telecommunications 
was worth noting here. 
Many countries established a  connexion between nuclear research 
and real sovereignty.  Nuclear power was essential not only for defence but 
also for the future of energy supplies.  Italy had done much to equip itself ade-
quately despite mistakes,  criticisms and quarrels.  International co-operation 
had been less effective: Euratom had failed to bring together the strength of 
the six Community countries on advanced projects which could not be carried 
through by individual member states.  Italy hoped that it would be possible to 
make a new start and drew attention to the possibilities existing in the sectors 
of fast reactors and isotope separation. 
- 67-All these efforts,  said Mr.  Pedini in conclusion,  should culminate 
in a  European technological community for all the sectors referred to; it should 
have a definite,  practical content and be in direct contact with the production 
apparatus  ..  This would enable Europe to make an organized financial effort and 
provide a market outlet so that it could narrow the gap between the Community 
and the USA  and enable Europe to conduct an effective dialogue with it.  Lastly, 
wider-ranging relations with Japan and the USSR would be possible. 
(Il Sole  - 24 Ore,  3 December 1968) 
- 68-Luxembourg 
Statement by the Luxembourg Minister of Foreign Affairs 
The lnxembourg Chamber of Deputies met on 16 October 1968, when 
it heard an oral report by Mr.  Gregoire,  Minister of Foreign Affairs,  on the 
consequences for Europe of the Prague coup.  The Minister stated,  inter alia: 
'It would,  perhaps,  not be beside the point to consider the following 
question: "Would Russia's satellites have attempted the Prague coup if they 
had been faced with a really united Europe,  that is to say a strong and deter-
mined Europe embracing all the free countries of the West?" 
Unfortunately,  Europe is not yet a decisive force in the competition 
between the big powers that are now about to quarrel over the possession of 
planets.  The conclusion to be drawn is obvious: we must hasten the strengthen-
ing of what already exists in order to become a  stabilizing element in the 
struggle that has been going on for the last twenty years.  The snag,  is,  how-
ever,  that in the West we play a very minor part indeed when we gather around 
a table to discuss the future of our continent.  The majority are in favour of 
firm action but in order that such action may be taken,  we must all share in it. 
Should we follow France? Where will she lead us to? The Ural or 
nowhere? Are we,  as a result of the events that have shaken the position of 
Paris,  ready to join Britain? There is no doubt as to the alternative. 
Yet we must persevere in the policy of persuasion which we have 
been practising vis-a-vis the French.  For how much longer? Some of you may 
object that after so many failures,  after so many attempts to advance in a 
roundabout way there is no point in pursuing this policy.  Shall we remain con-
fined to a little Europe that is hardly viable? Should we not,  at last, try to do 
something really novel,  even if  we have to do it without France, if she doesn't 
want to join us,  but never to do it against France? 
This is the dilemma which recent events have brought about,  and 
this is the choice we have to make!  There is only one course to follow,  that 
of Europe,  greater Europe. 
There is no point in opposing joint obstination to individual obstina-
tion.  We  must,  at last,  take a capital decision.  I am glad to observe that an 
- 69-idea which is very near to my heart is about to be achieved: the Western Euro-
pean Union now offers an encouraging forum for talks between the Six and 
Britain.  Whilst it should not be regarded as a back-door for admitting candi-
date countries to the EEC,  the Ministers have decided to meet in Rome for a 
further approach. ' 
(Press Department of the Luxembourg Ministry of Foreign Affairs and External 
Trade) 
- 70-Netherlands 
1.  Parliamentary guestions 
Agreement between the Six on legal matters 
In reply to a written question from Mr.  Vredeling (Labour Party) 
dated September 19 (1) the interim Foreign Minister who was also speaking 
for the Minister for Justice stated on October 18: 
'The six member States have appended to the Agreement they signed 
on  September 27,  1968 a joint declaration in which their Governments txpress 
a desire to avoid any divergences in interpreting the convention concerned and 
to study the possibilities of endowing the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities with competence in this matter. 
This study has in the meantime been entrusted to a working party 
set up by the Council.  Its task is to draw up a report on the competence of the 
Court regarding the civil application agreement and a series of other agree-
ments either concluded or to be concluded between the Six,  particularly those 
under article 220 of the EEC Treaty. 
The Dutch representatives on the working party consider that the 
regulations governing prejudicial decisions,  as laid down in the Treaty, should 
be regarded as a model for the new regulations.  There was general agreement 
on this basis although opinions differed as to how the work should proceed in 
future.' 
(Second Chamber,  Session 1968-1969,  Appendix 149) 
EEC participation in the International Sugar Agreement 
In reply to a written question of October 24,  1968 put by Messrs. 
Westerterp (Catholic People's Party),  Boersma (Anti-Revolution Party) and 
(1)  On the draft agreement between the Six on judicial power and the application 
of decisions in respect of commercial and civil law. 
- 71-Vander Mei (Historical Christian Union)  on the non-participation of the Com-
munity in the International Sugar Agreement,  Mr.  Lardinois,  Minister for 
Agriculture,  who was also speaking for the Ministers for Economic Affairs 
and for Co-operation with Developing Countries,  stated: 
'The sugar conference held on October 24 under UNCTAD auspices 
set a basic sugar export quota of 300,000 tons a year for the EEC even though 
the latter stated at the negotiations that it could not accept this decision.  The 
EEC proposed to the Conference that its self..-sufficiency rate should be 117 
which corresponded with an export capacity of nearly 1,200,000 tons per year. 
The Netherlands gave their agreement to the EEC Council mandate,  which 
was the basis of this proposal,  but made this subject to the possibility of 
changing it should the negotiations so require.  Although it later emerged during 
the  negotiations that the EEC could not obtain a self-sufficiency rate of 117, 
it was not possible for the EEC Council to agree on a more conciliatory stand-
point.  The efforts made at the last minute,  particularly by the Netherlands 
and the European Commission and some other member States,  met with no 
success. 
The Government regretted that,  for these reasons, the EEC and 
hence the Netherlands could not subscribe to the Agreement; the participation 
of the largest possible number of the major importers and exporters was 
necessary to ensure that international commodity agreements were as effec-
tive as could be.  From the standpoint of development policy,  it was hard to 
ignore the fact that the EEC's position in Geneva was liable to have an unfor-
tunate effect on its relations with the developing countries. 
The Government considered that since the EEC was unable to sub-
scribe to the Agreement at the start it should try to do so at a later date and 
endeavour in the meantime to establish the closest possible co-operation with 
the new international sugar organization in order to maintain the normal world 
trade in sugar in the interests of the sugar exporting developing countries, as 
required by the Agreement.' 
(Second Chamber,  Session 1968-1969,  page 411) 
European co-operation in oceanography 
On 28 November 1968 Mr. Vredeling (Labour Party) asked the opinion 
of the Dutch Government on the co-ordination in the EEC of oceanographical 
- 72-work and  on  the  form that  co-operation with  other  countries  could take 
in this  context. 
On 20 December Mr.  Luns,  Foreign Minister,  who was also speaking 
for the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries and for the Minister of Education 
and Science,  said in reply: 
'The Government considers that the closest possible dovetailing of 
policies between the Six and the other European countries is desirable with 
regard to oceanography.  This co-operation should also take into account the 
interests of agriculture and fisheries and be coupled with the co-operation 
already existing internationally on a much wider basis. It goes without saying 
that in view of the scope of oceanography,  the cost of studies and the fact that 
the seas are international,  it is in the interests of every country to co-operate 
as closely as possible here.  It is therefore not surprising that such a tradition 
of co-operation,  which had proved very fruitful,  already exists.  Several inter-
national organizations have been created for this purpose,  or are extending 
their activities to this sector.  At the world level,  one may quote the Interna-
tional  Oceanography Commission,  the United Nations Educational,  Scientific 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)  and the United Nations Food and Agricul-
ture Organization (FAO).  At the regional level there are the International 
Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES)  and the International Council for 
the Scientific Exploration of the Mediterranean (ICSEM). 
With regard to the subsequent development of scientific and techni-
cal research,  including oceanography,  we would refer to the EEC Council 
resolution of 9 and 10 December 1968.' 
(Appendix to the Report of the Debates in the Second Chamber,  Session 1968-
1969,  page 501) 
Association with Israel,  Tunisia and Morocco 
On  12 December Mr.  Westerterp (Catholic People's Party) put a 
written question to Mr.  Luns,  Foreign Minister,  who replied on 27  December 
as follows: 
'An association agreement will probably be concluded between the 
EEC,  on the one hand,  and Tunisia and Morocco,  on the other,  early in 1969. 
The Council has,  however,  been unable to determine the negotiating mandate 
for the European Commission concerning Israel's association application. 
- 73  -The representative of the Netherlands has stated on the EEC Council 
on several occasions that the delay in looking into Israel's application for as-
sociation is causing concern to the Dutch Government.  It finds this most re-
grettable in view of the need to maintain an economic balance in the Mediter-
ranean Basin.' At the Council meeting of 10 December,  he once again stated 
quite unequivocally that the Dutch Government could not accept that Israel's 
application be set aside indefinitely. It therefore demanded that it should be 
looked into at the first Council meeting in January 1969,  on the basis of the 
latest European Commission report on this subject and of the memorandum 
it undertook to draw up for this purpose. 
Adressing the Council on 10 December,  the Minister gave the fol-
lowing explanation: 
'The Dutch delegation has already drawn the attention of this Council 
to the interdependence  of our relations with the Mediterranean countries.  We 
have seen today that we are no longer very far from concluding an agreement 
with Morocco and Tunisia.  With regard to Spain,  I have noted that consultations 
have progressed. It is true,  and I would like this to be quite clear,  that we 
welcome this development but we have unfortunately also to note,  as I have 
said at the Council meeting on 30 July,  that progress has not been as rapid 
with regard to Israel.  Contrary to the promise that was made to us at that 
meeting,  the Council has still not taken up the Israel application again.  This 
is why I would once again draw your attention to the fact that the Dutch Govern-
ment cannot accept that Israel's request for association be neglected in favour 
of requests submitted by other countries in a  similar situation. 
I have learnt that,  apart from the publication of the Commission's 
report at the beginning of October,  work on Israel's application was limited 
last year to a single meeting of the working party. The above-mentioned report, 
which dealt with the possible form our relations with Israel could take and 
which I,  for my part,  consider to be a perfectly valid document,  appeared 
inadequate to some,  who called for a more detailed study of the problem. 
Mr.  President, this appears to me to be entirely unnecessary as 
the problem has been studied in sufficient detail. It is now for the Council to 
give its opinion on the solutions proposed,  on the basis of the preparatory 
work done by the Permanent Representatives.  This is why I should like to urge 
that this question be examined at the next Council meeting. In order to complete 
the preparations for this examination,  the Dutch Government intends,  in the 
near future,  to submit a memorandum on relations with Israel to the members 
of the Council and to the Commission. 
(Annex to the Report of the Debates in the Second Chamber,  Session 1968-1969, 
page 525) 
- 74-Prior bilateral consultations within the European Community 
In reply to questions put by Mr.  Vredeling,  a member of the Second 
Chamber,  the Minister for Agriculture and Fisheries,  who was also speaking 
for the Foreign Minister,  said that the Government might consult with another 
member State on various aspects of EEC policy and adopt a common approach 
prior to a  Council meeting,  adding that this could take place on the EEC Coun-
cil itself.  The Government felt that such prior consultations,  which should 
not moreover,  necessarily be limited to two member States,  could in some 
cases be a useful preparation for work by the Council of the European Com-
munities which was,  in any event,  the body with whom the right of decision 
rested. 
It was true that when it did not take part, these prior consultations 
did not make things any easier for the Netherlands at Council discussions.  As 
long,  however,  as this did not involve a systematic effort by a group of mem-
ber States to bend the Council decision to their will,  no reservation could be 
made concerning prior consultations outside the Council. 
(Handels & Transport Courant,  6 December 1968) 
2.  Mr.  Luns,  Dutch Foreign Minister,  interviewed about the situation 
in the Community (8  November 1968) 
Interviewed by the Swiss weekly 'Die Weltwoche', Mr. J. M.A. H. Luns, 
Dutch Foreign Minister,  made a statement on the current Community crisis 
and on the prospects for European co-operation.  He  said,  with reference to a 
possible new move on European integration: 
'There has of late been a great deal of initiative in regard to Euro-
pean integration, i. e.  since the "second French Dec~mber" (I am referring 
to 19 December 1967).  One  only has to think of the Benelux Memorandum 
and the proposals made by Germany and Italy.  My  colleague Mr.  Harmel, 
Belgian Foreign Minister,  recently made a new move,  starting from the Bene-
lux Memorandum.  This was at the WEU meeting in Rome.  He proposed setting 
up a working party,  comprising representatives from the seven countries,  to 
find out if any steps could be taken in the ~ontext of European integration in 
fields not covered by the Community Treaties,  such as foreign policy,  defence 
policy or technology.  I am firmly convinced that,  even if France were not 
ready to endorse such a procedure,  the other WEU members would shortly 
- 75  -set up a committee of this type,  entrusting it with such a mandate.  This would, 
of course,  not solve the problems of Britain's admission to the EEC; but in 
this way we would be making an effort to strengthen links with the United 
Kingdom.  France's attitude to European integration these last ten years has 
held back the development of the Community,  which was to have led out into 
a real European Union.  I think there have been many opportunities and I doubt 
whether many new chances will arise.  Naturally,  the reactions of th~ Five to 
the stance adopted by France have carried real weight,  although not all of 
them are equally determined to make a definite stand on this point.  I think, 
however,  that some form of co-operation with other European countries,  out-
side the scope of the Treaties,  could still be worked out. ' 
He  was then asked what the prospects for Europe would be if it were 
possible to bypass the France of de Gaulle and whether a  European Community 
without France would be conceivable.  Mr.  Luns stated: 
'As I have already said,  co-operation is possible in spheres not 
covered by the European Treaties,  even without France.  On the other hand, 
I find. it hard to imagine a  European Economic Community without France. I do 
not think it would be possible.  Similarly I would be as anxious to obtain the 
admission of France as I am now with respect to the United Kingdom if the 
present position of the two countries were reversed. NeitherBritainnorFrance 
should be left out of European integration. ' 
On co-operation between Italy and the Benelux countries within the 
Community Mr.  Luns said: 
In relations between Italy and the Benelux partners there is 
a satisfactory identity of ideas and approaches,  especially as regards the ad-
mission of new members.  I am particularly gratified at  the efforts Mr. Medici, 
my Italian colleague,  is making to further the discussion of Britain's admis-
sion,  using every resource at his command. ' 
Lastly,  Mr.  Luns gave his opinion on the attitude of the Federal 
Republic of Germany following the most recent meeting between General de 
Gaulle and Chancellor Kiesinger: 
'I think that today,  as in the past,  the Federal Republic of Germany 
sincerely desires an enlargement of the European Economic Community and is 
trying to devise interim arrangements which could strengthen our links with 
the United Kingdom.  It does,  however,  seem very difficult for the Bonn 
Government to make any progress here if France is not in agreement.  This 
- 76-is equally true of those fields in which the member states are quite free to 
make agreements with other partners as,  for example,  was proposed in the 
Benelux Memorandum.  I regret this attitude because I am convinced that 
Europe will never be united if we  are obliged always to wait for the agreement 
of every single country.  When the EEC was established,  we  did not wait for 
the United Kingdom which has,  in recent years,  completely changed in its 
attitude to the EEC itself.' 
(Mondo  Economico, 16 November 1968) 
3.  The Dutch Government recommends that a conference of European 
Ministers be called to discuss European unification 
At the WEU conference in Rome the discussion focused on the Bene-
lux plans for co-operation in the fields of politics,  defence,  technology and 
monetary affairs,  that is to say on matters not covered by the EEC Treaty 
which could be handled by WEU.  At the subsequent meeting of the WEU Foreign 
Ministers at The Hague,  Mr.'  Luns,  Dutch Foreign Minister,  announced that 
the Dutch Government had decided to call a major European conference of 
Foreign Ministers to discuss European unification.  Mr.  Luns again announced 
this decision in Brussels at a meeting attended by his colleagues from the 
other EEC States (except France) and the United Kingdom.  This Dutch move 
went back to a resolution passed by the European Parliamentary Congress 
which was held in The Hague. 
The Congress in question had prompted favourable British and Italian 
reactions to the idea of a ministerial conference which would impart a new 
impetus to European unification.  Mr.  Brandt,  German Foreign Minister,  also 
came out in favour of this idea at the Brussels meeting. 
(Handels & Transport Courant,  15 November 1968) 
4.  The standing Committee for Foreign Affairs discusses European 
policy 
Among  the  points discussed by the  Foreign Affairs  Committee 
at its open session were : Euratom,  consolidating and enlarging the Community, 
- 77-the EEC's subscribing to the International Sugar Agreement,  association 
agreements and the common trade policy. 
Every speaker expressed concern about Euratom and urged the 
Government to do its utmost to safeguard its future. 
Mr.  De Koster,  Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,  agreed with 
those who felt that the 'a la carte' approach - to which France was so attached -
whereby member States would participate mily in the Euratom activities which 
interested them,  was a serious threat and liable to dislocate the Community. 
Also critical of the French approach. was Mr.  Oele (Labour Party) 
who advocated a method which would stem the resurgence of nationalist ten-
dencies,  namely the use of Community enterprises.  He asked the Government 
to temper its rejection of the 'a la carte' formula so that the joint research 
centres might help in carrying through interesting technological and industrial 
projects. 
As regards consolidating the Community internally,  Mr.  Vredeling 
(Labour Party) stressed Article 8,  7 of the EEC Treaty; he said that all the 
other provisions of the Treaty were conditioned by the way this paragraph was 
applied.  This was particularly true of Article 138 concerning elections by 
direct universal suffrage to the European Parliament.  These two articles 
taken in conjunction meant that the Council was obliged to abide  by all 
the regulations in taking measures entailed by an enlargement of the Common 
Market. 
Mr.  Vredeling said the time had come for dealing with the problems 
involved in increasing the powers of the European Parliament,  in particular 
that of the Community's having its own resources.  He  expected the Chamber 
to withhold its assent regarding the Community's own resources - to which 
the Council was committed -unless democratic control over the Communities 
was simultaneously introduced. 
Answering Mr.  Vredeling,  Mr.  Luns confirmed that the Government 
would not submit to the Chamber any 'own resources' regulations pursuant to 
Article 201  of the Treaty if the powers of the European Parliament were not 
simultaneously enhanced. 
In response to a  suggestion from Mr.  Van Mierlo (Democracy '66) 
concerning direct elections to the European Parliament in the various countries, 
- 78  -Mr.  De Koster,  Secretary of State,  said that the Dutch Government had already 
submitted proposals to the Council in 1964 designed to confer wider powers on 
the European Parliament. He had asked whether these proposals were still con-
sistent with the wishes of the Government.  He  added that the Dutch Government 
would avail itself of every opportunity to make a real change in the powers of 
the European Parliament. 
Mr.  Boertien (Anti-Revolutionary Party) doubted the value of a sum-
mit conference on a larger scale than that of the Community arguing that the 
Government was not really in favour of a summit conference of the Six;  it felt 
that it would achieve nothing.  What,  therefore,  could be expected of a wider 
conference,  he asked.  Mr.  Westerterp of the Catholic People's Party on the 
other hand was in favour of such a conference. 
Mr.  Luns said that the gap between the EEC and the applicant States 
should not be widened in those areas covered by the European Treaties.  The 
Government used this argument to justify its 'cautious' policy on some points 
which lay outside the scope of the Treaties.  The term 'selective boycott' was 
thus out of place.  In reply to criticisms by the Commission,  the Minister 
defended the Dutch standpoint regarding work on the Marechal Committee. 
'The Dutch Government has not changed its attitude. If  the Council will confirm 
its intention to abide by the terms of reference of the Marechal Committee set 
out in October 1967,  the Netherlands is ready to resume these activities at 
once.' According to these terms of reference the Marechal Committee should 
make a preliminary study which would be followed by negotiations on a basis 
of equality with other countries,  notably the United Kingdom.  Mr.  Luns went 
on to say: 'In March,  Mr.  Couve de Murville,  to whom I put the question,  said 
that he could make no binding promise.  He  wanted first to see what emerged 
from consultations between the Six.  I said: "Then we cannot go through with it. 
Italy followed our lead and at the present m:)ment our position is unchanged." 
It was not the Dutch Government which had gone back on its word but France. 
To defend his position,  the French Minister alleged that the situation was not 
the same as in October 1967.' 
Mr.  De Koster,  Secretary of State,  referred to European patents -
a point raised by Mr.  Boertien.  'We were surprised at the WEU meeting by 
the attitude of Mr.  de  Lipkowski,  French Secretary 'of State,  who was known 
as a good European when he was a parliamentarian.  He  said at that meeting 
that the question of patents was one which France no longer saw as one limited 
to the Six.  On point 3,  in the programme put forward by Mr.  Debre,  this idea 
was advanced with some caution.  Yet at the meeting in Brussels on 4 and 5 
November,  Mr.  Debre somewhat changed his mind.  He  said that the Six had to 
be unanimous.  In saying this he disowned his Secretary of State. ' 
~ 79-With reference to the International Sugar Agreement,  Mr.  Udink, 
the Minister responsible for aid to developing countries,  said that the EEC's 
non -participation in the Agreement had been a major negative psychological 
shock to the third world.  'I believe that this is to be deplored.  It has been a 
major psychological shock,  not only because the Agreement is of real signi-
ficance for the developing countries but above all because it is regarded as 
evidence of what the EEC will do when it comes to the negotiations on primary 
products.  The Dutch Government anticipated this reaction and did its utmost 
within the EEC to get the Community to subscribe to the Agreement.  The 
Commission's mandate originally was that tQ,e  self-sufficiency point should 
be the index 117,  a stand that made any real negotiations impossible in Geneva 
because all the other parties wanted to discuss the problem of dividing up 
export quotas.  The EEC eventually agreed to negotiate on export qu~tas but 
asked for an outright quota of 1,200,000 tons of sugar, which was a volume the 
Community had never previously reached.  The Netherlands felt that to proceed 
from discussions on the self-sufficiency rate to discussions on export quotas 
was in itself a measure of progress.  The Dutch Government originally agreed 
to the quota of 1. 2m tons on the understanding that this negotiating mandate 
could be changed if this were necessary in order to arrive at an agreement. 
It quickly emerged that no agreement was possible on such a quota. Mr. Prebisch, 
UNCTAD  Secretary-General,  did not agree to go further than a figure of 
300,000 tons for the EEC.  Thus the gap was too great for any agreement to be 
possible on this basis.  The Netherlands Government fought to the last ditch 
in Brussels for a different negotiating mandate to be given to the Executive, 
endeavouring to reach an agreement on a figure of 600,000 tons.  Unfortunately, 
these efforts failed.' For Mr.  Westerterp this was further proof that the EEC 
Commission should not be sent to international negotiations with a binding 
mandate.  The EEC Commission ought-andtheTreatycreatedthispossibility-
to negotiate independently and then submit the results to the Council. 
With reference to trade agreements and associations,  Mr.  Schuijt 
recalled that the Six had agreed that citrus imports from Israel,  Turkey and 
Spain should attract the same treatment.  He  asked that this commitment be 
respected when the association agreements with Tunisia and Morocco were 
signed. 
Mr.  De Koster,  Secretary of State,  reassured Mr.  Schuijt on this 
point but said with regard to the association with Israel that although the 
Chamber had passed a motion calling on the Government to promote this in 
every way possible,  Germany was,  apart from the Netherlands,  the only one 
of the Six to support the idea.  France was opposed to establishing any kind of 
relationship with Israel. 
A trade agreement with Yugoslavia had the full support of the 
Government but,  said Mr.  Luns,  France also opposed this because of its 
- 80-agricultural interests.  The trade agreement provided for in the mandate of 
the EEC Commission was,  according to Yugoslavia,  virtually worthless be-
cause of the restrictions included in it.  The Dutch delegation to the Council 
meeting of 4 and 5 November had again called for a flexible attitude,  for both 
political and economic reasons. 
With reference to the renewal of the Yaounde Convention,  Mr. 
Westerterp called for an extension of the scope of the European Development 
Fund,  an increase in the number of African States to benefit from it,  an 
extension in the term of the association,  on condition that a revision clause 
was included. 
(Second Chamber,  Proceedings,  Session 1968-1969,  Foreign Affairs Meeting 
of 21  November 1968) 
5.  Visit to the Netherlands of President Hamani Diori of the Niger 
During his visit to the Netherlands last October,  Mr.  Hamani Diori, 
President of the Niger,  outlined his views on the operation of the development 
assistance given by the EEC to the Afro-Malagasy States and stated his wishes 
concerning the renewal of the Yaounde Convention. 
He  considered that the main problems raised by the renewal of the 
Yaounde Convention were: 
a)  marketing products on the European markets, 
b)  guarantees relating to export receipts, 
c) the industrialization of the African countries. 
EEC imports and,  in particular, AAMS eXports to the Netherlands 
still tended to level off.  Mr. · Hamani Diori thought this was due to the fall in 
AAMS exports of agricultural products.  Between 1964 and 1966 Dutch imports 
of agricultural products from the AAMS fell by 32 per cent in volume and 20 
per cent in value,  while imports of similar products from other countries in 
Africa or Latin America increased.  Tariff preferences extended to the AAMS 
had thus no adverse effects on trade between the EEC and other regions of the 
third  world. It might not be going too far to say  that, if  they were removed, this 
would lead to the total disappearance of AAMS products from the EEC market. 
- 81  -It was similarly not going too far to suggest that the EE C restrictions 
to protect its own agriculture were liable further to impair AAMS trade with 
the Community.  The new Convention of Association would have to specify the 
treatment to be given to AAMS products under the agricultural policy. It would 
have to give them effective protection so as to enable the AAMS to overcome 
certain handicaps affecting their competitiveness. 
The Associated States were convinced that it was, above all, through 
international agreements that an attempt had  .to be made to remedy the deterio-
ration in the terms of trade.  They were forced to conclude,  however,  that 
international negotiations,  whether under the aegis of organizations dealing 
with specific products or at the world trade conference,  had so far been of no 
avail.  This was why the AAMS  attached the greatest importance to measures 
to provide effective price support for their products under the new Convention. 
What the Associated States were asking was,  in the final analysis,  relatively 
little if one set the $200 m needed to support the prices of some products, 
particularly affected by price slides,  against the $200,000m  which the Euro-
pean Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund devoted to supporting the 
prices of agricultural products in the Community. 
Mr.  Hamani Diori said that the AAMS had been asked to diversify 
their production.  This would only be possible if they were industrialized first. 
So far the AAMS had imported finished products and exported raw materials. 
In future they had to start producing some of the products they had so far im-
ported and to process some of the agricultural and mining products themselves. 
It would,  however,  not be enough -if real industrial development 
was to be achieved - to satisfy local needs.  A recent EE C study showed that the 
number of businesses which could be set up would only be 100 and would only 
mean employment for 15,000 people.  Hence the need to create industries geared 
to exports, either of agricultural or mining products which had undergone first 
processing or manufactured consumer goods intended for the European and 
American markets.  This would be the best way in which the AAMS could 
diversify and get the most out of their agricultural products by the progressive 
integration of their primary and secondary activities.  The attitude of the EEC 
was to be regretted because,  while the Community agreed to give tariff pre-
ferences to raw materials imported from the AAMS,  it refused to give them 
the same preference when they had undergone any kind of processing. 
The highly-developed countries and Europe had therefore to leave it 
to the AAMS to produce a proportion of some finished goods and facilitate ac-
cess of these products to the European markets.  A fair division of industrial 
activity between poor and rich countries was as essential to the development 
of the third world as was the stabilization of raw material prices at an accep-
table level. 
- 82-In view of the small scale of savings in the AAMS they had,  when 
they wanted to set up new industries or extend existing ones,  to call on foreign 
capital and in particular private resources.  Unfortunately,  private capitalists 
were not very inclined to invest in Africa, first of all because the return on 
their investments did not seem adequate but,  above all,  because they were 
hesitant about taking risks in regions which they did not know very well or in 
which they had fears about their safety.  The facilities and benefits extended 
by the various Associated States seemed inadequate to attract capital,  despite 
the extremely favourable conditions offered by various investment schemes 
such as,  for example,  the support and guarantee funds in the countries of the 
'Entente',  which gave investors both technical and financial guarantees. 
It would,  however,  be desirable to complement this range of banking 
and fiscal measures by creating a guarantee fund for private investments in 
the framework of the Association.  The European institutions had so far been 
too little concerned with the industrialization of the AAMS.  Of the credits 
committed under the  Yaound~ Convention,  only 8.5 per cent had so far been 
used for this purpose. 
Mr.  Hamani Diori thought that the AAMS would,  as in the past, 
continue strictly to apply the principle of non-discrimination by extending to 
the six EEC States the same trade preferences,  the same rights of establish-
ment and the same conditions of access to their natural wealth. 
Africa was still a relatively small market but for the Europeans it 
was a privileged market. It was imperative to develop it and to keep it against 
the day when other regions in the world were lost or became competitore. It 
was also necessary for Europe to continue to give the AAMS its support if it 
wanted them to preserve their independence and their stability which were 
every day under threat. 
(Afrika,  November 1968) 
6.  The Second Chamber discusses the International Sugar Agreement 
When the International Coffee Agreement and the International Grains 
Agreement were adopted,  the Second Chamber also had a debate on the Inter-
national Sugar Agreement.  In a resolution moved by Mr.  Westerterp (Catholic 
People's Party) and by representatives of six other parties and which was 
passed almost unanimously,  the Chamber: 
- 83  -'Being convinced of the great importance of concluding international 
commodity agreements, 
Regrets that the EEC did not subscribe within the UNCTAD frame-
work,  to the International Sugar Agreement in 1968; 
Considers that the size of the sugar export quota asked for by the 
EEC Council was inconsistent with a rational development policy and that a 
reduction in this quota would not have been seriously prejudicial to agriculture 
in the EEC; 
Therefore calls on the Government to take the necessary steps on 
the EEC Council to hold the necessary discussions as soon as possible to 
secure the participation of the EE C in the International Sugar Agreement. ' 
Mr.  Lardinois,  Minister for Agriculture,  felt that there was a real 
chance that the EEC would still adhere to the Sugar Agreement. If  the EEC 
agreed on a new agricultural policy,  this adhesion would not raise the same 
difficulties as in the past. 
The Government fully endorsed the aims of the Agreement - which 
were not solely to create a better market for the developing countries - and 
regarded the motion as a practical form of support.  Mr.  Lardinois considered 
that it might be necessary to reduce the sugar surplus in the EEC.  There was, 
moreover,  little chance of importing more cane sugar from the developing. 
countries. 
The International Coffee Agreement,  the aims of which were similar 
to those of the Sugar Agreement,  provided for a fund to be set up to diversify 
the production structures in the main coffee-producing countries.  The fund 
would receive more than $25m from these countries.  The USA  had promised a 
contribution of $25m and it may double this contribution if other importing 
States do likewise. 
Various members,  including Mr.  Westerterp (Catholic People's 
Party) urged that the Nether  lands should participate in  the fund and Mr. Vredeling 
(Labour Party) put forward a motion,  which had the support of three other 
political parties,  asking the Government to subscribe to the fund.  The GovE:rn-
ment should also call on the EEC and other developed countries to follow suit. 
As regards food aid,  Mr.  Udink said that the Netherlands was ready to take 
part in this scheme within the framework of the EEC.  He thought it was im-
- 84-portant that part of the food aid should be earmarked for emergency assistance 
which should also be extended by the Community.  The Dutch Government,  he 
said,  did not think that food aid should be tied to a national flag. 
(Session 1968-1969,  Doc.  9800,  National Budget,  Chapter V,  Foreign Affairs, 
Handels & Transport Courant,  5 December 1968) 
- 85-Scandinavia 
1.  Mr.  Hilmar Baunsgaard,  Danish Prime Minister,  in a  statement on 
foreign and European policy 
The new session of the Danish Diet was opened on 1 October 1968 by 
Mr.  Hilmar Baunsgaard,  Danish Prime Minister. 
Danish foreign policy would,  in the near future,  be strongly influen-
ced by the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia.  As Mr.  Baunsgaard said, 
Denmark could see no reason in this time of crisis for changing its relationship 
with NATO;  the events in Prague would be taken into account in the current 
review of Danish defence policy.  At the same time,  the Government hoped 
that it would be possible,  in the long run,  to return to the policy of rapproche-
ment and detente it had so far pursued.  Mr.  Baunsgaard conceded that the 
policy pursued by Moscow had represented a  step backwards but it was to be 
hoped that one day the situation would be restored in which meaningful discus-
sions on European security would be possible.  In this context,  the question 
of German re-unification should also be discussed. 
The Danish efforts to close no door and to create conditions for a 
new phase in the bid for contacts between East and West had found expression 
in an appeal recently made to various countries by the Government.  These 
had been called upon to recognize the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.  In the 
Danish view,  any delay in the entry into force of the treaty would not only 
lengthen the hiatus in the drive for a detente but would also involve serious 
risk that other trends at odds with detente would become manifest.  With this 
in mind,  the Danish Government would,  for its part,  submit the treaty for 
the ratification of Parliament as soon as possible. 
This speech was being made at the opening of the new parliamentary 
session for the coalition Government and Mr.  Baunsgaard went on to say that 
the review of Danish defence policy would be concluded in the spring.  At all 
events,  the Government would submit proposals for a new defence system. 
He  greatly regretted that negotiations for enlarging the Community 
had,  once again,  come to a deadlock following the French veto.  In common 
with the United Kingdom,  Norway and Ireland,  however,  Denmark stood by its 
bid for accession.  In order, however,  to attenuate the adverse effects, es-
pecially that of the EEC's agricultural policy,  on Denmark's balance of pay-
ments,  Denmark would,  in the meantime,  keep in close touch with the EEC 
bodies in Brussels and endeavour to promote Danish exports through negotiations 
- 86-with the individual member States and,  in particular, with the Federal Republic. 
Coupled with this,  efforts would be made to develop economic co-operation 
domestically and to establish a  'Nordic Treaty'. 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  2 October 1968; 
Die Welt,  2 October 1968) 
2.  Economic co-operation between Nordic States 
From 19 to 20 October 1968 the Prime Ministers of the Nordic 
States had one of their periodic meetings in Oslo. 
The discussions centered on the possibility of closer economic co-
operation in the North referred to in an earlier meeting.  This time,  however, 
the heads of government hardly went into the material issues but dealt with 
the timing of further steps.  Before the end of the year,  the working party 
comprised of senior officials was to submit its report.  In February this would 
be discussed by the Prime Ministers with the Bureau and the Economic Com-
mittee of the Nordic Council and in March it would be the main talking point 
at the Nordic Council meeting. 
Practical details about progress in the studies were not given either 
in the joint communique or in the Prime Ministers' press conference. All those 
taking part recognized their positive commitment to closer economic co-opera-
tion in the North although they attached varying degrees of importance to th!.s. 
Mr.  Barten,  the Norwegian Prime Minister,  emphasized the diffi-
culties that had to be overcome.  It was recognized that opposition in many 
Norwegian and Danish economic circles to going all the way to a customs 
union was considerable; at the same time representatives of all four countries 
expressed a definite political will to overcome the difficulties; this would not 
be impossible if there were reciprocal concessions at the negotiations. Iceland 
did not take part in this work as it is pursuing the aim of joining EFTA.  An 
appropriate application would be submitted at the forthcoming meeting of the 
EFTA Ministerial Council in Vienna. 
The most interesting aspect of the Oslo meeting was a statement to 
the press made by Mr.  Koivisto,  Finnish Prime Minister: he emphasized 
Finland's freedom of movement in the integration policy context.  'The idea 
- 87-seems still to be current,' he said,  'that Finland's neutrality policy could 
prevent it from co-operating in an international division of labour. The removal 
of trade policy barriers is,  however,  not inconsistent with a policy of neutral-
ity.  Otherwise the neutral nations would be left isolated. ' 
This statement,  which was studied with great interest in t:Pe  other 
Nordic countries,  went no further,  however,  than to advocate trade liberaliza-
tion in Europe and he made it quite clear that Finland still attached great im-
portance to its trade with the East,  and that it would continue to use state in-
tervention as a shield with regard to its multination trade relations. 
Mr.  Koivisto's positive statement on trade policy had to be seen in 
conjunction with his statement on the international situation; this reflected the 
comments of President Kekkonen after the visit of Mr.  Kossygin to Helsinki. 
Mr.  Kekkonen had stressed that the talks with the Soviet leader had left him 
with the impression that the Soviet Union wished to pursue its policy of peace 
and international detente.  Mr.  Koivisto repeated that the international tension 
had not grown worse in recent months and that there were signs that the mutual 
mistrust was gradually diminishing. 
(Neue  ZUrcher Zeitung,  22  October 1968) 
- 88  -II.  PARTIES  AND  PROMINENT  POLITICIANS 
1.  Professor Hallstein on European integration 
On 3 October 1968, Professor Walter Hallstein, former President 
of the EEC Commission, advocated unflinchingly pursuing the 'European  work'. 
Professor Hallstein, now President of the European Movement, 
thought that the prerequisites today were firmness and patience in aiming to 
achieve the ends in view.  An  extension of integration in Europe was currently 
an issue that had fallen into the background and European unification was 
threatened.  The definite but still only temporary difficulties should not, how-
ever, divert attention from the tasks ahead.  Europe,  at present, he said, was 
full of concern but it was also full of opportunities. 
Speaking in Hamburg on 19 October 1968, he warned against any 
stagnation in European policy.  At the opening of the CDU  Land Conference in 
Hamburg, he said that the Czechoslovakian crisis had, once again, shown the 
need for a comprehensive policy design.  Priorities should be established and 
Europe was the first priority. 
An isolationist position was inconsistent with the European charac-
ter.  The first duty of western European politicians today was to hold fast by 
what had been achieved.  Subsequently a federation had to be built by means of 
common foreign and defence policies. 
In view of the French opposition, this could at present neither be 
achieved nor even worked out, he emphasized, but it was a thought that had to 
be kept permanently alive.  In his view there could be no lasting Europe with-
out France.  In individual questions, interim solutions had to be worked out. 
Europe today had become politically provincial because the world of today 
called for a continental mould, warned Professor Hallstein. 
Mr. Hallstein strongly warned against creating any special Euro-
pean community which could bring about the collapse of the structure of the 
Communities. 
At the Sixth Marienberg Congress on Europe on 24 October 1968, 
Professor Hallstein came out against considering the Harmel plan, which was 
- 89  -designed as an answer to the French attitude, particularly regarding the ex-
pansion of the Community, providing for a special arrangement with the appli-
cant States, and above all in technology and on monetary policy. 
If technology were put in a separate compartment this would be pre-
judicial to the economy at large.  Instead, he advocated a flexible Community 
structure which would,  in addition to the Community general programmes, 
involve special programmes affecting individual member States with which 
third countries could be associated. 
Professor Hallstein came out decisively against the 'package deal  1 
policy of the Benelux States, particularly the Netherlands, which amounted to 
saying that there would be no internal progress in the Community unless there 
were a change in the French attitude. 
(Neue ZUrcher Zeitung,  22  October 1968; 
Die Welt,  25 October 1968) 
2.  The Earl of Bessborough proposes that a European technology centre 
should be set up 
Addressing the Anglo-German Society in Hamburg on 9 October 1968, 
the Earl of Bessborough suggested that a European technology centre should 
be set up.  Lord Bessborough is the Opposition Spokesman in the House of 
Lords for Science and Research.  He also called for closer economic co-oper-
ation between the United Kingdom and the EEC States. 
He stressed that the United Kingdom was in a particularly good po-
sition to make a very useful contribution in this field.  He referred to the 
British successes in the field of nuclear energy and computers and in the air-
craft industry.  He said that the United Kingdom's atomic power stations were 
already producing around 5, 000 megawatts yearly.  This figure would be 
doubled when the second nuclear power programme was carried through. 
Lord Bessborough said that the United Kingdom led Western Europe 
in building nuclear reactors.  In 1971, for example, the first purely commer-
cial atomic power station would come on stream in the north of Scotland; this 
was based on a fast breeder reactor.  Britain was also today' s  leading export-
er of radio isotopes.  As for computers, British scientists were already on 
the point of developing the fifth and sixth generations. 
- 90-He said that closer co-operation in technology was also a matter of 
costs.  In 1940 the production costs for a Spitfire were around £5,000 sterling 
but today the Lightning Mark I costs £500, 000.  The expense of basic research 
in all fields had to be set against a higher unit output at the production stage. 
He particularly called on Germany to co-operate more closely with 
the United Kingdom on the peaceful uses of atomic energy, in the computer 
industry and in the field of turbine propulsion.  The Leyland Motor Corpora-
tion had already developed a turbine-propulsion lorry which would be manu-
factured in 1970 and would have a horse-power of between 350 and 400.  The 
prospects for oceanography,  automation and the exploration of the solar sys-
tem were also good. 
The criticism that the United Kingdom had allegedly neglected to 
modernize and adapt its industry was one he rejected.  A country whose ex-
ports today comprised 70 per cent commodities that did not exist 15 years 
ago could not be described as lagging behind.  With regard to training scien-
tists, the United Kingdom today had 45 universities and colleges of advanced 
technology. 
(Die Welt, 10 October 1968) 
3.  Motion on foreign policy passed by the Political Council of the 
Democratic Party of the Centre 
The Political Council of the Democratic Party of the Centre, chaired 
by Mr. Jean Lecanuet, met in Paris on 20  and 22 October and passed a foreign 
policy motion stressing, in particular,  the problem of uniting Europe :  'The 
foreign policy of the French Government is paralyzing the unification of Europe 
and impairing Atlantic solidarity without achieving the key aim of  d~tente be-
cause it places a premium on nationalism and is opposed to any Community 
organization of peoples for their defence and economic development .•••• 
The Democratic Party of the Centre calls for the political union of 
Europe and the admission of the United Kingdom to the European Community on 
the basis of equal rights and obligations;  for the French armed services to co-
operate organically in the common defence within an Atlantic Alliance adapted 
to new circumstances •••••  ' 
(Le Monde,  22  October 1968) 
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Speaking in Mtllln on 1 November 1968 at the Schleswig-Holstein 
CDU  conference, Mr. Lemke, the Land Chairman, was highly critical of 
France's attitude to the accession of the United Kingdom and the Scandinavian 
countries to the EEC. 'If France goes on kicking over the traces, then we shall 
inevitably have to go on without her.' 
Discussingprinciples, he said  - 'i'egarding whether the EEC should 
not be enlarged through a European technological community comprising 
Germany, Italy, the Benelux countries, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Norway, 
Sweden and Denmark  - that this could ultimately lead to common foreign and 
defence policies. 
He said that Moscow had wrought a qualitative change in the status 
quo in Europe, as was exemplified by the Russian intervention in Czechoslo-
vakia.  He did not see how  it was possible to defend the attitude that as long 
as Soviet troops did noi cross the European demarcation lines, this should be 
the criterion for inaction on the part of the West.  He  emphasized that it must 
be made clear that no desire for peace and understanding would prompt any of 
us to repudiate our legal status or to recognize either the Oder-Neisse Line 
or the national identity of the Soviet zone. 
Mr. Lemke was convinced that the Federal Republic had to spend 
more on defence.  Similarly,  a better design for NATO had to be worked out. 
At the same time the demand for justice in the defence dispensation had to be 
recognized.  He did not see any reason why a new European defence commu-
nity should not be created under new conditions with,in NATO. 
(Die Welt, 2 November 1968) 
5.  European affairs reviewed  at the CDU  Party conference in Berlin 
The CDU  Party held its 16th Congress in the Berlin Congress Hall 
from 4 to 7 November 1968. 
One of the focal points in the debate on the action programme was 
the drive towards a stronger design for European policy.  One indication of this 
was the decision not to treat European policy as a part of the foreign and defence 
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defence policy' in a special and important section of the action programme. 
This was formulated as follows : 
'1.  The political unification of Europe is a decisive contribution to peace 
in Europe and the world.  The unity of Europe is the only chance for 
our continent to live in peace, independence and security, side by side 
with the existing and up-and-coming world powers. 
2.  For this reason, we urge the political unification of Europe.  We call 
for (i) the completion of the European Economic Community and, in 
particular, for the removal of all frontiers,  (ii) common policies for 
economic and monetary affairs, development assistance and foreign · 
trade,  science and research, and (iii) for a progressive approximation 
of social policies.  The European Parliament should be directly elected 
and have budgetary, legislative and supervisory powers;  it should be 
involved in the appointment of the European Executive. 
3.  Franco-German co-operation assumes great importance in the unifi-
cation of Europe.  We want the EEC to be enlarged through the admis-
sion of States ready to join.  Until this accession takes place, advan-
tage should be taken of every opportunity to co-operate with these 
countries, with a view to achieving European unity.  For States that 
can or will only assume part of the common obligations, alternative 
organic links should be offered. 
4.  Our goal is the early establishment of a European federation with a 
free and democratic constitution,  a common foreign policy and a com-
mon defence system. 
5.  The European unification policy has not only to consider the interests 
of the States that belong to it at the moment.  It should be devised in a 
spirit of "all-European" solidarity and responsibility.' 
Professor Walter Hallstein, former President of the European 
Commission, told the press that one could not but be pleased at the greater 
strength, clarity of definition and meaningfullness that had thus been achieved. 
He took exception, however, to the fact that the European ideas put forward in 
the new points were not exactly what was required to find a way out of the 
present deadend  - the current context of this policy.  But this was a short-
term problem, whereas the CDU's action programme outlined what the Party's 
long-term political course was to be.  However, Dr. Hallstein was pleased to 
have a basis for European policy which set out clear conditions and aims in a 
way which would be noted both within and outside the Community and this 
could help to exonerate Germany from the criticism that it was paying too 
much attention to one member State. 
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pean Parliament to the point of including responsibility in regard to appointing 
the European Executive, together with the yearly establishment of the Euro-
pean federation with a free, democratic constitution and specific duties, are 
set out.  The advocacy of a common monetary policy represented a clear re-
fusal  - in contrast to the current trend  - to look for European solutions in 
this field outside the EEC. 
Prior to the European policy resolution of the Conference,  Chan-
cellor Kiesinger noted with great concern iii his 'statement of principles' that 
Bonn had, for a long time, been getting nowhere with its European drive. The 
endeavour here had to be to achieve greater political clarity.  Both the Com-
mon Market and the European Economic Community were vital to Europe. 
Every effort should therefore be made to develop them further, now with the 
Six and later with other countries. 
Chancellor Kiesinger regretted that the accession of the United 
Kingdom and other countries, of which the CDU  was sincerely in favour, was 
being delayed by French opposition.  Yet it would be a fatal mistake to neglect 
the urgently-needed internal development of the EEC for reasons of irritation 
or misplaced tactical considerations because these accessions had been 
delayed.  The development of the EEC did not involve any political union of 
Europe.  One had here to be careful to avoid the error of believing that the 
European economic union would lead directly out into a political union. This 
could, perhaps, be viewed as a long-term development.  Until then, however, 
Europe would be excluded from any say in the shaping of its own destiny or the 
future of the world.  'We cannot wait that long '·  ' 
It was now that every effort must be made to form a more cohesive 
international approach on the part of the European States.  Every use should 
be made of the institutional possibilities and of multilateral and bilateral re-
lationships.  This also meant that Bonn's efforts to achieve the economic and 
political unification of Europe should not simply be a series of stages but 
should go hand in hand with efforts directed at establishing the European fed-
eral state.  This might be difficult.  Chancellor Kiesinger had nothing to say 
against the existing European institutes.  He was a vigorous supporter of them. 
If, however, it proved that Europe was, as it were, imprisoned by these in-
stitutions, th.en they would have to help the institutions themselves, using all 
the means available and exploiting all relationships to resolve this problem. 
'We shall do this and,  indeed, we have already begun to tackle this problem.' 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  5 and 6 November 1968; 
Handelsblatt,  6 November 1968: 
Neue ZUrcher Zeitung,  6 ann  7 November 1968) 
- 94 -6.  Statement by the Dutch Ambassador in Bonn 
Speaking in DUsseldorf on 6 November 1968 to the German-Dutch 
Society, Dr. J.  G. de Beus, Dutch Ambassador in Bonn, called upon the Fe-
deral Government to make a greater effort to use its key position to greater 
advantage and increase co-operation between the EEC and the applicantStates. 
For more than six years, people had been waiting for the enlarge-
ment of the European Communities and they could no longer build their hopes 
on time working for European unification.  So far France, whom the Ambas-
sador did not mention by name, had continued to find new reasons for with-
holding its assent to the necessary enlargement of the Community.  Hence 
Europe was at a dead end  and, he said, it must be led out of it again. 
Dr. de Beus outlined the Dutch standpoint by saying that the EEC 
should not widen the division of the free countries of Europe into two blocs 
through the further internal development of the Community, as France was 
now requesting.  The enlargement of the EEC had to go hand in hand with its 
growth and it was high time to begin working together with the United King-
dom and the other applicant States in the fields of technology, defence and 
patent and company law. 
(Handelsblatt, 7 November 1968) 
7.  A world monetary conference should be preceded by a European 
conference 
Among the inferences he drew from recent crises, Mr. Giscard 
d'Estaing found fault with the European monetary system on two main counts : 
it was too flexible when creating new artificial liquidities was involved;  this 
increased speculation;  and it was too rigid when mqderate adjustments in the 
rates of exchange were called for. 
To put the system right, he felt that there should first be a central-
izing body to create liquidities in the form of an international unit, which 
would underpin the national currencies;  at the same time, the possibility of 
widening the margin through which rates of exchange were allowed to fluctuate 
should be studied.  He said that large-scale adjustments in major currencies 
had become impossible because of the incentive they gave to speculators and 
because of the shock they imparted to the whole monetary system.  Yet the 
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justments was borne by the domestic cyclical policy and led to alternating in-
flation and deflation periods which were costly for the economy and prejudicial 
to employment. 
A world monetary conference should therefore look into the possibi-
lity of joint decisions on creating liquidities and provide for the introduction of 
more flexible adjustment machinery. 
Mr. Giscard d'Estaing stressed, however, that no world monetary 
reform could remove the need to solve the special problems of national cur-
rencies and that, prior to any international conference, it was necessary to 
organize the monetary solidarity of Europe. 
If, as would be desirable, Europe were endowed with a monetary or-
ganization, it would have been able to deal with the problem itself and thereby 
assert its independence. 
The monetary solidarity of the Community could,  in his view,. find 
expression in a regional institution similar to the International Monetary Fund, 
in swap agreements between interested countries, pooling part of the exchange 
reserves held,  adopting a joint approach on international bodies and, lastly, 
the establishment of absolutely fixed rates of exchange within the Common 
Market. 
(Le Monde,  28  November 1968) 
8.  Dr. Erhard warns against breaking up EFTA 
Speaking in Vienna on 28  November 1968, Dr. Erhard, former Fe-
deral German Chancellor, warned against the attempt of individual countries 
to break with EFTA in order to join the EEC which might, perhaps, be of 
greater use to them. 
Such an attitude naturally weakened their negotiating position. The 
fact that Britain's attempt to join the EEC had, unfortunately, twice been re-
jected was something he had taken to mean that 'the largest country in EFTA 
should be the key with which the door could be opened for all'. 
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dents association on aspects of European integration.  To give up the idea of 
a comprehensive solution or, in other words, to trust in the success of the 
'small steps' approach would,  he feared,  lead nowhere and many plausible 
explanations would be found for the failure of the negotiations.  No  one was 
wrong, everyone was right but as a result, unfortunately, Europe would be a 
lost cause. 
(VWD-Europa,  29 November 1968) 
9.  Mr. Marjolin:  We must see to it that France does not withdraw 
into its shell 
Mr. Robert Marjolin, former Vice-President of the EEC Commis-
sion,  stated during a discussion on Radio Europe No. 1:  'The Common Market 
did not intervene as a Community in the monetary crisis because it is not a 
monetary entity.....  I do not think that a European currency is possible with-
out a European political community, without a European government.' 
Mr. Marjolin also stated that he had been 'rather shocked' recently 
by the anti-German feelings of a large section of the public.  He asked whether 
France would have revalued its currency had it been in the same position as 
Germany;  he felt it would now have done so. 
Going on to the decisions taken by the French Government, he said 
that the reintroduction of exchange controls was a necessary evil.  Such a 
measure had to be taken but, he said, he would regard as an evil anything 
which restricted trade or the flow  of capital or payments in a Europe moving 
towards unity. 
He said that the danger which must be avoided at all costs was that 
exchange controls would give way to further controls and possibly import con-
trols;  this would,  to some extent, be a negation of the Common Market.  He 
thought that this danger would be avoided because Mr. Couve de Murville, 
Mr. Ortoli and, of course, General de Gaulle were convinced that the French 
economy had to be exposed to foreign competition.  This danger would,  if it 
materialized, cause France to withdraw into its shell.  In his view, this trend 
was one which could come about imperceptibly and had to be avoided at any 
price. 
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in the added value tax were inconsistent with the Treaty of Rome.  He said 
that there was nothing in the spirit or the letter of the Treaty to prevent a 
Government from replacing non-repayable taxes by repayable ones. 
Lastly, with reference to the international monetary system, 
Mr. Marjolin said:  'It makes me rather sceptical when I hear people criti-
cizing  this system.  A monetary system is worth what the monetary policies 
of its member States are worth.'  If, however, the decision were taken to 
overhaul it, a restriction should be placed on the possibility, open to certain 
currencies, of attracting credits  - in a sense involuntarily  - through the  ac-
cumulation of reserves.  In other words, the present practice of granting 
credits freely as between one country and another to contend with difficulties 
seemed to him both justified and reasonable;  but he thought, conversely, that 
the use of reserve currencies was a dangerous practice if it went beyond a 
certain point.  The idea that currencies could not fluctuate freely exceptwith-
in extremely limited proportions had, furthermore, been seriously challenged 
of late. 
(Le Monde,  28  November 1968) 
10.  Mr. Pleven discusses French foreign. policy on the television pro-
gramme 'Meet the press' 
In the television programme 'Meet the press', Mr. Pleven spent an 
hour under fire from three journalists from leading French dailies.  With ref-
erence to European problems, the former President of the Council stated : 
'The aim of achieving a  d~tente with the East, which General de Gaulle desires, 
seems reasonable to me.  My  disagreement with the President of the Republic 
is on the means to be employed to achieve this end.  France's leaving NATO 
was a princely gift to the USSR  and nothing was obtained in exchange. 
No alliance without a permanent organization can be effective.  The 
Parliament does not even know if there is any agreement between France and 
NATO on the possible employment of French forces in Germany. 
I do not think that France alone can produce a credible deterrent. 
For this to be possible, its forces would have to be merged with those of the 
United Kingdom and the United States. 
( .....  ) 
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scientific and technical race.  We have been chasing after several hares at 
once  and caught none of them because we have not allowed  the conditions for 
European action to be created. 
France's policy has also re-awakened nationalism in neighbouring 
countries.  A united Europe cannot be achieved except on the basis of the 
equality of the participating States.  Our bilateral agreements with Germany 
have worried our partners.  If the path to a united Europe is blocked, it is 
through a fear that France and Germany may combine together.' 
Mr. Pleven indicated that he would not make France's return to 
NATO  a condition of his joining the French majority party. 'On the other hand,' 
he made clear, 'my position would be the reverse if France withdrew from the 
Atlantic Alliance.' 
(Le Monde, 4 December 1968) 
11.  The Independent Party of Mr. Giscard d'Estaing and the National 
Independent and Farmers' Party discusses European unity 
Speaking on 'Radio Europe', following a banquet in La Villette, 
Mr. Giscard d'Estaing said, with reference to Europe:  'There will not be a 
Common Market unless there is a monetary organization for Europe.  If this 
is not set up soon, there will be further crises affecting other currencies and 
the countries concerned will not be able to do anything but pursue a policy 
similar to that which France is attempting at the moment.  The Common 
Market would not be able to stand up to the series of shocks that would result. 
Hence monetary negotiations for Europe are essential before major interna-
tional negotiations begin.  If the nations of Europe go to this conference inde-
pendently, the Common Market will break down.' 
A  few days later, the National Council of the Independent and 
Farmers' Party met in Paris under the chairmanship of its Honorary Presi-
dent,  Mr. Antoine Pinay.  The meeting closed with the adoption of a motion in 
which, with reference to foreign policy, the Party 'reconfirmed its resolve to 
respect its alliance with its Atlantic partners and proclaimed its faith in the 
European construction'. 
(Le Monde,  21 December 1968) 
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The SFIO Socialist Party held its last national congress from 21  to 
24 December at Puteaux.  The main aim of this congress was to constitute a 
new socialist party, merging the former SFIO, the Convention of Republic In-
stitutions and various non-Communist groupings on the Left. 
The Puteaux congress was dominated by the disappearance of one 
party and the constitution of a new one but it"still adopted motions on foreign 
policy, one of which dealt with Europe.  This read : 
1 Alarmed at the threats of disintegration hovering over the Euro-
pean Communities, which constitute a deliberate violation of the spirit and 
letter of the Treaties of Rome : 
(a)  noting with regret the policy direction with which the Council of 
Ministers concluded its discussion on nuclear research in the Com-
munity; 
(b)  considering that the lack of a common, co-ordinated effort in tech-
nological research means the end of any prospect of progress for 
Europe; 
(c)  condemns the attitude of the Gaullists in power in stopping the Com-
munity work, which is a prelude to the destruction of the European 
Community; 
(d)  is gratified at the public demonstration organized in Brussels on 
17 December 1968 by the trade union organizations of European of-
ficials and declares its support for their  action; 
(e)  urges all those who want a united Europe to bring home to French 
public opinion the dangers with which Europe is threatened; 
(f)  stresses the need for re-launching European integration to democ-
ratize and consolidate the Communities.  1 
(Le Monde and Combat,  21-24 December 1968) 
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In April 1968 leading politicians of different allegiances signed a 
1 Manifesto for the independence of Europe', thereby setting up a European 
independence movement. 
The Manifesto consisted mainly in a strong condemnation of 'the 
domination of American industrial and financial groups' and  advocated 'the 
systematic development of the bases of true co-operation •••••  with peoples' 
democracies, including the Soviet Union in so far as it proves itself to be 
European'. 
The leaders of the new movement include,  side by side, Commu-
nists, Christians of the left, members of the Progressive Party, Gaullists, 
'fellow travellers' of the Communist or Gaullist parties and even militant 
members of the new Extreme Left.  The Executive includes Alain Le Leap, 
former Secretary-General of the CGT who has for the past 8 years been living 
in retirement in the Var,  declining any political responsibility. 
The movement appears to have three aims :  to set up political 
working parties to establish the constituent features of a 'minimum programme' 
for 'European independence';  to hold information conferences and to issue a 
publication to put the general public on its guard concerning the dangers of the 
'American hegemony';  to encourage the setting up of similar movements in 
other European countries and to establish links with them. 
The communiqu~ issued by the founders of the new movement reads 
as follows: 
'In April1968, and despite the diversity of their ideologies, the 
signatories to the Manifesto for the independence of Europe, signified their 
determination to help foil the economical, political and military imperialism 
of the United States and to work for a gradual union of the peoples of Europe 
which would rule out any domination. 
They still consider that the independence of the European peoples 
means gradually eliminating the political and economic hegemonies and the 
military blocs which divide Europe. 
Recent events in Czechoslovakia and the latest world monetary cri-
sis have aggravated this division of Europe and started the cold war off again, 
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German problem. 
In view qf this situation, the signatories to the Manifesto have de-
cided to resume, widen and organize their efforts.  They constitute the Move-
ment for European Independence whose principles are laid down in the Mani-
festo ofApril1968. 
The underlying principles of their joint action which in no way 
restricts their other political activities are : · 
(a)  to promote and support any move to combat the American hegemony 
in Western Europe, the ultimate effects of which can only be the fi-
nancial dependence, technological leeway,  social regression and 
cultural decline of Europe; 
(b)  to organize contacts and increase the exchange of ideas and experi-
ence with all those in Central and Eastern Europe who are in favour 
of the independence and progressive union of Europe; 
(c)  to develop relations with Eastern and Central Europe, to find solu-
tions to the German problem and that of European security with a 
view to liquidating military blocs; 
(d)  to help the peoples of Asia, Africa and America to free themselves 
from under  -development and from imperialism. 
As it takes root in France, the Movement has decided at the same 
time to broaden its relations in the various countries of Europe so as to bring 
the whole of Europe within its scope.' 
The National Council of the Movement has 60 members including : 
Messrs. Emmanuel d'Astier de la Vigerie, Francis Cr~mieux, Max-Pol 
Fouchet, Pierre M. Gallois, Olivier Germain-Thomas, Paul-Marie de la 
Gorce, Pierre LeBrun, Alain Le Leap,  Albert-Paul Lentin, Edmond Michelet, 
Alain Ravennes, Serge Vincent-Vidal, Pierre de Boisdeffre. 
(Le Monde,  24 December 1968) 
- 102-14.  Mr. Mauro Ferri, National Secretary of the Italian Socialist Party, 
stresses the need to accelerate European unification 
Interviewed by the review 'lniziativa europe  a', Mr. Mauro Ferri, 
National Secretary of the Italian Socialist Party (which is affiliated to the 
Socialist International), said that the paralysis of European political and eco-
nomic integration and the failure to enlarge the EEC to include the United 
Kingdom, were among the real reasons for Europe's present division and 
wealmess.  He said that Italy had 'trump cards to play' for a revival of a pro-
European policy. 
Italy's action in recent years had been consistent with the priority 
requirements of economic expansion.  Italy had chosen the course of economic 
integration rather than that of political integration and had pursued it to the 
point where it was feasible;  he said that Europeans were today faced with two 
basic political issues;  the first was enlarging the Community to include the 
United Kingdom and the second was to make another more practical bid for 
political integration on an institutional basis. 
Mr. Ferri then stressed the need for British accession to the Com-
mupity to give a better balance in uniting Europe.  He said that two factors to 
bear in mind were : 'The ambition of De Gaulle's France to become a great 
power and the not unexpected emergence of a Germany that is economically 
very strong and aware of its strength.  It is against this backgroti.nd that 
Britain's presence in the Community and in other designs for European inte-
gration is seen to be desirable.  We must also ensure that this enlargement 
does not whittle away the supranational component in European integration 
because the problems of balance within the integrated Europe will not be solved 
- to mention only the economic and financial ones  - if we maintain the various 
national authorities;  we must work towards a genuine common policy.' 
Mr. Ferri went on:  'Economic, financial and monetary consider-
ations have shown the urgent need, at the integrated Europe level, for an eco-
nomic and monetary policy which will transcend the nationalist claims of De 
Gaulle or the ambitions of Germany ••••• 
Secondly, we need a common foreign policy.  The consolidation of 
NATO  after the events in Czechoslovakia could come about within the Alliance 
if the American supremacy were flanked by a strong and co-ordinated Euro-
pean presence which could act as an independent counterweight.  The Czecho-
slovakian crisis led to stalemate in the policy of opening up relations with the 
East European countries which the individual West European States had until 
then severally pursued;  and this stalemate will probably only be resolved if 
- 103 -Europeans together review prospects and the ways and means of pursuing such 
a policy. 
Thirdly, as we have seen, the Czechoslovakian crisis raised the 
question of restoring the military balance.  This is a serious issue, involving 
economic and political considerations :  there could be a change of emphasis 
and influence which would affect individual States internally.  Again,  only 
integration will give an answer to this question which will provide conditions 
of security for our economic and social development and our democratic sta-
bility.  If European nations devise a common policy for economic affairs, 
foreign policy and defence, obviously there will have to be many institutional 
changes.  We could envision enlarging the supervisory powers of the European 
Parliament (and here the Government's task of renewing the Italian represen-
tation assumes its full significance).  The same criteria for the composition 
of this Parliament should be reviewed to give more direct participation by the 
public at large.  It is true that speeches have been made and repeated on this 
subject.  I think that the confused international situation has had a depressing 
effect on the internal politics of the countries of Western Europe.  And this 
should induce us to quicken the pace.' 
(Iniziativa europea 1968  - Year X  - No.  111) 
- 104-III.  ORGANIZATIONS  AND  GROUPINGS 
1.  The Belgian trarle union movement and European problems 
The National Information Committee of Belgium's General Labour 
Federation examined European problems in the light of the recent GLF con-
gresses and of the latest developments in the European Community.  The G  LF 
had the following observations to make to its affiliated members: 
11.  The need to revive the idea of uniting Europe comes from the se-
riousness of the crisis which the Community is at present  undergoing. Ds-
spite the completion of the customs union 18 months ahead of the orig-
inal schedule and despite the fact that the machinery for the common 
agricultural policy has been set up, the outstanding fact is the lack of 
any real progress in formulating common policies. 
In the long run this lack of common policies is liable to prej-
udice what has been achieved.  The recent French measures are in 
this respect a significant example.  The application of the safeguard 
clauses calls the customs union into question.  More indirect mea-
sures, furthermore,  lead to the same result:  one has only to think of 
the various tax exemptions or subsidies in favour of investments. 
2.  For our trade union organizations there is also the fact that 
we have, by and large, been too much guided by the European Move-
ment type of action summed up in the words "Europe for Europe". 
For the generation that emerged from the war this formula meant 
something, but for the younger generation it is meaningless. 
Practically speaking, we have endeavoured to put our case in 
the Community institutions without always making a sufficiently clear 
distinction between ourselves and the other groups;  agriculturalprices 
and the non-disappearance of frontiers.  For our propaganda we should 
also take into account the difficulty of assessing the favourable effects 
of integration. 
3.  Under these conditions, to relaunch the idea of uniting Europe 
means giving it  a content.  This means making a critical analysis of 
what is being done at the moment and suggesting alternatives. 
Our campaign should be concentrated on a few general themes 
and one or two specific points. 
- 105 -(a)  General themes 
- The lack of unity in Europe explains why it is not present on the 
world stage.  In the Vietnam war anfl  in the Near East crisis, the 
States of Europe might have marte suggestions or criticisms but 
only an integraten Europe couln have affected the course of 
events. 
- If it is true that fear of the USSR  made people react in 1949 and 
1950,  the fear of American economic domination might perhaps 
provoke a beneficial reaction.  Obviously one must not fall into 
the error of an unjustifiable anti-Americanism;  one should, on 
the contrary, stress the dangers to Europe's future of being pas-
sive in the face of the American challenge. 
Attention must thus be focused on the need to develop key sectors 
by a concentration of efforts in scientific research and technology 
and in guaranteeing security of employment through a policy de-
vised at the Community level (and in particular through a regional 
policy). 
- The points in the CISL/CISC joint memorandum issued from 
Rome, i.e. the enlargement of the Community and strengthening 
its democratic structure.  It is worthwhile showing the adverse 
effects on consultations with the trade union organizations of 
transferring power from the Commission to the Council.  Here, 
the point to be emphasized is the need to strengthen the hand of 
the Parliament. 
These three themes should guide us with regard to the merger of 
the Treati.es.  We know by experience that our ability to influence 
events positively is limiten.  Even on those points where we have 
been successful, our contribution noes not emerge clearlybecause 
of the amendements undergone in Community procedure. 
We are, on the other hand, certainly able to stand in the way of 
certain events.  If the merger of the Treaties does not measure 
up to our claims, we must try to prevent its ratification. 
(b)  Specific themes 
(i) The rOle and the activity of the trade union organizations and 
secretariat. 
(ii) Introducing greater flexibility into the customs union, for example 
through easing up frontier controls (in the Benelux countries) and 
- 106-the campaign regarding the prices of some products, in relation 
to competition rules and the agricultural policy. 
(iii) Our action programme of May 1965. 
(iv) Theothersocialproblems:  employment, the Social Fund, occupa-
tional training. 
4.  If an agreement is reached on these themes there are two 
questions of organization which have first to be answered : 
(i)  Should one not plan from the outset to co-ordinate the campaign, 
both in the Benelux countries and in France, with the Christian 
trade union organizations ? 
(ii)  If we enter on a campaign this must have the clear mark of trade 
unionism on it.  We should avoid wasting too much effort on de-
monstrations of the "European Movement type" where we should 
be no more than "camp-followers".' 
(La Tribune, September 1968) 
2.  Mr. Huvelin, President of the National Council of French Manage-
ment, discusses Europe 
In an exclusive interview which he gave to the  'R~publicain Lorrain' 
Mr. Paul Huvelin, President of the National Council of French Management~ 
was asked about the attitude of French management to European unification. 
In reply he said:  'The National Council of French Management has felt ever 
since the Common Market started that European unification was a prerequi-
site for the expansion and the freedom of the French economy ••.•• 
The choice of opening up frontiers has been upheld and this is a clear 
sign that France has broken with the protectionist traditions of the past.' 
Referring then to the British application to join the EEC, he said: 
'The possibility of open competition from neighbours which have powerful in-
dustrial traditions naturally makes French business leaders think.  Within an 
increasingly strong Economic Community they  feel that they can nonetheless 
face up to this.  Thus French management does not reject this possibility out 
of principle but it is convinced of the need to strengthen the Common Market 
as an economic unity before anything else.  Once this priority is established it 
- 107-would be strengthened rather than weakened if the United Kingdom were ready 
to join as a full partner, accepting all the commitments involved for the 
immediate future and in the long-term prospects.' 
(Le R~publicain Lorrain, 16 October 1968) 
3.  Conference organized by the European Movement in the Netherlands 
to discuss employment problems as seen from a European angle 
On 17 October the Dutch section of the European Movement organized 
a conference in Amsterdam to discuss problems of employment in the EEC. 
The speakers included:  Mr. Roolvink,  Minister for Social Affairs and Public 
Health, Mr. Sassen, a member of the European Commission,  Mr. Bosma, 
President of the Federation of Dutch Enterprises,  Mr. Kloos, President of 
the Dutch Trade Union Organizations and Mr. De Wolff,  President of the EEC 
working party on the medium-term economic policy. 
The broad measure of agreement between representatives of trade 
unions and management and the speakers from Brussels was a noteworthy 
feature of this conference,  They were unanimous in recognizing that none of 
the member States was yet in a position to pursue a long-term employment 
policy entirely on its own. 
Mr. Roolvink stressed that,  at present, the only problem command-
ing  any real attention was that of employment structures. Two Ministers were 
dealing with this problem :  the Minister for Economic Affairs who was re-
sponsible for employment policy and the Minister for Social Affairs who was 
concerned with the optimal adaptation of supply to demand, both as regards the 
location and the nature of job opportunities.  Mr. Roolvink felt that a distinc-
tion had to be made between three closely-interwoven groups of problems: 
(1)  problems raised by recession and the overhauling of certainbranches 
of the economy; 
(2)  problems associated with technological development; 
(3)  those stemming from the uneven expansion of different regions. 
All the member States were familiar with these structural  difficulties. 
This was a reason why the problems of employment policy and the attendant 
labour market issues should be tackled at Community level.  The Treaties and 
the tools they created were, however, inadequate to meet this purpose.  With 
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social partners and that was about all.  It could only be hoped, the Minister 
felt, that the climate would  become more favourable and that an institutional 
framework could be set up.  These were the two prerequisites if the problems 
were to be properly tackled. 
As for measures designed to improve the present situation, 
Mr. Roolvink began by proposing that the European Social Fund should, in fu-
ture, intervene not only to deal with urgent cases;  its main function should be 
to take preventive action.  A  voiding unemployment should not be the least of 
the Fund's purposes.  The allowances it paid out should also go to poor areas 
and to improving the occupational training of workers because technological 
development necessitated that this be taken to an increasingly higher level. 
Mr. Roolvink also asked that the European Investment Bank should 
have more scope and that its statute should be overhauled;  he added that the 
ECSC redevelopment loans could serve as a guide here. 
Mr. Sassen outlined the work done by the Community to promote 
employment.  He, too,  suggested various improvements, particularly re-
garding the operation of the European Social Fund.  To date, it had operated 
mainly 1 after the event' ,  in that it had reimbursed .member States with 50 per 
cent of the costs of measures already taken.  It should, in future,  act more 
'before the event';  its concern should primarily be with additional training and 
occupational retraining;  it should not, under any circumstances, remain a 
sort of European unemployment fund. 
Mr. Sassen also quoted the ECSC  as an example. He also advocated 
setting up a European employment council comprising members of the Euro-
pean Commission, national governments, trade unions and management. 
Mr. Sassen came out against the nationalistic and egocentric ideas 
of many of the Dutch political parties which advocated special methods in the 
field of employment and who did not take into account the ideas or the approach 
of the other member States.  These methods were often inconsistent with those 
prevailing elsewhere.  The implementation of the European employment policy 
meant that all those concerned had to look at problems from a European angle. 
Mr. Bosma considered that the surface area of a region should not 
be decisive when political guidelilies were being formulated.  A domestic sur-
vey could therefore show the way to a European policy to stimulate the labour 
market, pin-point the centres of tension and thus allow the necessary correc-
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tural problems.  Structural measures were not always taken in time and when 
they were, they were often too incidental to avoid upheavals on the labour mar-
ket.  A good policy presupposed an accurate idea of the development of society. 
Medium and long-term planning was necessary to show, with regard to em-
ployment: 
(a)  the foreseeable employment trend in the various branches of the 
economy, 
(b)  foreseeable changes in jobs within these hranches of the economy. 
These forecasts would have to be regularly updated because it was 
difficult to assess how rapidly change took place.  The action taken on the 
basis of these forecasts would thus have to be flexible.  This could be achieved 
by securing greater manpower mobility both from one place to another and 
from one job to another. 
Mr. Kloos considered that the problems of employment could not be 
tackled on the national level.·  States, regions and towns were fiercely com-
peting with each other to attract domestic and foreign industry without refer-
ence to any overall plan within the context of the regional employment policy. 
This was an unfortunate kind of competition of which those  industries settling 
in a given region took advantage to obtain settlement facilities.  A diversified 
expansion policy was essential.  It had to be a policy of expansion because 
economic growth provided the means for increasing employment and produc-
tivity.  It had to be varied because the problems themselves were varied and 
complicated and they transcended the national context.  They could not be 
dealt with by a national policy.  Mr. Kloos therefore felt that the European 
Commission should have greater authority.  It should first have a genuine 
Community planning body to deal with cyclical policy problems and medium-
term planning.  Only then would it be able to fight on equal terms with the 
governments.  To cope with structural changes three sorts of measures were 
necessary: 
(i)  a greater mobility both as to place and jobs should be secured by 
occupational training and allowances; 
(ii)  alternative jobs should be created in declining industries and in re-
gions with inadequate structures; 
(iii)  to bring the recession process to a halt if the measures concerned 
were not effective enough. 
Finding answers to all these problems called for a minimum of co-
operation and even, in many cases, for a genuine common policy. The medium-
term economic policy should provide the basis.  The assistance and rationali-
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other  - be replaced by a Community policy, established by reference to Com-
munity criteria.  Such policies were urgently required in the fields oftextiles, 
shipbuilding and the steel industry.  Where rationalization took place, the 
closing of enterprises should not be made attractive only to employers;  the 
workers, too,  should benefit from advantageous provisions.  It would thus be 
desirable,  as part of the income guarantee coupled with age and/  or years of 
service, to enable them to retire before the stipulated age. 
To achieve this the Community must take community decisions and 
it must show financial solidarity. 
From the institutional standpoint, it was essential for the Commis-
sion, the Governments and the social partners, to take part.  The tripartite 
consultative committees of the European Social Fund could be merged to form 
a European labour market council.  This council would not, however, be able 
to do  anything unless it were given the necessary tools.  The powers of the 
European Social Fund had to be increased so that it had the same scope for 
action as the ECSC  in readaptation policy.  It should have the right of initia-
tive, to be used in the medium-term structural policy. 
An  active structural policy could go some way towards solving a 
great many regional problems but it could not solve those of regions which 
were lagging behind economically.  Possibilities of co-operation were, no 
doubt,  greater  at the international level but it was also necessary to ensure 
that national measures did not cause too many irregularities in the conditions 
of competition. 
The main aim was to reach the stage where the Community bore 
part of the financial cost of promoting the economic development of the regions. 
This was a necessary consequence of the economic unity which the 
Community represented and this was something that could not be rejected on 
the grounds that the Netherlands would have to pay out more than it received. 
(Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant, 18 October 1968; 
Handels- en Transport Courant, 18 October 1968; 
De Vakbeweging,  18 October 1968;  · 
De Nederlandse Onderneming, 25 October 1968) 
- 111-4.  German Banking Conference in DUsseldorf 
At the opening of the 11th German Banking Conference in DUsseldorf 
(21 to 22 October 1968) Dr. Schiller, the Federal German Economics Minis-
ter, discussed cyclical trends and external trade relations. 
He said that there had been a made-to-measure upswing and thatthe 
German Mark was one of the most stable currencies in the world.  He again 
rejected the requirement of some foreign circles that the D -Mark should be 
revalued.  It  would be depressing, he said, if we ourselves had to correct 
every error which had started off in other countries, in their own houses. 
Everyone had an obligation and obligations were not 'convertible'.  A revalu-
ation of the D-Mark was not debated at the IMF meeting either. 
'We are moving from the nal\re approach to an enlightened market 
economy, in which private banks are a vital factor,' he stressed.  They were 
the main connecting link within the economy between enterprises, private 
households, the State and the outside world and exerted their influence through 
consultations, information and control on the decisions of their credit custom-
ers in the economy at large.  Yet they were more than commercial partners 
for the private householders;  those with savings and deposit accounts also re-
ferred to them for help in making decisions. 
Professor Schiller also discussed Britain's accession to the Euro-
pean Economic Community.  He said that it would only be possible to consoli-
date the British economy when it was merged with the EEC.  Within the EEC 
itself, one had further to pursue a policy directed at growth and stability. 
'Our aim is and remains a European Community of stability.'  In this con-
nexion, he praised the solidarity of the member States and said that the help 
given to France had shown that no member could now do without the Common 
Market. 
In an impassioned speech at the Bankers' Conference,  Mr. Jean 
Rey, President of the Commission of the European Communities, called for 
an attack on the right of veto.  Departing from the original theme of his talk, 
he said that,  although the Governments of the individual member States had the 
right to hold different opinions, they also had an obligation to work together. 
Otherwise, the Community would become as weak a body as 'the lame United 
Nations', similarly paralyzed by the very right of veto.  By using its veto, one 
partner had stood against the enlargement of the Community which all the 
others wanted;  it did this in the name of a Community about which it had,  at 
the same time,  said that it did not suit its taste. 
- 112-Understandably, the economic integration of Europe and the struc-
tural changes linked to it incur a loss of impetus but these must be reduced to 
a minimum, not least to avoid political regression. 
Mr. Rey praised the compromise bid of the German Foreign Min-
ister with regard to enlarging the EEC and said that this suggestion still re-
mained on the negotiating table.  The Community was, indeed, in a state of 
crisis but this was neither the first nor the worst and it was certainly not the 
last.  In spite of everything, he was firmly convinced that the EEC would not 
disappear from the economic landscape and that it would progress on the right 
course. 
Different opinions were always being expressed as to whether the 
monetary union, which was an integral part of a complete customs union, 
should, as it were, be the culminating point at the end ofthejourneyor wheth-
er it could not serve as the driving force for accelerating integration. Mr. Rey 
gave no direct answer to this question but it was clear from what he inferred 
that a gradual realization of the monetary union,  in harmony with integration 
in all other fields, was the only possible answer he could have given. 
He referred once again to the legally vague monetary policy provi-
sions in the EEC Treaty which had,  in the course of time, brought into being 
various committees to co-ordinate monetary policy (the EEC Monetary Com-
mittee, the quarterly meetings of Finance Ministers, the Committee of Central 
Bank Governors, the Cyclical Policy Committee, obligation to consult concern-
ing changes in rates of exchange and on questions concerning international mone-
tary relations). In  this connexion,  he referred to the units of account introduced 
in the field of agricultural market regulations, which would make it increasing-
ly difficult and unlikely that there would be any parity changes. 
With reference to the latest French difficulties, he advocated giving 
a more definite shape to the provision in the EEC Treaty for reciprocal assis-
tance between the member States in the event of balance-of-payments difficul-
ties.  This could, perhaps, be developed as a reserve tool for the member 
States, which would subsequently also come to be regarded as such by third 
countries.  The member States would thus help to solve the monetary ques-
tions arising in a larger context. 
The Commission had, in several documents, both recommended and 
given precise details about monetary policy co-ordination.  This mainly in-
volved unifying the currency markets in the Community.  He advocated either 
further restricting or completely removing the limits on the daily exchange 
rates fluctuations (currently • 75 per cent either way)  in the currency dealings 
within the Community. The same question arose with forward rates. Eliminating 
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relations within the Community and would have great  psychological significance 
as a result;  it would establish monetary policy co-operation in the EEC in a 
more practical way. 
Mr. Strauss, Federal Finance Minister, spoke about 'the public 
authorities as creditor and debtor';  with reference to the revaluation of the 
D-Mark, he came out decisively on the side of Dr. Schiller.  He  said that re-
cent experience and a careful weighing-up of all the arguments had shown that 
the majority was in favour of maintaining the present rate of exchange.  'In 
view of the uncertainty of the path before us, it would be inconsistent with a 
responsible attitude on the part of the Government to create new unrest and 
uncertainty. ' 
(lndustriekurier,  22  October 1968; 
Die Welt, 22  October 1968; 
Frankfurter Allgemeine  Zeitung,  22  and 23 October 1968; 
L'Echo de la Bourse, 23  October 1968) 
5.  Trade union action in the European Community 
The Confederation of Christian Trade Unions in Belgium helcl its 
24th congress in Brussels from 24  to 26 October 1968.  The congress closed 
by passing the following resolution on European problems : 
'The Congress, 
1.  considering: 
(a)  that the Customs Union was in fact  brought into effect on 1 July 1968; 
(b)  the delay in finalizing most of the common policies; 
(c)  the lack of progress with the European social policy; 
(d)  the danger to European integration of a succession of political 
crises; 
2.  regrets that Europe has failed to understand the need to create an 
economic,  social and political entity that would turn it into a real 
United States of Europe able to play its rightful part on the world 
stage at the right moment; 
- 114-3.  recalls that the EEC cannot remain a mere Customs Union but must 
become a real economic union and that this must be with a view to a 
future political union; 
4.  asks that the merger of the Treaties of the European Economic 
Community, the European Coal and Steel Community and the Euro-
pean Atomic Energy Community should be effected in this spiritwith 
the professional organizations, particularly the trade union organi-
zations, playing a practical part at every stage; 
5.  assures the European Organization of the International Confederation 
of Christian Trade Unions of its support and would like to see it be-
come more integrated and have greater resources at its disposal; 
6.  asks the professional organizations to contribute towards developing 
the work of the international professional organizations especially 
within the EEC so that the work of the trade unions may find expres-
sion in practical co-operation between the workers of more than one 
State.  Europe must constitute both an economic and social whole.' 
(Au travail,  9 November 1968) 
6.  The case for Europeanizing the Universities 
Writing in the Bulletin of the European Movement, Mr. Oele, a 
member of the European Parliament (Dutch Socialist) called for a more rapid 
elimination of obstacles to the free movement of research workers, students 
and workers and for earlier implementation of the programme dealing with the 
equivalence of university diplomas.  Mr. Oele supported the efforts being 
made ill this direction by the EEC Commission.  The Article in the Euratom 
Treaty concerning the European University had, like many others, remained 
a dead letter.  This was why the European Commission could be proud of the 
fact that it was now less emphatic about the somewhat ambitious plan which 
originated around 1950 to set up a model European University.  Whilst the idea 
itself remained valid, the chances of turning it into a practical reality were 
greater in the field of advanced research and teaching institutes which had a 
more specific purpose.  Without wishing to deny that this was a worthwhile 
aim to pursue, it had to be remembered that the main focus should be on step-
ping up exchanges between existing European universities. 
It was certain that wider"-ranging contacts between the universities 
would be beneficial both to students and staff and to industry, especially if 
these contacts made for a better division  of  work and intensified other exchanges. 
- 115-This proposal, which was in itself practical, had one appealing aspect:  it 
concerned the younger generation and he who 'is young has the key to the 
future'.  But would the Europe of today succeed in winning the support of the 
younger generation ?  To carry through its university plans, the European 
Commission could do with some allies because the difficulties were so great. 
Linguistic differences would still be a serious obstacle for as long as people 
refused to make English  - for example  - the language of the research work-
ers and scientists whose vocation was international. 
The research contracts that industry or the public authorities might 
conclude with the universities would do but little to help with the division of 
work and co-operation with these universities as long as these contracts con-
tinued to be envisioned in a purely national framework.  The credits from 
Brussels would indeed be a great help because it was money that the universi-
ties needed more than ever in order to expand.  For the time being, however, 
no great help could be expected from the Community's own resources.  The 
free movement of university staff furthermore was liable to increase rather 
than reduce the financial difficulties of the universities.  Lastly, the trend 
towards university autonomy was becoming more pronounced in the regions 
and States of the Community.  The result of this was that the Commission 
could only take an indirect part in the process of reform the universities were 
currently engaged in.  It could not rely on the active or tacit support ofthose 
for whom European co-operation was of immediate general interest because 
universities were not corporations geared to a market and having a single ob-
jective. 
Europe no longer had the wind of change in its sails.  It was now 
blowing in its face,  especially in the universities.  The wind of change was at 
present blowing within national frontiers and it compelled a choice of course. 
In this choice Europe was not recognized as an end in itself but as a means. 
It had not to be the last bastion in the defence of national culture but the inter-
mediate stage at which we could enlarge our sphere of action, have a greater 
say in decisions taken and attain to greater mastery over technical develop-
ment.  It was thus not for Europe to be the objective of a militant Christian 
West but to serve as a means of achieving a pluralist confederation able to 
help solve world problems.  The best young people and scientists in the Com-
mwlity were moving in this direction and would no doubt like to help in 'Euro-
peanizing' the universities, provided this in turn led to a social reform of these 
institutions. 
The final aim of the European Community was a heterogeneous poli-
tical society with limited powers.  Was it to be expected that it should throw 
itself with political ~lan into the struggle for a reform of the universities ? The 
answer was simple.  The Commission itself was aware that to pursue this ob-
jective it needed new powers and new provisions in the Treaty. 
- 116-It was therefore firmly resolved to break out of the limits of its 
terms of reference.  If it wanted to help pulling down the great walls sur-
rounding so many European scientific institutions, it could not be content to 
improve regulations on competition between the universities.  It had to create 
the conditions for a wider and more social development  of the European uni-
versities.  It had to take part in a long-term development plan for university 
teaching, which Europe so much needed.  It had to be the focal point for dis-
cussions on the university's responsibility to society.  It had to help in a more 
experimental development of science teaching.  Lastly, in the interests of the 
economy and of the whole of Western industrial society it had to work towards 
creating a European statute of the rights and duties of the specialized univer-
sity. 
If the European Community did not have its own design for the future, 
it could not really help dealing with university problems.  It had clearly to 
show young people what there was for them in the Europe in which they would 
represent the decision-taking generation, what guarantees there would be 
against a relapse into political nationalism and,  above all, what new tasks 
could be undertaken, which were still waiting to be tackled. 
(Nieuw Europa, October 1968) 
7.  Professor Schneider and Mr. Fritz Berg oppose the formation of 
blocs in Europe and  advocate giving a new impetus to European po-
!!EY 
On 3 October 1968, Professor Schneider, President of the German 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, addressed the European Union of Finan-
cial and Business Correspondents in the Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
in DUsseldorf.  From the standpoint of German business, as a large and old-
established supplier but also as a customer of its European partners, he said 
it was an absurdity that blocs should come to be formed within Europe.  It was 
undeniable that there was no longer a common political resolve on the part of 
the six governments to achieve the political aims of the Rome Treaties and 
that, as a result, further progress would be very laborious. 
After the establishment of the customs union on 1 July 1968 which 
was, in fact, no more than a customs tariff union, it would be even more diffi-
cult to reach the next stage, i.e  • .the economic union, because traditional na-
tional interests were at stake and there would be a hard struggle to safeguard 
them.  Similarly, he saw little, at present, on which the common trade policy 
envisioned in the Treaty could be based. 
- 117-As for the agricultural policy, which had long been regarded as the 
pride of the EEC, he said that he could not accept that it was, in its present 
form, a 'tool in the hands of common sense in business' between the Six or a 
demonstration of the sense of responsibility of the Community vis-~-vis its 
trading partners in Europe and overseas. 
It appeared to him that it was irreconcilable with sound common 
sense when the resolution of serious monetary crises was due, in a large mea-
sure, to the understanding and successful co-operation of  the European Central 
Bank Presidents, but that the Governments could not agree on a policy which 
would serve to prevent economic and monetary crises in the EEC. 
Speaking in DUsseldorf at the Annual General Meeting of the Indus-
trial Credit Bank on 24  October 1968, Mr. Fritz Berg, President of the Feder-
ation of German Industry, came out against a revaluation of the German-Mark. 
A once-and-for-all intervention was as much to be rejected as were greater 
margins of fluctuation or graduated rates of parity.  The uncertainty of un-
steady rates of exchange was something that the world's economy could no 
longer afford.  He  emphasized that the future lay rather in a much closer co-
operation in international monetary policy and legislation.  The EEC had to 
develop into a hard-currency bloc. 
Europe would only 1 survive' against the USA if European firms met 
size with size.  Either one struggled through to a European internal market or 
one had to fall back on a policy of 'national allotments'.  In the latter case, 
Europe would fall to pieces • 
(Die Welt, 25 October 1968) 
8.  Agricultural quotas?  Statement on agricultural policy by the Presi-
dent of the German Agricultural Credit Union 
In an article published on 31  October 1968, the President of the 
German Agricultural Credit Union discussed the problem of agricultural quotas 
in the following terms : 
The common agricultural policy is based on the principle that the 
Common Market alone shall control prices and imports by variable levies 
which are adjusted to the prevailing situation.  In the meantime, it has become 
obvious to everyone that this system has led to a dead end.  The price policy, 
- 118-which has proved so inadequate to the farmers, has stimulated overproduction 
and this is flooding the agricultural markets, restricting  the room to manoeuvre 
trade policy and clearly overtaxing the budgets of the member States.  The 
obligation of the Community resulting from the market regulations either to 
export surpluses at world prices or to destroy them has become an illusion 
since the surpluses no longer usable by market standards have grown to unan-
ticipated proportions.  The farmers recognize that price promises mean 
nothing when they cannot be fulfilled on the market and that excessive produc-
tion, which has likewise been an unforeseen result of rationalization, is be-
ginning to act against them . 
The resulting discussion on a new agricultural policy course, accel-
erated and made more pronounced through a change in office of the Minister 
for Agriculture, has suddenly brought this fact out into the open and has also 
embraced the French, who have so far been the main beneficiaries of the sys-
tem.  In 196 9 the French Government will have to pay out more than 7, 000  m 
French Francs in market support alone and this is more than half the total 
aid for agriculture and nearly a quarter of the gross sales receipts.  It  clearly 
regards such a burden on the State as unacceptable.  Moreover, it has cause 
to doubt whether Germany and Italy will still be prepared, for their part, to 
contribute through increased payments to the EAGGF, which will once again 
mainly benefit France, to this immense subsidy for French agriculture, 
whose overproduction is depressing its own markets.  The French farmers, 
at all events the younger ones, seem indeed to have realized that there is no 
way out with the present system. 
In the forefront of the discussions is the differentiation in agricul-
tural assistance.  Encouragement is to be given to the production of competi-
tive farms,  and farms of the size below this group are to receive social assis-
tance in so far as they abandon or restrict production for the market.  The 
main idea here is to regulate the whole output quantitatively instead of doing 
so as previously through the agency of price alone.  As the French agricul-
tural press indicates, this should mean production restrictions for cereals, 
milk,  sugar beet and for fruit, which is of special importance to farmers in 
southern France.  This would be a complete reversal of Mr. Pisani's agri-
cultural policy which, for example, gave a strong stimulus to fruit in view of 
the apparently unlimited absorption capacity of the German market;  the trees 
planted as a result of the official plan have now  simply not to grow sky-high. 
Similar observations are being made in other member States.  The 
leading agricultural organizations in Germany proposed to the Minister of 
Food before the annual deadline that the milk market should be regulated by 
reference to the sugar market organization principle whereby every dairy 
would have a basic delivery quota;  the quantities coming within this limit could 
be marketed  at intervention or guide prices whereas the surplus quantities 
could oncy be marketed at world prices.  The leading foodstuff organization in 
- 119-the Community took up this proposal on a Belgian motion which was fully sup-
ported by representatives of the other member States, subject to reservations 
by the Dutch.  The principle of quantity regulation or, to be more precise, of 
quotas, was once again on the table.  The Commission has always energetical-
ly rejected the quota procedure both for the internal markets and for the com-
mon external frontiers although it would have been easier at the GATT nego-
tiations, for example, if it had been able to offer firm, long-term import 
quotas •  Since the market direction has come to a standstill on the question of 
price and the Mansholt proposals for a radical unification of farm structures 
are, in the best possible of contingencies, no more than pipe-dreams, there 
remains no alternative but to look this new course in the eyes. 
(Handelsblatt,  31 October 1968) 
9.  Franco-German co-operation is the focal point of a meeting in 
DUsseldorf of the German branch of the International Chamber of 
Commerce 
The importance of good relations with Germany for the French eco-
nomy was emphasized in an address given at a meeting of the Management 
Committee of the German branch of the International Chamber of Commerce 
in DUsseldorf on 7 November 1968. 
Leading French businessmen saw Franco-German co-operation as 
the nub of the European Economic Community and they felt that this had to be 
further developed because it was at the same time the basis of the Franco-
German relations.  This view was put forward by Mr. Paul Huvelin,  President 
of the French Employers Association.  Particularly noteworthy was his obser-
vation that French economy too was convinced of the need to enlarge the EEC. 
He believed that the recent efforts of the French Government to find possible 
solutions were quite sincere.  In the event of Britain's accession, some areas 
of French industry would experience difficulties but these should not be over-
estimated.  Mr. Huvelin referred here to the British monetary and balance-
of-payments problems, which had first to be cleared.  He stressed the over-
riding importance attached by the general public in France to the Franco-
German rapprochement. 
Mr. Huvelin did not think it likely that the introduction of partici-
pation in France would lead to a situation comparable with the German consul-
tation system.  The law, as so far envisioned, did not threaten the essential 
structures of private enterprises.  What was involved was mainly better in-
formation for the works committees on the running of these concerns.  At the 
- 120-same time, French employers would have to make sure that the apparently 
'fully acceptable' proposals of Mr. Capitant, the Minister for Justice on the 
Left of the Gaullist Party, for profit-sharing by workers were not carried too 
far.  The spokesman for French employers here relied on the firmness of 
General de Gaulle who would certainly see to it that the authority of business 
management was not undermined. 
French economy was anxious about the heavy cost burden borne by 
enterprises resulting from the wage agreements  they had had to conclude 
early in the summer to end the crisis.  The sequel to this crisis should not 
be under-estimated even though business activity in France had improved con-
siderably and confidence had been restored since the end of the crisis.  The 
increase in the cost of living of around 5 per cent in the current year and a 
further increase in 1969 had to be taken into account.  Employers had, be-
cause of this increase in the cost of living in the spring of 1969, to reckon 
with new  and massive wage claims from the trade unions.  He  did not think, 
however, that an increase in wages on the same scale as this year was likely 
because it would appreciably exceed the attainable progress in productivity. 
Mr. Franz Heinrich Ulrich, Spokesman for the Board of the Deutsche 
Bank and Vice-President of the German branch of the International Chamber 
of Commerce, stressed how  much it was in the interests of German economy 
for the French economy to recover completely from the difficulties resulting 
from the events in May and June as quickly as possible. France was Germany's 
main trading partner as, indeed, Germany was the most important trading 
partner of F ranee.  Trade between the two countries in both directions had 
grown to over D M 18, OOOm.  The German economy was very gratified that 
French business was in favour,  as Mr. Huvelin had assured them, of elimi-
nating the French import quotas;  this had been the quickest way of overcoming 
the difficulties resulting from the May/June crisis. 
Mr. Ulrich called for closer co-operation in the EEC on cyclical 
and monetary policies.  It was, in the long run, unacceptable to regard it as 
normal for one member State to have an average increase in its cost  ofliving 
of 5 per cent, while other member States had to accept an upper limit of 2 per 
cent:  'We must work out a common measure here.'  Despite Mr. Huvelin's 
acceptance of the principle of enlarging the EEC, Mr. Ulrich felt that there 
were still some differences of opinion on this subject.  German business was 
ready to support any proposal that did not loosen the ties between London and 
the Community. 
Mr. Otto Wolff von Amerongen, President of the German Branch, 
conclucfud the meeting by stressing the need for sound monetary discipline 
throughout the Community.  Only this, he said, could provide a joint stand 
- 121  -against changes in exchange rates.  Dr. Alwin MUnchmeyer'  s proposal to 
create a European monetary union as the beginning of a new stage in Commu-
nity integration was one which Mr. Otto Wolff regarded as not feasible. 
(Handelsblatt,  8 and 9 November 1968) 
10.  Belgian industries and the future of the Community 
In its bulletin of November 10, 1968, the Federation of Belgian in-
dustries published an editorial entitled :  'The drive towards reviving the Euro-
pean Community.  1 
'For nearly a year the Six have been failing to agree on a common 
design for the conditions under which the Common Market might be enlarged. 
They have issued numerous plans, and ideas have been put forward by this or 
that member State, but no valid common synthesis has been established by the 
European Commission whose responsibility it is to look after the general in-
terests of the Community, because of a lack of any adequate political consen-
sus. 
Although this is in itself not very encouraging, what makes it the 
more dangerous and unacceptable to both Belgian and European business 
spheres is that it has led, in a way that was not intended in the Treaty of 
Rome, to a series of political vetoes which have prevented the Community 
from developing normally and rationally and from expanding internally.  This 
practice of "retaliatory" vetoes has particularly affected industrialists be-
cause of the way it has hampered business within the Community.  The most 
characteristic examples are the common work on setting up a new, European-
type company and that regarding research and technology. 
Today a great many firms are forced to expand their organizations 
to an optimal size, to streamline their buying and sales service, to specialize 
and diversify their products, their range or their services and to increase 
their research potential.  It may be indispensable for firms to amalgamate in 
order to withstand world competition and to meet the challenge of technological 
change. 
Most industrialists who are confronted with the obstacles and delays 
in the harmonization work affecting enterprises regard the creation of a Euro-
pean-type company as a way of accelerating mergers and amalgamations and 
- 122-of providing new opportunities for firms which want to go to the financial mar-
ket so that they can become established and expand their activities in several 
Community countries.  Such a company could, furthermore, pave the way to 
the real economical integration of Europe.  All these arguments justify the 
work done so far both by the Commission and the Permanent Representatives; 
these deserve to be continued and to lead to early decisions. 
At the meeting of the Council of Ministers in Luxembourg on 
31  October 1967, representatives from the field of scientific research showed 
how the technological gap between the United States and Europe went on widen-
ing every year.  A working group under the chairmanship of Mr.  Mar~chal 
was set up to look at the problems facing Europe in scientific and technologi-
cal research. 
In its first report, this group recommends that "a systematic effort 
should be made to innovate at both the Community and national levels". 
All those concerned are agreed and wanting a better co-ordination of 
European research and development work.  One urgent need is that the neces-
sary legal framework be set up to encourage firms to participate in technolo-
gical progress.  Practical measures must be taken to ensure real co-operation 
between governments and between enterprises;  Belgian industry feels bound to 
express its concern at the prolonged stoppage in the work of the Mar~chal 
Group. 
The seriousness of such a situation is a revealing comment on the 
very unsatisfactory atmosphere for political co-operation between the member 
States.  This makes it difficult not only to attain new objectives within the 
Community but also to carry on with the perfectly normal work (formally pro-
vided for in the Treaty) of changing the present customs union into a real and 
adequate economic union before the end of the transition  period on 1 January 1970. 
The serious imbalance between the actual stage reached with the 
customs union and the various common policies (economic, trade, aid, free 
movement of capital, etc. with the sole exception of the common agricultural 
policy) is causing very serious concern to Belgian industry.  The lack of ade-
quate common policies results mainly in the lack of any real single market for 
the six countries, because a series of trade, technical and fiscal obstacles 
remain - where they do not grow worse  - and means, in practice, that mar-
kets are in separate compartments.  This situation is disturbing because the 
resultant economic nationalism in the Six makes it hard and, to a large extent 
purposeless, for the European Commission to do its job under the Treaty of 
- 123  -assessing how far national and regional assistance, which has recently been 
growing to chaotic proportions, is consistent with the Common Market. 
The lack of any adequate, general control over such practices ag-
gravates competitive anomalies between the Six, and, in some sectors, negates 
the benefits of eliminating customs duties. 
In conclusion, Belgian industry feels that a situation, where no pro-
gress is possible in new and essential ways and where there is no satisfactory 
development of the economic union planned in the Treaty of Rome,  calls for 
urgent and appropriate action on the part of the Council of Ministers of the 
Community to get things moving again.  This must have top priority, bearing 
in mind the time-limit of 1 January 1970 for the work on developing the Com-
munity internally. 
How  indeed can one imagine that even third countries will go on 
wanting to belong to a  Community whose internal clevelopment has stopped, 
\rith the sole exception of the customs and  agricultural problems ? ' 
(Bulletin of the Federation of Belgian Industries, No.  28,  10 November 1968) 
11.  Conference in Rome on employment problems seen in the light of 
technological development 
On 14 and 15 November a conference was held in Rome to study prob-
lems  of  employment  in relation to technological development.  The confer-
ence had been organized by the Federation of Chambers of Commerce on the 
initiative of Mr. Andreotti,  Minister of Industry.  In his opening address 
Mr. Andreotti stressed that between 1950 and 1968 the Italian Government had 
created two million new industrial jobs and Italy was the only country in the 
European Community where unemployment had decreased in 1967 (from 769,000 
to 689,000 units). 
HO\rever.  the remaining number of unemployed,  as well as the fair-
ly large number of under-employed,  regional differences and the medium 
le,·e  1 of the gross national procluct (which is, in fact,  well below the German 
ancl  French levels). are sufficient reasons for the Government to consider 
more appropriate remeclies to its economic difficulties. 
- 12-±  -There was, in particular, the problem of the relationship between 
technological modernization and employment which,  in some sectors, was 
causing great concern to employers and personnel. 
The high cost of machines and the development of automation re-
quired a lesser number of workers.  Technical progress could not be stopped 
but it was necessary to plan in time a number of additional measures.  On the 
other hand,  technological evolution should not alter the  fact that the develop-
ment of industrial employment  - even in quantitative terms  - was the main 
objective of Italian economic policy.  If this were not so, then the employment 
problem in southern Italy and other underdeveloped areas would be perpetuated 
and this would go against every principle of justice and morality. 
The example of the highly industrialized nations was particularly 
comforting with regard to the growing possibilities of employment. 
The Italian economic success was the result of a general effort at 
all public and private levels. 
Following the conference at the national headquarters, there \dll be 
further regional meetings to give practical effect to the measures which the 
Federation of Chambers of Commerce intends to  take.  It will, in addition.  be 
both necessary and advisable to consider closer co-operation with trade unions. 
as it is essential to dispel the understandable diffidence on the part of\\·orkers 
with regard to certain modernization efforts, which were all too often seen as 
measures ~esigned to reduce the employment of less qualifieil  workers. 
(11  Sole  - 24  Ore,  16 November 1968) 
12.  Farmers:  the time has come to reinforce European solidarity 
The three large farming organizations  - the Farmers' Feileration, 
the Young Farmers and the Agricultural Mutual Benefit Society  - had a meet-
ing in November with Mr. Boulin and afterwards issued a  communiqu~ on the 
consequences of the Government's recent economic decisions.  They took the 
view that the only possible approach to the austerity programme would be to 
ensure a division of effort between the various occupational and social catego-
ries, bearing in mind the situation of each;  recovery prospects must be real 
for all sectors.  The communiqu~ recalled that farmers had borne heavier 
- 125  -burdens in 1968 because of increases in other sectors and stated that it would 
be unfair to ignore this now. 
The agricultural organizations could not accept that farmers should 
once again be penalized.  They asked that all the measures designed to reduce 
the cost of investments anrl  stimulate exports should also apply to farming. 
They trusted that European solidarity would be reinforced on all sides, par-
ticularly as regards agriculture. 
(Le Monde,  27  November 1968) 
13.  The president of the Federal Union of German Banks draws certain 
conclusions from the international monetary crisis and calls for a 
European mone~ary system to achieve stability 
Dr. Alwin MUnchmeyer,  President of the Federal Union of German 
Banks, dealt with current monetary problems in an article which appeared in 
'Handelsblatt' on 2 December 1968. 
Among the points he made were the following: 
'If we consider the outcome of discussions on the international mon-
etary crisis and the measures taken to restore the stability of our monetary 
system, then we must recognize that we are still as far as ever from a deci-
sive breakthrough.  Once again,  it emerged from all the consultations that 
when there is a dangerous worsening of the situation in one country, the deci-
sions taken are governed by consirlerations of national prestige.  International 
agreements such as GATT and procedural questions governed by Treaty such 
as that of the EEC were simply ignored.  We have now  once again left the path 
towards grarlually freeing world trade which has been pursued with tremen-
dous effort over the last twenty years;  we have gone back instead to a jungle 
of protectionist and "dirigiste" national measures.' 
In this context the German Government's decision to choose fiscal 
measures rather than revaluation to maintain the balance of external trade had 
been the choice of the lesser of two evils.  Revaluation would not have been 
desirable because other States did not make it clear what monetary and cy-
clical policy measures they envisaged to deal with their difficulties. Whether 
the programme decided upon by France was in fact a lesser evil than devaluing 
the franc remained to be seen and depended on the extent to which other nations 
- 126-saw the need for counter-measures  - in view of its considerable effects on 
the international flow of goods and capital.  Hence the international monetary 
system was at present in a state of uncertain calm but it could easily change 
into one of extreme instability. 
It had therefore to be asked what couln be none permanently to 
strengthen confidence in the stability of individual currencies and in the sys-
tem as a whole.  It was recognized by those who wanten a ranical re-organi-
zation of the world monetary system that it was not so much the system as a 
failure to respect the rules of the game that was responsible for the crisis. 
Calm and stability could be, to a large extent, achieved with the present sys-
tem but only if maximum international co-operation and co-ordination were 
not only discussed but actually secured. 
The European Economic Community seemed to Dr. MUnchmeyer to 
be the very area which simply had closely to co-ordinate its economic and 
monetary policies in line with the objectives it had set under the Treaties. It 
was therefore regrettable to have to acknowledge that one was regressing to-
wards disintegration instead of taking a definite political stand to take decisive 
steps forward in a European integration policy.  But for the present crisis, in 
which France felt it could not opt for a devaluation of its currency, would we 
now have arrived at a good point in time for establishing a European monetary 
union? 
Setting the exchange rates of all the member States at the present 
level and eliminating the margins of fluctuation would have taken the wind out 
of the sails of the speculators.  If the rates of exchange within the EEC at 
least were to cease to be used as an economic policy parameter, a common 
economic, financial and cyclical policy would act as a practical control for 
the Governments of the member States. 
The institutional requirements for close monetary policy co-opera-
tion in the EEC were to a large extent alreany fulfilled,  in view of the existing 
interdependence.  It han for a long time been the anvice of the Finance Minis-
ter that it should be on the Medium-term Economic Policy Committee and the 
Committee of Central Bank Governors that the policy of the issuing banks was 
discussed,  and where they kept each other regularly informed on lines of 
credit policy and the main measures taken by the Central Banks.  There was 
also the Monetary Committee which had, pursuant to Article 105 of  the EEC 
Treaty, to keep an eye on the financial and monetary situation of the member 
States and of the Community and  on the general flow of payments of the mem-
ber States and report regularly to the Council and to the Commission. Every 
member State was 'examiner]' by the Monetary Committee at least once ayear. 
In April 1964 its mandate was extended to cover exchange rates and interna-
tional monetary questions.  The institutional nucleus for a European federal 
- 127 -reserve system already existed in the shape of these committees. !thad, how-
ever, to be used to greater advantage as a starting point and above all its po-
sition had to be made more secure by agreement. 
For some years there had no longer been any decisive impulse in 
the EEC;  the completion of the customs union in the middle of 1968 was the 
result of a decision taken a long time ago.  At the present stage the operative 
factor was a national 'dirigisme' which had long been regarded as having at 
last disappeared. 
Dr  •.  Miinchmeyer expected a great deal from the creation of a mo-
netary union which he saw as a way out of the deadlock;  he felt it could impart 
a strong impetus to overcoming stagnation and to accelerating the harmoniza-
tion process which would otherwise be very exacting.  Differences in fiscal 
systems and in the remaining competitive conditions could probably be dealt 
with much more quickly if the currency ann credit policies for the whole EEC 
were lilliformly regulated and the unimpeded flow of currency and capital due 
to variations in interest rates evened itself up.  It would then soon be clear 
that the highly-prized national independence  regar.ding budgetary policy was 
subject to limitations.  Every budgetary deficit could then only be covered from 
a joint pool of liquidities.  The illusory possibility of straying from 'the 
straight and narrow' would then be restricted. 
A common currency and credit policy would also define the area 
within which everyone had to remain.  If the boundaries were fixed and if 
within these boundaries the market forces had a free rein, then it would soon 
be evident just how untenable national differences in,  say, the taxation of sim-
ilar situations or in the investment provisions of finance institutes were. They 
would thus be cut off from the main stream of expansion and this process 
would follow through more rapidly than could be achieved at the laborious dis-
cussions of experts.  A European monetary union would thus not have to be the 
cornerstone of European integration, as had so often been suggested, but it 
could indeed prove to be the strongest dynamo for integration. 
To the extent that a European monetary union became a reality and 
the Community developed into an internal market, this area would strengthen 
its tactical and trade  policy position vis  -a.-vis. the other major trading nations. To 
the same extent this unity would indirectly also give a special negotiating position 
on monetary policy questions because discussions on the national balance-of-
payments situations of the member States would have to take second place to 
an assessment of the overall balance of payments of the Community.  In 1967, 
the balance of trade surplus of the EEC vis-il-vis third countries was only just 
around D M 3, OOOm.  But even with this figure, discussions must take a different 
- 128-turn at negotiations between a European monetary union and third countries if 
there should be an external trade imbalance. 
(Handelsblatt,  2 December 1968) 
14.  The 'Force Ouvri~re' Conferleration criticizes the French Govern-
ment for having admitted the General Labour Confederation (CGT) 
to a European Committee 
In an article entitled 'The European Trojan Horse' in the weekly 
journal of the 'Force Ouvri~re' (Socialist),  Mr. Camille Mourgues,  a leading 
member of that Confederation,  criticized the French Government for having 
paved the way for representatives of the CGT to enter an EEC Committee. 
The 'Force Ouvri~re' (which is affiliated to the International Con-
federation of Free Trade Unions) was attacking the decision of the French 
Government to find a seat for the CGT on the EEC' s Committee on the free 
movement of workers. 
Mr. Camille Mourgues said that  nobody would have thought of asso-
ciating the professed opponents of the European idea with the Community, 
whether or not they were organized into a constituent borly.  The CGT a-'ld  its 
'overlords', the Communist Party, were a case in point  - they had deliber-
ately been left out of 'the building of Europe' •  Admittedly, however, they 
themselves had not wished to participate and this was as it should be.  The 
CGT had always inveighed against this Europe and had tried, by every means, 
to wreck it. 
Mr. Mourgues added :  'Nobody will be fooled,  at least they should 
not be;  and yet it was the French Government which prepared, organized and 
launched the whole affair, for it was not just a first step.  A promise has been 
made to go farther by opening other doors, particularly that of the Economic 
and Social Committee of the EEC. 
The collusion  between  the CGT and Gaullism does not in any way disturb 
the former; but for the French Government to lend itself to this is something we 
find annoying but not surprising.  Perhaps it is seeking "allies" to delay or 
even hamper the unification of Europe or to remain at most the Europe of na-
tion States, so dear to General de Gaulle.' 
- 129-'With or without a wooden horse', he concluded,  'the wolf will enter 
the fold with the complicity of the French Government.' 
(Nouvelle R~publique du Centre Ouest,  29 December 1968) 
- 130-DEVELOPMENT  OF  EUROPEAN  INTEGRATION 
I. COMMUNITY  INSTITUTIONS 
1.  Speech made by Mr.  Mans  holt during the European Week in the 
Faculty of Law of Utrecht on the prospects for European integration 
In a speech on 30 October - during the European Week in the Fac-
ulty of Law of Utrecht - Mr.  Mansholt,  discussing European integration pros-
pects,  opined that there was little chance that the programmes for furthering 
European integration would come to fruition in the next few years.  Nonetheless, 
optimism was not out of place because there was no other solution than  that 
proposed in the plans. 
Mr.  Mansholt felt that the Spaak Committee,  which was wound up 
ten years ago,  should be revived.  This Committee should look into ways  of 
breaking the deadlock in Europe. 
Although,  under present circumstances,  the political community 
had to be built using such existing democratic means as the political parties 
and national governments,  it would one day be necessary to do  away with the 
outworn machinery of national governments and parliaments. 
A thorough enquiry had to be made into the funda\nental differences 
of view concerning the construction of Europe and to associate the United 
Kingdom and the Scandinavian countries in deliberations on a \.ew political 
construction. 
In support of his views on the need for a politically united Europe, 
Mr.  Mans  holt spoke of its economic, technological and scientific expansion. 
It would no longer be possible,  twenty years from now,  to resolve in ana-
tional context the problems resulting from an increase in material welfare. 
The whole governmental complex had to measure up to the European dimension. 
- 131 -Mr.  Mans  holt felt that it was high time to create the means to control 
and influence the financial and social decisions of the European Communities: 
'Thousands of millions pass through our hands without being subject to any con-
trol and - let us be quite frank about this - the officials care little for parlia-
mentary democracy.' 
Regarding help for the developing countries,  Mr.  Mansholt observed 
that far more than the 'charity' of one per cent of national incomes was needed 
for any real result to be achieved. 
(Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant,  4 October 1968) 
2.  President Rey reviews the general situation in the European  Com-
munity 
On 24  October,  Mr. Jean Rey,  President of the European Commis-
sion,  spoke to the Institute for International Political Studies about 'The gen-
eral situtation in the European Community.' 
He began by recalling the contribution made by Italian statesmen to 
bringing the  European idea to fruition  and  made  special reference to 
::\Ir.  Alcide de Gas  peri and President Saragat.  He said that Italy was playing 
an increasingly important part in Europe; this was also due to the brisk tempo 
of Italy's economic expansion.  Going on to discuss the situation in the Com-
munities,  he said that the customs union of the six member States had been 
completed on 1 July and it was time to move on to the next stage.  Among the 
objectives to be achieved were: 
a)  A common industrial policy; 
b)  The application of the added value taxation system; 
c)  Drawing up common regulations for competition,  social services and 
transport; 
d)  Co-ordinating monetary policies with a view to introducing a common 
currency for the member States. 
- 132-The legal instruments for merging the economies had to be created. 
In particular,  transnational mergers had to be promoted.  Europe's economy 
would not be able to withstand American competition if the Six acted indepen-
dently and if their economies were not merged.  There were,  for various rea-
sons,  sectors which needed raising to the Community scale,  especially key 
industries and those in a state of crisis. In other words,  it was a  question of 
adjusting to the scale of the market that had been created. 
Mr.  Rey denied that the Community was paralyzed. There were many 
sectors in which it was still operating.  One example was the agricultural poli-
cy.  Progress was being made with fiscal harmonization and in unifying the 
transport sector.  Negotiations had been held with Morocco and Yugoslavia and 
the renewal of the Yaounde Convention was being discussed.  The member 
States had adopted a common policy at the Kennedy Round as they had  when 
sterling was devalued.  There was thus no cause to suggest the Community was 
paralyzed although there was a  political crisis concerning its enlargement. 
The Commission had always thought that the best way of solving the existing 
problems was to negotiate with the United Kingdom.  It was possible to find a 
way in which Britain could participate in the EEC,  in all probability by means 
of a transition period prior to full accession. 
The speaker repeated that he was opposed to the veto system  and 
strongly hoped that it would be abolished.  Unanimity had been reached in some 
cases but unanimity had not to be confused with the veto. If the veto system 
continued,  other answers would have to be found.  It gave rise to reprisals and 
counter-vetoes.  Examples of this were Italy's attitude to concluding trade 
agreements with the other Mediterranean States and the Dutch attitude to tech-
nology.  The Commission was also opposed to nationalism.  It was paradoxical 
that while industry was becoming concentrated internally,  Governments were 
trying to oppose concentrations between States.  National arguments could not 
keep pace with the needs of Europe.  The Community Treaties had to be merged 
even though this might take years. 
Lastly,  consideration had to be given to the political union.  The 
Common Market had not been designed and built purely as an economic market. 
The lack of political co-operation was a source of concern.  It had,  however, 
to be remembered that if Europe was in a state of crisis there had been three 
similar ones since the Community came into being.  These had always been 
overcome because the reasons for working together had always been infinitely 
stronger than the forces dividing the Community.  No one would have imagined, 
fifteen years ago,  that Europe could have made such striking progress.  He 
concluded by saying that there were two events which characterized our time: 
the reconciliation of churches and-the reconciliation of the peoples ofWestern 
Europe.  For centuries now we have had 'the Europe of nation States',  these 
- 133 -were centuries of civil wars between Europeans.  It depended on the faith  of 
Europeans that Europe should become what they wanted it to be. 
(Relazioni Internazionali,  No.  44,  2 November 1968) 
3.  Mr.  Rey sums up the progress of the Common Market in 1968 
Speaking to journalists in Brussels on 17 December,  Mr.  Rey, Pres-
ident of the EEC Commission,  summed up progress in 1968. 
He began by saying that he was convinced that the Community would 
resolve the current crisis·as it had resolved several others since 1954.  He 
was annoyed at the pessimism expressed in the press.  There was no cause to 
fear that the Community was paralyzed,  nor that it would remain at the stage 
of a mere customs union.  New decisions were being taken all the time and 
these did not only concern what the Community had achieved so far.  The search 
for an agreement on European technology was now going forward unhampered 
and a compromise had been worked out.  The Council had recently had inter-
esting talks on monetary problems,  so as to devise co-operation machinery. 
The fact remained that a certain number of issues were still on the table.  He 
discussed four of these,  the first being that of enlarging the Community.  He 
recalled the various proposals that had been made in 1968 and said that trade 
arrangements could only be envisioned as a first step towards the subsequent 
accession of the applicant States,  although the transition from one phase to the 
other would not be obligatory.  Such arrangements could,  moreover,  be  pro-
posed to countries which simply wished to be associated with the Common 
Market.  This would be consistent with GATT rules. Other arrangements would 
not be acceptable: the States neighbouring the Common Market had rejected the 
idea of establishing a free trade area with it and a preference zone would not 
be acceptable to GATT.  The analysis of such arrangements was progressing 
and there was a chance that the Six would agree on a provisional settlement at 
Easter. 
The second problem discussed was the common agricultural policy. 
The Commission had not been surprised at the very strong reactions of  the 
general public to Mr.  Manshol  t'  s  memorandum on reforming agricultural struc-
tures in the Common Market.  Mr.  Rey said that the value of this memorandum 
lay in the fact that it stated problems as they were and in the fact that it  had 
brought the problems home to the general public. 
- 134-Broaching the problem that had provoked the most pessimistic and 
biting comments in recent weeks,  Mr.  Rey put forward three arguments for 
preserving Euratom: 
a)  what had been gained over the past ten years had to be safeguarded; 
b)  it would be an unacceptable paradox to place the Joint Research Centre 
in jeopardy at a time when technological co-operation had become pos-
sible; 
c)  the human problem of 2, 700 research workers and technicians who had 
put their trust in the Community could not be ignored. 
Lastly,  Mr.  Rey discussed the consolidation of the Community.  He 
said he was concerned because there were some who sought to challenge  the 
very institutional principles on which the Community was built. Supranation-
ality implied no suggestion of superiority. It was a legal principle and it was 
only by putting it into application that it was possible to devise common poli-
cies. Mr.  Rey took a very firm stand: the Community powers had to be pre-
served at all costs. If the Council were to take decisions that were inconsis-
tent with the Treaties,  the Commission would not hesitate to refer the matter 
to the Court of Justice of the Communities. 
(Le Soir,  De  Standaard,  18  December 1968) 
- 135 -II.  MOVEMENTS,  ORGANIZATIONS  AND  PROMINENT  FIGURES 
1.  Sir Geoffrey de Freitas and Mr.  Stewart discuss new ways of making 
Western Europe more coherent 
At a  meeting of the Labour Committee for Europe,  in Blackpool,  on 
1 October,  which he chaired,  Sir Geoffrey de Freitas,  President of the Coun-
cil of Europe,  urged the  British  Government to propose a conference of heads 
of European States which were members of the EEC and EFTA to decide the 
strategy for a united Europe on a wide range of subjects which fell outside the 
jurisdiction of the EEC. 
The Foreign Secretary,  Mr.  Michael Stewart,  told the meeting that 
seeking for fields of cooperation which are available outside the scope of the 
Treaty of Rome,  the Government must take the initiative in proposing new or 
adapted institutions for greater collabol'ation between Britain and the  EEC 
countries.  The Western European Union is undeniably an official forum where 
Britain and the countries of the Six can meet.  Britain ought to start to make 
fuller use of the opportunities for consultation there. 
(The Guardian,  2  October  1968;  The Times,  2 October 1968) 
2,  European questions under discussion at the Second German-Italian 
Legal Congress 
The theme of the Second German-Italian Legal Congress held  in 
Berlin on 4 October 1968 was the abuse of market positions with special ref-
erence to the implications of Community law for the German and Italian legal 
systems. 
Dr.  Mestmacker argued that neither German nor Community law on 
competition included any measure against the acquisition of a dominant market 
position but sought only to prevent an abuse of market strength.  There was 
still no direct decision about the interpretation of Article 86  of the EEC Treaty. 
But perhaps the ruling of the European Court of Justice concerning Ruhr coal 
- 137-sales could be helpful in regard to an interpretation although this was a deci-
sion taken pursuant to Article 65  of the Treaty establishing the European Coal 
and Steel Community. 
In this connexion,  the European Court of Justice decided that  oli-
gopolies had a power of price decision which could be misused. If the interpre-
tation of Article 65  of the Treaty of Paris could be transferred so as to apply 
to Article 86 of the EEC Treaty there would be a field of application for this 
provision which was extraordinarily wide.  The changes sought by Germany 
followed in a similar direction. 
On the other hand,  Dr.  Ricardo Monaco,  judge at the European 
Court of Justice,  opined that it was doubtful whether the ECSC decision of the 
Court could be made to apply to the EEC field. Amalgamations were to some 
extent absolutely unavoidable today even though they had been regarded as in-
admissible when the relevant provisions were drafted.  The interpretation of 
the EEC Treaty had to take into account the economic developments since it 
was passed and the needs of the Common Market. 
The authors of the EEC Treaty had been far-sighted in allowing 
amalgamations in areas other than the coal and steel sectors. Admissible 
mergers,  however,  could have  unacceptable  effects in the light of Article 86 
of the EEC Treaty.  There would,  of course,  be abuse if trade between  the 
member States were appreciably affected. 
(Industriekurier,  5 October 1968) 
3.  The 'Berlin Business Conference for 1968': the trade problems of 
the developing countries 
At the 'Berlin Business Conference for 1968' Dr.  Thiessen,  a direc-
tor of the financial board for redevelopment in Frankfurt,  proposed a compre-
hensive system of incentives for increasing exports to promote the sales ofthe 
developing countries. 
The essential feature of this system of incentives could be financial 
assistance on the part of the developing countries; this would involve : 
- 138  -(a)  loans to the developing countries which obtained an export surplus in 
relation to others or 
(b)  a willingness to credit the other country with this surplus and therefore 
to provide development assistance itself in its own currency or 
(c)  loans to all mutual suppliers unable to balance their trade. 
The developing countries had to increase their trade with each other. 
Financial assistance of the kind proposed could be given in the framework  of 
existing development aid.  Without such help,  however,  it was unlikely there 
would be any early increase in the individual trade of the developing countries. 
Dr.  Thiessen thought that the financing system could be carried through bilat-
erally as a  'bonus system' under the development aid; this would give it more 
chance in the regional and multilateral context when it came to settling the 
balances of payments as between developing countries. 
Trade of the developing countries between themselves had developed 
disappointingly since 1950 as compared with the 'own' sales of  the  industrial-
ized States and the East European countries.  The supplies of the developing 
countriestoeachothertotalledDM 32,000m in 1966 or only 21 per cent oftheir 
total exports. In 195 0 the figure was DM  2  0, OOOm  or around 27 per cent of total 
exports.  The 'own' trade of the developing countries which was twice as high 
in 1950 as that of the East European countries was thus less than the internal 
trade of the industrialized States and the Eastern bloc. Dr.  Thiessen noted 
that the slower growth in this field was manifest,  he said,  'in the process of 
disintegration,  namely in the trade of the developing countries with eachother.' 
Indications of this disintegration were the dissolution of monetary unions,  the 
creation of protective tariff systems,  even against immediately neighbouring 
States,  the change of status of the surplus-producing countries into that of im-
porting States and the divisions due  to political conflicts.  A return to inter-
national free trade was,  he thought,  Utopian bearing in. mind the aims of the 
development policy over the long term. Progressive economic expansionought, 
however,  to make a more liberal trade policy both possible and necessary once 
again.  This called for a  review of the relevant economic policy. 
In Europe this meant that the three regional economic blocs - the 
EEC,  EFTA and Comecon- wished to be seen as alternatives.  The decisive 
issue was whether ways and means could be found to adapt trade policy to the 
degree of its economic expansion.  This would be decisive for the advances in 
productivity of the whole of Europe. As recent events in central Europe had 
shovvn,  a change from thoughts of political alternatives to discussions of  a 
different kind to the dialogue that had so far obtained would be welcomed. 
- 139-Mr.  Henry Rochereau,  a  member of the European Commission, 
spoke at the business conference about  prospects  for renewing the Association 
Agreement.  In its present form,  dealing as it did with the Associated African 
States and Madagascar,  it would expire on 31 May 1969.  The EEC had already 
proposed special arrangements to improve the conditions for selling the prod-
ucts of these countries on the Community and other markets.  The proposed 
arrangements would focus mainly on training qualified staff,  organizing their 
participation at fairs,  meetings between the specialists concerned,  market 
research and publicity campaigns.  Europe was already an important market 
for tropical products and it could and must endeavour in the years ahead to 
secure a  more favourable sales pattern for these products,  particularly the 
tropical products of Africa, on the world and Community markets, Mr. Rochereau 
added in conclusion. 
(Industriekurier,  5 October 1968) 
4.  Speech by Mr.  Christopher Soames,  British  Ambassador in France 
Speaking in the University of Lille on  13  October, Mr. Christopher 
Soames,  British Ambassador in France,  made his first major speech in French 
since his  arrival in France. 
Mr.  Soames began with a  profession of his European faith and friend-
ship for France.  'I am an ardent European in that I passionately believe in the 
beneficial influence on the world that a  really united Europe could exert. But 
this Europe will never come about without Franco-British understanding -in-
deed,  without  Franco-British conviction',  he said. 
He then emphasized that the economic power of unity was only  a 
means to an end.  'Our conception of Europe requires that she devote her grow-
ing economic strength to influence events of the world in the European interest. 
The Europe of which we  think is not only more prosperous,  it  is  also  more 
powerful and more autonomous.  That is the Europe we wish to help create. 
Could it become a  reality,  or was this condemned to remain an in-
accessible hope?  'It implies that we  superimpose on our interests and  our 
national prides the interest and the pride of Europe.  First and foremost  we 
shall need to have the sense of a  common aim,  in order to attain common 
- 140-European views expressed with a common European voice.  What a great and 
difficult adventure,  but also what an exalting one!' 
'From the British point of view the decision is taken,  the choice is 
made.  Both Government and Opposition hope that negotiations will open as soon 
as possible between her Majesty's Government and the Governments of the Six 
and that they will reach a positive conclusion. If this were not the case,  it 
would be for reasons independent of the British Governments's will.  This 
great and important decision has not been taken lightly; you may be sure we 
will not give it up lightly. ' 
'There is in Europe a sufficient potential to equal - and more - the 
super powers,  but only on condition that she is ready to devote herself to the 
common endeavour required,  and to be inspired by the vision which will enable 
her to achieve a unity of views,  of ideals,  and of action.  Let us not allow ob-
solete disputes to rise again.  What should concern us today is no longer  the 
equilibrium of forces within Europe; it is rather the equilibrium of economic 
and political for<.:es  between Europe and the rest of the world.' 
'The destiny of Europe is to be at the centre of world affairs,  in the 
serum and not on the touchline as a spectator. If we are able to attain the nec-
essary unity,  accepting the necessary institutions,  then those who come after 
us will have a solid foundation on which to act,  and on which to exercise  the 
influence for which our acquired experience,  our savoir faire, our civilization, 
and our culture have prepared us. But if,  on the contrary, the States of Western 
Europe turn in on themselves and keep up ancient and outworn quarrels,  then 
our successors will inherit nothing except a house divided against itself.' 
'Time is not working for us.  We  must travel fast.  The present 
superiority of America's advanced industries is increasing each year. Tech-
nological co-operation between Britain and her European neighbours is possible 
- 141 -even when we are outside the Common Market,  and it must be exploited. But 
it is only when we enter the EEC that we shall realize all the possibilities. 1 
(The Times,  The Guardian,  Le Figaro,  14 October 1968) 
5,  Mr.  Poher hands the Robert Schuman prize to Mr.  Emilio Colombo 
In Thionville on 13  October, Mr. Alain Poher,  President  of  the 
European Parliament and President of the French Senate,  handed the gold 
medal of the Robert Schuman prize for 1968 to Mr.  Emilio Colombo,  Italian 
Minister for the Treasury; this prize is awarded each year to a pioneer of the 
European idea.  The ceremony was attented by many leading Europeans,  in-
cluding Mr.  Pierre Werner,  President of the Government of the Grand-Duchy 
of Luxembourg,  Mr.  Joseph Bech,  former Foreign Minister of the Grand-Duchy 
and signatory to the Treaties of Rome,  Mr.  Bodson,  representing Mr.  Rey, 
and Mr. Alfred Topfer,  of Hamburg,  who created the prize. 
Mr. Joseph Schaff,  President of the Association of the Friends  of 
Robert Schuman,  described Mr. Colombo as a  staunch supporter of the European 
idea and Mr. Alain Poher said,  before handing him the great gold medal: 'It is 
possible to be both European and patriotic.  This is not contradictory.  To be 
European is no doubt the best way of being patriotic today. 1 
In an analysis of the situation in Europe today, Mr. Colombo stressed 
that Europe wished to be the point of departure for a new age in human history. 
It did not intend to return to out-of-date national patterns,  even on a larger 
scale.  Referring to the present difficulties,  Mr.  Colombo concluded: 'We must 
continue in a practical way in sectors where it is possible,  with all those who 
are ready to share the rights and duties of this undertaking with us.' 
Mr.  Saragat,  President of the Italian Republic,  sent a congratula-
tory message to Mr.  Colombo in which he stressed the fact that the Schuman 
prize awarded to him was also a tribute to Italy and a  recognition of its efforts 
towards solidarity between the peoples of Europe.  A similar message  was 
sent by Mr.  Medici,  Foreign Minister,  who hoped that the Thionville ceremony 
would constitute the point of departure for a new move towards uniting Europe. 
(Agence Europe,  14  October 1968) 
- 142-6.  The three main British political parties join the Action Committee 
for the United States of Europe 
On October 25,  the Action Committee for the United States of Europe, 
of which Mr. Jean Monnet is chairman, published a communique announcing 
that the three main British political parties had joined the movement. 
The aims of the Action Committee were closely in line with those of 
the Labour Party which believed that European political,  economical and tech-
nological integration was essential if Europe was to fulfil her great potential 
and make a unique contribution to securing and maintaining world peace.  The 
work already achieved by the distinguished members of the Action Committee 
was quite remarkable. It was an honour for the Labour Party to be invited to 
take part in it,  and the Labour Party was glad to join the Action Committee 
for the United States of Europe as a full member. 
The Conservative Party recalled that when it was in power from 1951 
to 1964,  it had played its full part in all the European organizations. In 1961, 
furthermore,  it took the historic decision of asking to become a full member 
of the three European Communities and continued the negotiations held to this 
effect until they were broken off against the wishes of the British Government 
in 1963.  The Conservative Party would particularly appreciate joining the 
Action Committee with whose work it was fully familiar.  Indeed it offered an 
opportunity to have talks and to consider how progress could be made to achieve 
a wider European unity. 
The Liberal Party stated that it had since the war constantly strug-
gled not only to create a united Europe on the basis of voluntary co-operation 
between all the free nations but a  Europe with common institutions,  developing 
in a European democracy. It recognized that however great the results of eco-
nomical and technical co-operation had been,  the European Community of the 
future had to go much further.  Not only has the sphere of co-operation to  be 
enlarged to include foreign policy,  defence and a large proportion of the social 
and cultural policies but also these policies had to be carried  through as soon as 
possible by means of an elected European Parliament acting according to  its 
own powers as a sovereign body. 
Europe was too weak and too great to be fragmented. Alone,  these 
countries,  even the largest of them,  would be dominated by external powers. 
If Europe remained divided,  the genius of its civilization would no longer be 
able to guide the world in creative thought and action but would do  no more 
than provide sorry evidence th2t its governments and its peoples were inca-
pable of learning the lessons of history. 
- 143-The British delegates to the Action Committee are: Messrs. George 
Brown,  Walter Padley and Michael Stewart for the Labour Party;Mr. Reginald 
Maudling,  Sir Alec Douglas-Home,  Mr.  Selwyn Lloyd for the Conservative 
Party; Mr. Jeremy Thorpe for the Liberal Party. 
They will sit as representatives of their parties,  as is the case with 
their continental colleagues and not as individual members. 
On this occasion Mr. Jean Monnet stated: 
'I consider the fact that the three main British political parties have 
joined the Action Committee for the United States of Europe is an important 
new factor which should facilitate British participation in the Common Market 
and in the unification of Europe.  No  negotiations are possible at the moment 
between the Six and the United Kingdom because of the attitude adopted by the 
French Government; but the problems are still there and as time goes by the 
situation in Europe gets worse. 
The entry into the Common Market of a country like  the United 
Kingdom cannot be done without raising difficulties. General de Gaulle has 
stressed several of these as being insurmountable obstacles.  The Committee, 
on the other hand,  thinks that these obstacles can be overcome and that it is 
urgently necessary to work out a common standpoint for the United Kingdom 
and the Six concerning the practical solutions that are possible.  The Commit-
tee is going to look into these solutions and to make proposals to the govern-
ments.' 
(Le Monde,  26 October 1968) 
7.  Monetary relations in the European Community 
The way that the European monetary system could be organized  was 
discussed at a conference in Brussels on 25  October.  This was convened by 
the European League for Economic Co-operation and began with a paper by 
Professor Triffin and a  report by Mr.  Lamfallussy,  a director of the Bank of 
Brussels. 
- 144  -Mr.  Eyskens,  Belgian Prime Minister,  and Mr.  Werner,  President 
of the Luxembourg Government,  also outlined their views. 
Mr.  Eyskens thought that the economic integration which was now 
being achieved was hard to imagine without a  European monetary system,  the 
culminating point of which should be a  European currency.  This would require 
each of the partners to accept a  discipline which would go as far as harmo-
nizing incomes policies. It would be gratifying to imagine this monetary order 
in a  Europe embracing the United Kingdom and the Scandinavian countries. 
Mr.  Werner,  for his part,  recalled the plan he had already outlined 
at the CDU  Conference in Saarbrlicken in January 1968  (1). 
At the close of the conference,  the European League for Economic 
Co-operation adopted a  resolution: 
'The ELEC recalls that its work has always been directed at cre-
ating a unified Europe embracing all the West European nations.  A combina-
tion of circumstances has meant that the European Economic Community, com-
prising six of these countries,  finds itself in the vanguard of this movement. 
The ELEC firmly reiterates its conviction that the economic integration ofthe 
Europe of the Six implies its monetary unification and subsequently the cre-
ation of the joint decision-taking and management bodies which this unification 
will call for. 
Bearing in mind the advanced degree of monetary co-operation al-
ready achieved between the Six and the existence of large monetary reserves 
in these countries,  the ELEC asks these countries to undertake not to change 
the relative parities of their currencies. In order to create the conditions 
that would enable them to keep this commitment,  the ELEC considers that the 
six countries should at once adopt common objectives for their economic and 
social policies and ensure that they are compatible with each other,  particu-
larly with regard to the desired rate of growth,  the optimum level of employ-
ment and price trends. 
With the same end in view,  all the provisions of the Rome Treaty 
covering consultations and assistance between member States should  be carried 
into effect.  The mutual assistance provisions in particular should be made 
more precise so as to support fixed rates of exchange by all necessary means, 
(1}  See Quarterly Survey of European Documentation No.1, January-March 1968. 
- 145  -not only through standing consultations but,  if necessary,  by direct and even 
automatic assistance.  The Community institutions ought,  under conditions to 
be specified,  to have their powers regarding recommendations and decisions 
extended to the monetary field. 
The ELEC proposes that the Monetary Committee should actively 
pursue the introduction of a system of relations between the currencies of the 
Six based solely on their official rates of exchange,  ruling out any internal 
fluctuations below and above these parities and thus making these currencies 
completely interchangeable. 
The ELEC stresses the immediate need to widen the scope of mon-
etary co-operation and,  at the same time,  to continue the work undertaken to 
integrate the national capital markets. It considers that the policy pursued in 
this field must be treated by governments as a Community problem and no 
longer seen from the purely national angle. 
The ELEC considers that it is essential for the six countries  to 
devise a common standpoint in all matters referred to the international mon-
etary authorities so that they can there express their views with the full au-
thority attaching to their real importance in the world's economy.  Recent 
developments in world monetary co-operation,  notably regarding special draw-
ing rights,  make it essential for the six countries to acquire this authority. 
Through this series of measures,  the Europe of the Six would ac-
quire an economic and social power which would enable it to act as a catalyst 
on the progress of European unification and thus improve the contribution it 
can make to international co-operation.  The ELEC considers that Europe will 
not really be complete unless the other countries of Western Europe and, above 
all,  the United Kingdom add their potential to that of the Six,  thus enabling 
Europe to exercise its rightful influence in the world. 
In the meantime,  the ELEC trusts that the Six will,  while stepping 
up monetary co-operation between themselves,  bear in mind the wider Europe 
and take an active part in devising a  European monetary policy. 
(Luxemburger Wort,  Le Soir,  29 October 1968; 
Bulletin de  la federation des industries belges,  No.  28,  10 November 1968) 
- 146-8.  The European Conference of Local Authorities favours strength-
ening regional structures 
Mr.  Lambin,  Mayor of Trelou (France) submitted a very lengthy 
resolution for the Conference's Economic and Social Committee in which the 
Conference drew attention to the fact that the regional context was sufficiently 
broad and yet sufficiently limited; this made it possible accurately to assess 
not only the extent of local needs and resources but also the number of national 
and European markets; it also catered for the needs of the Association of Local 
Communities and their representatives in regard to decisions affecting them 
and it was the right context in which to adjust and co-ordinate measures,  to 
ensure a  'snowball' effect over a wide front. 
The regional context,  the Conference stated,  allows for overall 
plans to be drawn up in which all the means available to a region for develop-
ment policy can and must be co-ordinated (industry,  agriculture,  trade, 
tourism,  finance,  energy; communications,  amenities,  housing,  teaching, 
occupational training,  etc.) and the task of giving a new lease of life to rural 
areas is an integral part of this policy. 
The Conference considered that strong decentralized regional struc-
tures implied that there should be elected regional assemblies endowed with 
the power to create resources and in particular to levy taxes.  They also im-
plied that there should be regional executives responsible to them and em-
powered in particular to draw up regional redevelopment and expansion plans. 
Lastly,  they implied regional councils which would represent the various pro-
fessional,  social and cultural bodies. 
With regard to European integration,  the European Conference of 
Local Authorities said that the liberalization of markets could only be pursued 
rationally in a  European Community context. It therefore felt that a  European 
policy for helping the predominantly rural regions called for a  European  po-
litical authority which would be responsible to a real European Parliament; 
this would be stronger for being authentically and hence democratically repre-
sentative of all the regions in Europe. 
The locally elected representatives also came out in favour of en-
larging the Community to other European States which were ready to accept 
the same rights and obligations as the Six.  They called on the European Com-
munities to strengthen the links established with these States.  They said  that 
they were in favour of elections to the European Parliament by direct univer-
sal suffrage. 
(Dernieres Nouvelles d'Alsace,  1 November 1968) 
- 147-9.  Speaking in Turin,  the United States Ambassador calls for co-oper-
ation against the danger of a return to protectionism 
Speaking in Turin,  Ambassador Acldey stressed that the process of 
freeing international trade had to go on.  In the last 18  years between 1950 and 
1967 world trade had undergone an extraordinary expansion and had almost 
quadrupled.  He  reviewed the 20 years during which GATT had been in opera-
tion and the contribution its two underlying principles,  non-discrimination and 
reciprocity,  had made to economic progress.  He  said that with the conclusion 
of the Kennedy Round,  the modern world had attained to an unprecedented 
degree of free trade; but the ground won had to be protected because there was 
an ever present danger of a  return to protectionism.  New moves were there-
fore necessary in the field of freeing trade. 
He  stressed the successful efforts of the United States to resist pro-
tectionist pressure,  including that in the U.S.  Congress. Whatever the outcome 
of the presidential election,  he said,  it could be anticipated that the protec-
tionist pressure which had already been experienced the previous year would 
continue to be applied and might even become more pronounced. 
With reference to the principle of reciprocity,  he stressed  the value 
of co-operation and of non-insistence on reciprocity for every concession be-
cause there were times when the greater interests of all demanded understand-
ing,  tolerance and generosity. 
As an example,  many countries,  including Italy,  had last spring 
offered to accelerate the introduction of Kennedy Round concessions - without 
reciprocity - to help the United States to solve its balance-of-payments prob-
lem.  This gesture of international friendship had been of incalculable value in 
helping those in the U.S.  who were opposed to the protectionist pressures. 
Another example was the position of the United States with regard 
to the creation of the European Common Market.  The United States had sup-
ported the Common Market and accepted the fact that American products would 
be subject to discrimination on the European markets; it had done so because 
it felt that the political advantages of a  strong Western Europe would be  of 
greater importance.  This was still the American attitude. 
- 148-Ambassador Ackley concluded with an appeal on behalf of the devel-
oping countries calling for every effort to be made to strengthen economic co-
operation between the nations of the Atlantic Alliance not only for the benefit of 
both sides but of the whole of the free wodd. 
(La Stampa,  1 November 1968) 
10.  The 20th anniversary of the Franco-German Institute in Ludwigsburg 
The Franco-German Institute in Ludwigsburg celebrated its  20th 
anniversary on 7 November 1968. 
Its foundation in 1948 was an act of courage and good sense  on the 
part of a few men who understood the need for Europe to sweep aside the rub-
ble of tragedies,  misunderstandings and sorrow between the two neighbouring 
States on the Rhine. 
At that time,  France had already done considerable cultural work 
in its occupation area.  In the old WUrttemberg city,  whose links with its twin-
town Montbeliard {which formerly bore the German name of Mompelgard) were 
those of history and tradition,  an Institute had been created which was an in-
dependent meeting-place open to people fl·om all walks of public life.  The ar-
gument that it was wrong to want to restrict talks between French andGermans 
to cultural affairs had proved over two decades to be right : several thousand 
French and German people had,  thanks to the intervention of the Ludwigsburg 
Institute, travelled to the neighbouring country and had seen from their meet-
ings,  training courses and conferences how important it was to complete the 
rapprochement in a practical way,  thus developing an inner conviction  that 
both countries are part of Europe. 
In his progress report,  Dr.  Franz Schenk,  the Director of the In-
stitute,  outlined its history.  The Institute,  which was concerned with promot-
ing both languages,  had arranged for board and lodging for thousands of guests 
in both countries and had arranged trips,  the twinning of towns and schools, 
training courses and also organized regular meetings in Ludwigsburg. 
Professor Carlo Schmid, who spoke at the anniversary celebrations, 
recommended,  with regard to Germany's 'French policy': 'patience,  prudence 
- 149-and honorably to  state what  changes  one  wanted; but without going  too far. 
Thumping on the table was no policy. ' 
He said that no European policy was possible either against or with-
out France.  To pursue such a  policy at all was not a simple matter but 'the 
carpet had to be rolled down so that they could go on walking. ' In this connec-
tion he mentioned the bilateral agreements on limited areas of interest,  a 
more intensive exchange of capital within Europe instead of overseas and the 
development of joint nuclear research and development assistance. 
It was noticeable that Professor Schmid,  who described himself,  to 
the amusement of the guests,  as a kind of political assistant waiter,  was un-
usually indulgent about de  Gaulle's policy.  He described the nationalism of the 
French President as being basically anti-imperialism. In support of this view 
he referred to 'the great courage of de  Gaulle in winding up the Algerian busi-
ness.' 
Mr.  Fran<;ois Seydoux, French Ambassador in Bonn,  speaking  in 
French and German,  paid tribute to the services rendered by the Ludwigsburg 
Institute in the past and stressed how necessary it would remain in the future. 
Professor Wilhelm Hahn, Minister for Culture for Baden-Wtirttemberg 
recalled one memorable incident. When General de Gaulle had, six years pre-
viously,  come into the castle and received the tribute of the younger generation 
in Germany he not only spoke of the value of Franco-German friendship but 
also of the value of a  'vision of a greater Europe.' 
(Die Welt,  6 November 1968; 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  9 November 1968) 
11.  Mr.  Robert Schaetzel :U.S. prefers a united Europe 
Addressing industrialists and bankers at a conference on the lessons 
of the first ten years of the European Economic Community and the prospects 
for industry,  sponsored by the Federal Trust for Education and Research and 
Britain in Europe Limited,  Mr.  Robert Schaetzel,  U.S.  Ambassador to  the 
European Community,  said in London,  on 7 November,  that the  U.S. preferred 
a united Europe because of the dangers itsawinafragmentedEurope.American 
- 150-interest in Europe was not that of being a  'kind of mother hen or Boy Scout' 
telling the Europeans how to organize their affairs. 
The new U.S.  Administration would be forced to make new choices 
and lay down new policies.  At this moment of flux,  what seems  to  want to do 
may be a  major factor in the formulation of new foreign policy in the U.S. 
America had been consistently in favour of a united Europe as the 
only framework they envisaged for the handling of the German problem. It 
also seemed to be the only means whereby the problem of the technological 
gap could be solved. 
To him,  the gap in the economic strength and the economic growth-
rates between the U.S. and Europe could only be bridged  by Europeans achieving 
a degree of unification which took full advantage of the economic and political 
resources of Western Eurdpe. 
It seems the technological or economic gap might turn out to be one 
of the most important incentives which will continue to drive Europeans  to-
wards a greater degree of unity. 
Mr.  Schaetzel said that alternative policies to a united Europe were 
non-existent.  He could not persuade himself that a  North Atlantic Free Trade 
area was an economically sound or a politically viable notion.  It suggested 
economic warfare between Atlantic countries against the major European Com-
munity. 
It was politically unrealistic because he  could not imagine any coun-
tries being willing to engage in this economic warfare. 
The second alternative would be General de  Gaulle's idea of a Europe 
of nation States.  That concept seemed to be rejected not only by all other 
member States but many Frenchmen as weJl. 
It was reasonable to expect there would be an end to the stagnation 
in European communities,  and they would move forward to give more intelli-
gent and consistent support to the institutions which were essential andneeded 
by the European Communities. 
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expressed the belief that it was absolutely vital to explore the field of education. 
Opportunities were legion and requirements were clear.  The students were 
restless and there ought to be a possibility of some exchange of information 
and experience between the U.S.  and Europe. 
It seemed equally essential that Europe,  even in its present con-
figuration,  must be prepared to assume responsibilities in the fields of less-
developed countries,  commercial policies,  the broad field of monetary affairs, 
and possibly in the defence field as well. 
It seems entirely possible that the objective situation can produce 
very sudden changes. 
Both the U.S.  and Europe must be clear where they want to go. 
There must be rigorous thought and analysis now so that Europe and the U.S. 
will be prepared for change when it takes place. 
On the question of the danger of a third force hostile to the U.S.  he 
said there was more concern in the U.S.  about the possibility of a fragmented 
Europe than there was about a united Europe. 
(News Bulletin of the United States Information Service,  7 November 1968; 
Times,  8 November 1968) 
12.  Conference of European Parliamentarians in The Hague 
The European Movement held a conference of European Parliamen-
tarians in The Hague from 8 to 9 November 1968 to give fresh impetus to the 
European idea. It was attended by 525 parliamentarians from sixteen coun-
tries,  including 100 British MPs and ten ministers; there were eight foreign 
ministers. Neither the  French Government nor the French majority party 
was represented.  The French opposition parties had fifty members present. 
Also participating were Mr.  Rey,  President of the European Commission, 
Mr.  Geoffrey de Freitas, President of the Consultative Assembly of the Coun-
cil of Europe and Mr. Badini Confalonieri,  Chairman of the Western European 
Union. 
- 152-The Congress was opened by Queen Juliana of the Netherlands,  who 
stressed that the economic and political unity of Europe was a vital necessity. 
European unity could serve as an example for bringing other parts of the world 
together and could thus contribute to peace between large groups of the world's 
population. 
After an address of welcome by Mr.  Molenaar,  President  of  the 
European Movement in the Netherlands,  Mr.  Hallstein,  President of the In-
ternational European Movement,  assumed the chairmanship of the Congress. 
He  stated that the unification of Europe was a matter of life and death. Europe 
had no  support  in the world and its security was thus insufficiently assured. 
The Europeans let slip great opportunities to take decisions in matters which 
involved the European responsibility and were of European concern.  'We are 
here to change this, '  he said,  'and for this purpose we must give absolute 
priority to the completion and systematic development of the European Com-
munity; our main aim is to create the United States of Europe. It is for us to 
take the initiative and go qeyond the treaties which lead to that goal. 
Mr. Duncan Sandys (British Conservative) explained that the dead-
lock in uniting Europe was not only the result of the veto of one government. 
He  argued that it was possible to have common policies in areas which  fell 
outside the scope of the Treaties of Rome. 
Mr.  Stewart,  British Foreign Secretary, saidthattheUnitedKingdom 
could not wait indefinitely and that some progress must be made.  'If this is 
not possible in the economic field,  we must explore other possibilities. '  He 
recalled that the United Kingdom had earlier in the year endorsed both  the 
Benelux memorandum for co-operation in areas outside the scope of the Com-
munity and the Harmel Plan for using the Western European Union as  the 
framework for wider co-operation.  He  said that these two plans did not  re-
strict co-operation to foreign policy and defence.  Technological co-operation 
was specifically mentioned in both plans as a viable area for wider European 
co-operation. 
Mr.  Harmel,  Belgian Foreign Minister argued that the drive touni-
ty should be devoid of dogmatism.  'We should be ignoring realities if we  af-
fected to believe that the united Europe which we seek- i.e. the Europe which 
will develop round the Community - will suddenly come into being through  a 
simple formula. 
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be found in an identical manner,  at the same moment,  by the same individuals. 
We  must therefore harness the European will to progress wherever possible. 
What matters is that we should not disperse our efforts; they must 
be concentrated; for our States are bound by Treaties and these must be exe-
cuted - within the framework of the Treaties of Rome,  Brussels and Paris and 
in the context of the Council of Europe. 
We should direct our efforts through these channels, while respecting 
in full our existing commitments. 
People want to know where Belgium stands in the discussions between 
the countries of the Treaty of Paris and those of the Treaty of London. We made 
proposals to this effect. We are in favour of a conference at the highest level; 
this is something which our partners want and this meeting is thus useful  in 
bringing us nearer to this end. ' 
Sir Geoffrey de Freitas, President of the Council of Europe, ex-
plained in his speech: 'We should now be able to make a more imaginative use 
of the Council of Europe. A resolution passed by the Committee of Ministers 
in 1951 made it possible for any group of member States to conclude partial 
agreements covering monetary,  technological or political affairs even if other 
States in the Council of Europe are not ready to join them.  Naturally a member 
can veto the formal conclusion of such a partial agreement. But this cannot 
stand in the way of setting up an ad hoc committee to study the Harmel Plan if 
there is a simple two-thirds majority in favour.  Our rules of  procedure do 
not call for unanimity,  even as regards the granting of a budgetary appropri-
ation  •. I myself make a proposal along these lines on the Council of Europe. 
Against this background of the many recommendations and resolutions which 
have nearly always been passed unanimously over the last two years, !expect 
that the Consultative Assembly will give unanimous support to my proposal. 
Through the Council of Europe every democratic State in Europe 
has the chance to express its opinion and to make a practical contribution 
towards implementing the Harmel Plan which could be a decisive step towards 
European unity.' 
Speaking for the CSU,  Mr.  Strauss,  German Finance Minister, came 
to the conclusion that the Common Market had to be expanded and its doors 
opened if the unity of the States of Europe was to be achieved. 
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to the complete absence of Gaullist members from the discussion; he warned 
that the meeting might be seen as an anti-French demonstration.  He firmly 
rejected any attempt to undertake anything without France.  He  referred to the 
constructive talks which had been held in the. Community and said that defence 
and security under NATO  had been discussed.  He greeted the idea of a European 
summit conference without enthusiasm. 
Mr. Jean Rey,  President of the European Commission,  said  that 
only the Community was in a position to develop common policies; the inde-
pendence of Europe had to be achieved by consolidating the Community insti-
tutions.  He said that the lesson of the present crisis was that the right  of 
veto must be abolished. 
Speaking for the Swedish,  Austrian and Swiss delegations,  Mr. 
Bo Martinsson said: 'We share the hopes of a progressive development of a 
united Europe.  However,  we hope that in the efforts to reach this goal it will 
not be considered necessary to insist on the use by all participants of methods 
which will make it difficult for some interested European nations to play their 
natural rale and thus be able to make their full contributions.  In the economic, 
social and cultural sphere we are prepared to take part in organizations and 
activities that will bring the European peoples ever closer together. It  is, 
however,  our belief that an intimate international co-operation in Europe can 
grow faster and better if consideration within practical limits is given to the 
special position of some countries with regard to certain forms of political 
co-operation. Even if we  cannot adhere to all parts of the resolution and there-
fore cannot vote for it I wish to emphasize our interest in contributing  to the 
development of a united Europe.  It is our sincere hope that this Conference 
will give a new and strong impetus to the movement towards this goal.' 
Mr.  Badini Confalonieri,  President of the Western European Union 
Assembly,  discussed defence : 
'Twenty years ago,  when we were making preparations for the unification of 
Europe,  one of our main aims was to stem the expansion of the Stalinist dic-
tatorship.  Today,  thanks to the nuclear deterrent of the United States,  the 
Soviet advance has been stopped. But  the invasion of Czechoslovakia,  twenty 
years after the Prague "coup",  shows that there is a continuing threat  to 
divided Europe. 
To meet these threats,  all our countries rely on the Atlantic Alli-
ance.  But co-operation with the United States within the Alliance should not 
preclude the tightening of links between Europeans. By drawing closer together, 
Europeans can make a more effective contribution to the defence of their own 
- 155-continent.  That is why Western European Union,  the only European organiza-
tion with competence in the field of defence,  should pursue two complemen-
tary aims.  The first is to express the European viewpoint in the definition of 
the western defence policy.  The harmonization of the political and military 
concepts of the WEU  countries will simplify and facilitate consultations within 
the United States,  and here,  speed will be essential in the times of emergency 
which may well lie ahead for Europe.  The second aim is to maintain  and de-
velop a  modern armaments industry,  giving priority, for political and economic 
reasons,  to the output of European industry. Arms procurement, which accounts 
for such a large part of our countries' budgets,  should be an instrument for the 
building of Europe. But we  must not be concerned with defence matters alone. 
Thanks to the protection ensured by the deterrent effect of the American, 
British and French nuclear forces and of the defence system of the Atlantic 
Alliance as a whole,  Europe can pursue a policy of persuasion. By this,  I 
mean that with the help of the "shield" the WEU  countries can take the risk of 
increasing exchanges with Eastern Europe,  with a view to spreading the ideal 
of freedom which is inherent in them all without exception,  since  neither 
Portugal nor Greece is a member of their alliance.  In this ideological compe-
tition,  it is the Soviet Union which is on the defensive,  as is proved by the oc-
cupation of Czechoslovakia or the iron curtain which isolates the inhabitants 
of East Germany. 
It is perhaps difficult to foresee the reactions of the Soviet Union to 
the inevitably changing style of socialism in the former Stalinist empire, which 
cannot evade an evolution which is worldwide.  During the dangerous period, 
Europeans must show their determination not to accept the division of Europe 
as final.  What an example would be set,  what influence and what prestige could 
be gained for our cause with the successful building of Europe! Any steps to-
wards the unification of Europe will bring us closer to the time when  each 
European nation will be free to decide for itself on the political regime of its 
choice.  1 
At the close of the Conference,  the following 'Declaration of Europe' 
was unanimously adopted : 
'a)  We,  European Members of Parliament,  assembled at The Hague 
on the 20th Anniversary of the Congress of Europe of 1948,  declare that it is 
more than ever necessary and urgent to bring about the economic and political 
union of Europe. 
b)  During these last twenty years substantial progress has been made. 
But all further advance is now being held up.  The present stalemate is under-
mining public faith in the European.. idea and encouraging a  revival of nation-
alism.  The essential momentum is being lost; and we  are in danger, not merely 
of making no further progress,  but of slipping backwards. 
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China is on her way to becoming a third super power.  The free nations  of 
Europe have ceased to have any significant say in great international decisions; 
and the rape of Czechoslovakia is a sharp reminder of the continuing threat to 
their security.  Meanwhile,  the technological gap between the two sides of the 
Atlantic is getting ever wider. 
d)  So long as Europe remains divided,  her position will continue to 
decline. 
But unity will not come about automatically,  simply by waiting. It 
requires positive action and the will to take the necessary decisions. 
e)  The best and most natural way to unite Europe is to build upon the 
foundations of t~e European Community which means simultaneously : 
1)  to complete the process of economic and social integration; 
2)  to strengthen progressively the democratic character of its institutions; 
3)  to enlarge its membership by the admission of Britain and other European 
nations; 
4)  to extend the competence of the Community to the wider political sphere. 
The governments should make a final effort to compose their differ-
ences and go forward together. 
f)  But the peoples of Europe cannot afford to stand still any longer. If 
this road continues to be blocked by disagreement we call upon those govern-
ments which recognize the pressing need for European unity to seek other ways 
towards the integration of their policies in spheres outside the scope of the 
European Community and towards the setting  up of the necessary common insti-
tutions,  which should have supranational powers and a solid democratic struc-
ture,  based on direct elections._ The matters on which joint study and decision 
are needed include international affairs,  defence and arms procurement. We 
ask that a conference of Heads of Governments be convened for this purpose. 
Any agreements made should be open to subsequent accession  by 
other countries. 
g)  The final decisions rest with governments and parliaments. But the 
active support of the people they represent is indispensable. We,  therefore, 
appeal to all who share our aim,  and particularly to the rising generation,  to 
help  by word and deed, to hasten the construction of the United States of Europe. 
1 
(Europese Beweging,  Den Haag,  1Nieuw Europa 
1
,  November 1968; 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  11  November 1968; 
Neue  ZUrcher Zeitung,  11  November 1968; 
Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant,  9 November 1968). 
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At Europe's third international space conference which was held in 
Bad Godesberg from 12  to 14  November,  an attempt was made to go a stage 
further towards a single European international space organization. It was 
attended by Ministers from 12  European countries and from Australia. Canada 
and several other countries sent observers. 
The States concerned,  including Canada,  are members of one or 
more of the three European space organizations : 
ELDO  (European Launcher Development Organization); 
ESRO  (European Space Research Organization); 
CETS (European Conference on Telecommunications Satellites); 
In his opening address,  Mr.  Stoltenberg,  the Federal Minister  for 
Research,  stressed the need for drawing up a  European space programme 
provided,  however,  that the objectives set were limited and realistic.  The 
two most important questions on which decisions were needed and about which 
resolutions were adopted,  were : 
a)  Should Europe's three international space organizations which at present 
exist side by side (i.e. ESRO,  ELDO,  CETS) be merged into a single 
organization along the lines of the A me  ric  an NASA? 
b)  Should the European satellites and rockets programme be expanded and, 
if so,  in what direction? 
At the Bad Godesberg conference,  support was given to the idea of 
setting up a large-scale European space organization along the lines of NASA. 
Mr. Stoltenberg endorsed this view at the close of the conference. 
He  described the results of the three-day talks in which represen-
tatives of approximately 19 States had taken part as the first success in con-
centrating European space research. He had gone to the conference with  a 
Government mandate to achieve the amalgamation of the three European space 
organizations in a single one. 
The most important result of the conference remained the  basic 
decision to set up a new European organization for space projects,  communi-
cation satellites and carrier rockets.  Those attending the conference hoped 
(a)  that there would be better co-ordination between the existing  space 
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organizations,  (b)  that national disagreements within the organizations would 
be removed and (c) that the programme would be implemented more effective-
ly.  Concerning the agreement for this new organization which should super-
sede ESRO and ELDO and lead to a  'European NASA',  further detailed work 
would have to be done in the period up to 1 October 1969.  The final decision 
can perhaps be reached at the next space conference in Brussels early  in 1970. 
The Committee of experts should consider all the proposals which had already 
been put forward,  particularly those in the three reports by Messrs. Causse, 
Bannier and Spay.  This decision stemmed from a French proposal and was 
finalized by a small committee of Ministers. 
It was unanimously agreed at the conference to work out a joint 
position for the negotiations beginning in February 1969 for the final statute 
of the International Space Communications Satellites Consortium: 'INTELSA  T'. 
It was hoped that this would enable the Europeans to achieve a stronger posi-
tion vis-a-vis the United States.  The INTELSAT consortium which at present 
included 62  countries had ~o far been dominated by the US. 
Europe should not in future give up its own rocket capacity. On the 
eve of the European space conference,  the ELDO  Ministerial Council had 
agreed,  on the basis of a German motion for a resolution,  that the current 
ELDO programme (Europa I and Europa II)  should be brought to a successful 
conclusion by means of technical simplifications subject to an upper budget 
limit of $  626m.  The rocket development programme for the European satel-
lite programme should be prepared by means of studies and experimental 
work with a view to launching heavier space satellites. The ELDO Council was 
asked to prepare proposals for the new organization for running future launcher 
rocket programmes and for the new arrangements to be made with industry 
which should provide real competition as a result of setting up European in-
dustrial consortia to allow for the conclusion of agreed price contracts. Apart 
from the UK,  all the ELDO member States were ready to take part in a further 
programme provided the costs could be contained and that the end in view 
remained the European satellite.  The United Kingdom confirmed its decision 
not to co-operate in the ELDO programme after 1971. It did however state its 
readiness to give British rockets of the Blue Streak type to ELDO or to individ-
ual  member States.  Blue Streak is the first stage of the European rocket. 
In the resolution passed by the space conference on manufacturing 
and using European rockets,  it was however stated that between 1972 and 1976 
the European countries should launch two rockets a year. It was noted that 
up until 1976 two European rockets could be made available only.  As emerged 
from the papers of the space conference,  a programme for ESRO  satellitE;ls 
has a secure future until 1971.  From that period up till 1974 the necessary 
funds have not yet been secured.  Further analysis is necessary for decisions 
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mentioned was satellites for meteorology and for air and sea navigation. 
With regard to television satellites covered by the European Confer-
ence of Telecommunications Satellites (CETS) the Governments concerned 
were asked to state their conditions of participation by 1 February 1969.  A 
Governmental conference of those concerned  would be held in March or  Apri11969 
to take  a  decision on  the  basis of the economic and technical studies made. 
Mr.  Stoltenberg made it clear that most of the countries had spoken in favour 
of this plan. 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  1 and 13 November 1968; 
Neue ZUrcher Zeitung,  9 and 16  November 1968; 
Die Welt,  13  November 1968; 
Industriekurier,  14  and 15  November 1968; 
Handelsblatt,  18  November 1968) 
14.  J.  Robert Schaetzel :  'Challenge of technology is for all advanced 
nations' 
J. Robert Schaetzel,  the US  Ambassador to the European Commu-
nities writes in an article published by the News Bulletin of the United States 
Information Service (15  December) :  ' ... All ingredients of "The American 
challenge" are really responses to phenomena which are common to every 
advanced society.  The "counter-attack" prescribed for Europe by Servan-
Schreiber is,  of course,  the outline of a  European response to a challenge 
which America has been meeting in its own fashion,' but which in essence is 
not uniquely American. 
It is evident, however, that there would be political and economic 
consequences for the United States if Europe followed the course recommended 
by Mr. Servan-Schreiber,  some of these consequences would not be altogether 
pleasant.  Even now there are economic problems between the United States 
and the European Communities,  for example,  in agricultural trade and in non-
tariff barriers to trade. We  have no illusions that these economic problems 
would suddenly be solved if Europe were to unite in a  dynamic liberal frame-
work with common institutions. 
Nor do we expect that a  Europe with common political institutions 
would necessarily see the political problems of the world in the same light 
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that we  do.  Geography,  history,  and profound differences in military power 
and defence responsibilities will preclude that for as far into the future  as 
anyone can see ... 
. . .  In fact,  I can testify that the United States Government continues 
to hope that Europe will be capable of unifying in all conceivable fields, , , eco-
nomic,  political,  and military. 
The opinion of the American people,  reflected in the position  of 
both the democratic and the republican parties, has been favourable to European 
unity,  and it still is.  I see no reason to think that that will change.  The voices 
of those Europeans who call for the unity of the European nations will continue 
to be heard  and to be welcomed in America.  The United States rejects hegem-
ony for itself in Western Europe as much as it would reject the claims of any 
other single state to speak for Europe. 
Asserting my belief in the continuity of a policy which seems rooted 
in the deeply-held opinions of the American people is no guarantee that  that 
policy will not change.  There are,  fortunately,  other reasons (economic, polit-
ical and security reasons) to think that the American commitment to European 
unity will remain  the  keystone of our European policy • 
. . • I began by arguing that the challenge described by Mr.  Servan-
Schreiber was not really American,  that basically it was a challenge which 
every advanced nation,  including America,  had to face. 
There is another challenge,  to which America has a better claim, 
except that it was really European by origin and inspiration.  This is the chal-
lenge to Europe to throw off its allegiance to the patterns of the past and to 
find its future in a unity which alone can bring it greatness.' 
(News Bulletin of the United States Information Service,  No.  23 9, 
10 December 1968) 
15.  The Union of the Industries in the European Community (UNICE)  and 
research activities 
In December 1968  the UNICE  published a memorandum on scientific 
and technical research in the European Communities. 
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future of the nuclear sector,  for which the Community had had no real research 
and teaching programme since 1 January 1968. While it was recognized that the 
nations of Western Europe had to make a greater effort on research and devel-
opment if they were to compete successfully with other major States,  the Joint 
Centre  for  Nuclear  Research had been working below capacity for  several 
months.  In its resolution of 8 December 1967 the Council of Ministers demon-
strated that it was aware of this situation and envisaged that the work of the 
Joint Centre might also cover non-nuclear activities,  particularly in the fields 
referred to in the Council Decision of 31 October 1967. It also recognized that 
the administrative structure and the management of the Joint Centre had to be 
improved to secure greater efficiency. 
This same concern was  apparent  in  the  Council  decision  of 
28  November  1968. 
In view of its responsibilities,  the UNICE  appealed to  the  Com-
mission and to the Governments of the member  States  to  see to it that mea-
sures were taken to make the best possible use of the Community potential in 
forward-looking research and development programmes. 
To plan the long-term work of the Joint Centre effectively,  it had 
to be completely overhauled and there should be no hesitation about changing 
staff,  organization or objectives.  There were some major tasks to be carried 
out in nuclear research and development but these should be the subject of a 
selective programme. 
Similarly,  in the next programme to cover a period of years,  it 
should be possible to entrust non-nuclear activities to the Joint Centre. Apart 
from the nuclear and para-nuclear sectors,  one could,  indeed,  quote many 
fields in which major research into the future of technology had to be carried 
out. 
This was especially necessary because Western Europe was lagging 
behind the other economic powers in many sectors of decisive importance for 
its future; th1s gap could only be bridged by research and development projects 
that should  be both selective and on a large scale. 
It would also be worthwhile ascertaining whether the Joint Centre 
could not also become a  European documentation and information centre. 
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Generally speaking,  there should also be more effective  co-opera-
tion between the various public bodies in Europe engaged in advanced research 
in what were often related fields. 
It was also important for work to be organized in a different way in 
future.  The guidelines should be laid down by reference to the principles of 
organization and to the structures of industry. Only guidelines such as these 
would make it possible to carry through work geared to innovation,  particu-
larly in pure research and technological development,  and ensure its useful-
ness from the point of view of developing Community industry. 
UNICE  hoped that there would be a constant exchange of men and 
ideas between the Community institutions and the research bodies  on  the one 
hand and industry on the other. 
(Bulletin of the Federation of Belgian Industry,  No.  32,  20 December 1968; 
Le Soir,  29  and 30 December 1968) 
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